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We present a formal model of network protocols and their application
to modeling firewall policies. The formalization is based on the Unified
Policy Framework (UPF). The formalization was originally developed
with for generating test cases for testing the security configuration
actual firewall and router (middle-boxes) using HOL-TestGen. Our
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Because of its connected life, the modern world is increasingly depending on secure
implementations and configurations of network infrastructures. As building blocks of the
latter, firewalls are playing a central role in ensuring the overall security of networked
applications.
Firewalls, routers applying network-address-translation (NAT) and similar networking
systems suffer from the same quality problems as other complex software. Jennifer Rex-
ford mentioned in her keynote at POPL 2012 that high-end firewalls consist of more than
20 million lines of code comprising components written in Ada as well as LISP. However,
the testing techniques discussed here are of wider interest to all network infrastructure
operators that need to ensure the security and reliability of their infrastructures across
system changes such as system upgrades or hardware replacements. This is because fire-
walls and routers are active network elements that can filter and rewrite network traffic
based on configurable rules. The configuration by appropriate rule sets implements a
security policy or links networks together.
Thus, it is, firstly, important to test both the implementation of a firewall and, sec-
ondly, the correct configuration for each use. To address this problem, we model fire-
wall policies formally in Isabelle/HOL. This formalization is based on the Unified Policy
Framework (UPF) [6]. This formalization allows to express access control policies on the
network level using a combinator-based language that is close to textbook-style specifi-
cations of firewall rules. To actually test the implementation as well as the configuration
of a firewall, we use HOL-TestGen [1, 2, 5] to generate test cases that can be used to
validate the compliance of real network middleboxes (e.g., firewalls, routers). In this
document, we focus on the Isabelle formalization of network access control policies. For
details of the overall approach, we refer the reader elsewhere [7]
1.2 The Unified Policy Framework (UPF)
Our formalization of firewall policies is based on the Unified Policy Framework (UPF.
In this section, we briefly introduce UPF, for all details we refer the reader to) [6].
UPF is a generic framework for policy modeling with the primary goal of being used
for test case generation. The interested reader is referred to [4] for an application of
UPF to large scale access control policies in the health care domain; a comprehensive
treatment is also contained in the reference manual coming with the distribution on the
HOL-TestGen website (http://www.brucker.ch/projects/hol-testgen/). UPF is based on
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the following four principles:
1. policies are represented as functions (rather than relations),
2. policy combination avoids conflicts by construction,
3. the decision type is three-valued (allow, deny, undefined),
4. the output type does not only contain the decision but also a ‘slot’ for arbitrary
result data.
Formally, the concept of a policy is specified as a partial function from some input
to a decision value and additional some output. Partial functions are used because
elementary policies are described by partial system behavior, which are glued together
by operators such as function override and functional composition.
type synonym α 7→ β = α ⇀ β decision
where the enumeration type decision is
datatype α decision = allow α | deny α
As policies are partial functions or ‘maps’, the notions of a domain dom p ::α ⇀ β ⇒
α set and a range ran p :: [α ⇀ β]⇒ β set can be inherited from the Isabelle library.
Inspired by the Z notation [8], there is the concept of domain restriction / and
range restriction . , defined as:
definition / ::α set⇒ α 7→ β ⇒ α 7→ β
where S / p = λx. if x ∈ S then p x else⊥
definition . ::α 7→ β ⇒ β decision set⇒ α 7→ β




∈ S then p x else⊥
The operator ‘the’ strips off the Some, if it exists. Otherwise the range restriction is
underspecified.
There are many operators that change the result of applying the policy to a particular
element. The essential one is the update:
p(x 7→ t) = λy. if y = x thenbtc else p y
Next, there are three categories of elementary policies in UPF, relating to the three
possible decision values:
• The empty policy; undefined for all elements: ∅ = λx. ⊥
• A policy allowing everything, written as Af f , or AU if the additional output is
unit (defined as λx. ballow()c).
• A policy denying everything, written as Df f , or DU if the additional output is
unit.
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The most often used approach to define individual rules is to define a rule as a refine-




Finally, rules can be combined to policies in three different ways:
• Override operators: used for policies of the same type, written as ⊕i .
• Parallel combination operators: used for the parallel composition of policies of
potentially different type, written as ⊗i .
• Sequential combination operators: used for the sequential composition of policies
of potentially different type, written as ◦i .
All three combinators exist in four variants, depending on how the decisions of the
constituent policies are to be combined. For example, the ⊗2 operator is the parallel
combination operator where the decision of the second policy is used.
Several interesting algebraic properties are proved for UPF operators. For example,
distributivity
(P1 ⊕ P2)⊗ P3 = (P1 ⊗ P3)⊕ (P2 ⊗ P3)


























One can think of many different possible address representations. In this distribution,
we include seven different variants:
• DatatypeAddress: Three explicitly named addresses, which build up a network
consisting of three disjunct subnetworks. I.e. there are no overlaps and there is no
way to distinguish between individual hosts within a network.
• DatatypePort: An address is a pair, with the first element being the same as above,
and the second being a port number modelled as an Integer1.
1For technical reasons, we always use Integers instead of Naturals. As a consequence, the (test) speci-
fications have to be adjusted to eliminate negative numbers.
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• adr i: An address in an Integer.
• adr ip: An address is a pair of an Integer and a port (which is again an Integer).
• adr ipp: An address is a triple consisting of two Integers modelling the IP address
and the port number, and the specification of the network protocol
• IPv4: An address is a pair. The first element is a four-tuple of Integers, modelling
an IPv4 address, the second element is an Integer denoting the port number.
• IPv4 TCPUDP: The same as above, but including additionally the specification of
the network protocol.
The theories of each pf the networks are relatively small. It suffices to provide the
required types, a couple of lemmas, and - if required - a definition for the source and
destination ports of a packet.
end






In networks based e.g. on TCP/IP, a message from A to B is encapsulated in pack-
ets, which contain the content of the message and routing information. The routing
information mainly contains its source and its destination address.
In the case of stateless packet filters, a firewall bases its decision upon this routing
information and, in the stateful case, on the content. Thus, we model a packet as a
four-tuple of the mentioned elements, together with an id field.
The ID is an integer:
type-synonym id = int
To enable different representations of addresses (e.g. IPv4 and IPv6, with or with-
out ports), we model them as an unconstrained type class and directly provide several
instances:
class adr
type-synonym ′α src = ′α
type-synonym ′α dest = ′α
instance int ::adr ..
instance nat ::adr ..
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instance fun :: (adr ,adr) adr ..
instance prod :: (adr ,adr) adr ..
The content is also specified with an unconstrained generic type:
type-synonym ′β content = ′β
For applications where the concrete representation of the content field does not matter
(usually the case for stateless packet filters), we provide a default type which can be used
in those cases:
datatype DummyContent = data
Finally, a packet is:
type-synonym ( ′α, ′β) packet = id × ′α src × ′α dest × ′β content
Protocols (e.g. http) are not modelled explicitly. In the case of stateless packet filters,
they are only visible by the destination port of a packet, which are modelled as part of
the address. Additionally, stateful firewalls often determine the protocol by the content
of a packet.
definition src :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′α
where src = fst o snd
Port numbers (which are part of an address) are also modelled in a generic way. The
integers and the naturals are typical representations of port numbers.
class port
instance int ::port ..
instance nat :: port ..
instance fun :: (port ,port) port ..
instance prod :: (port ,port) port ..
A packet therefore has two parameters, the first being the address, the second the con-
tent. For the sake of simplicity, we do not allow to have a different address representation
format for the source and the destination of a packet.
To access the different parts of a packet directly, we define a couple of projectors:
definition id :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ id
where id = fst
definition dest :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′α dest
where dest = fst o snd o snd
definition content :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′β content
where content = snd o snd o snd
datatype protocol = tcp | udp
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lemma either : [[a 6= tcp;a 6= udp]] =⇒ False
by (case-tac a,simp-all)
lemma either2 [simp]: (a 6= tcp) = (a = udp)
by (case-tac a,simp-all)
lemma either3 [simp]: (a 6= udp) = (a = tcp)
by (case-tac a,simp-all)
The following two constants give the source and destination port number of a packet.
Address representations using port numbers need to provide a definition for these types.
consts src-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
consts dest-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
consts src-protocol :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ protocol
consts dest-protocol :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ protocol
A subnetwork (or simply a network) is a set of sets of addresses.
type-synonym ′α net = ′α set set
The relation in subnet (@) checks if an address is in a specific network.
definition
in-subnet :: ′α::adr ⇒ ′α net ⇒ bool (infixl @ 100 ) where
in-subnet a S = (∃ s ∈ S . a ∈ s)
The following lemmas will be useful later.
lemma in-subnet :
(a, e) @ {{(x1 ,y). P x1 y}} = P a e
by (simp add : in-subnet-def )
lemma src-in-subnet :
src(q ,(a,e),r ,t) @ {{(x1 ,y). P x1 y}} = P a e
by (simp add : in-subnet-def in-subnet src-def )
lemma dest-in-subnet :
dest (q ,r ,((a),e),t) @ {{(x1 ,y). P x1 y}} = P a e
by (simp add : in-subnet-def in-subnet dest-def )
Address models should provide a definition for the following constant, returning a
network consisting of the input address only.
consts subnet-of :: ′α::adr ⇒ ′α net









A theory describing a network consisting of three subnetworks. Hosts within a network
are not distinguished.
datatype DatatypeAddress = dmz-adr | intranet-adr | internet-adr
definition
dmz ::DatatypeAddress net where
dmz = {{dmz-adr}}
definition
intranet ::DatatypeAddress net where
intranet = {{intranet-adr}}
definition
internet ::DatatypeAddress net where
internet = {{internet-adr}}
end






A theory describing a network consisting of three subnetworks, including port numbers
modelled as Integers. Hosts within a network are not distinguished.




DatatypePort = (DatatypeAddress × port)
instance DatatypeAddress :: adr ..
definition
dmz ::DatatypePort net where
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dmz = {{(a,b). a = dmz-adr}}
definition
intranet ::DatatypePort net where
intranet = {{(a,b). a = intranet-adr}}
definition
internet ::DatatypePort net where
internet = {{(a,b). a = internet-adr}}
overloading src-port-datatype ≡ src-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
src-port-datatype (x ::(DatatypePort , ′β) packet) ≡ (snd o fst o snd) x
end
overloading dest-port-datatype ≡ dest-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
dest-port-datatype (x ::(DatatypePort , ′β) packet) ≡(snd o fst o snd o snd) x
end
overloading subnet-of-datatype ≡ subnet-of :: ′α::adr ⇒ ′α net
begin
definition
subnet-of-datatype (x ::DatatypePort) ≡ {{(a,b::int). a = fst x}}
end
lemma src-port : src-port ((a,x ,d ,e)::(DatatypePort , ′β) packet) = snd x
by (simp add : src-port-datatype-def in-subnet)
lemma dest-port : dest-port ((a,d ,x ,e)::(DatatypePort , ′β) packet) = snd x
by (simp add : dest-port-datatype-def in-subnet)










A theory where addresses are modelled as Integers.
type-synonym
adr i = int
end






A theory describing addresses which are modelled as a pair of Integers - the first being






adr ip = address × port
overloading src-port-int ≡ src-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
src-port-int (x ::(adr ip,
′β) packet) ≡ (snd o fst o snd) x
end
overloading dest-port-int ≡ dest-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
dest-port-int (x ::(adr ip,
′β) packet) ≡ (snd o fst o snd o snd) x
end
overloading subnet-of-int ≡ subnet-of :: ′α::adr ⇒ ′α net
begin
definition
subnet-of-int (x ::(adr ip)) ≡ {{(a,b::int). a = fst x}}
end
lemma src-port : src-port (a,x ::adr ip,d ,e) = snd x
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by (simp add : src-port-int-def in-subnet)
lemma dest-port : dest-port (a,d ,x ::adr ip,e) = snd x
by (simp add : dest-port-int-def in-subnet)
lemmas adr ipLemmas = src-port dest-port src-port-int-def dest-port-int-def
end






A theory describing addresses which are modelled as a pair of Integers - the first being






adr ipp = address × port × protocol
instance protocol :: adr ..
overloading src-port-int-TCPUDP ≡ src-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
src-port-int-TCPUDP (x ::(adr ipp,
′β) packet) ≡ (fst o snd o fst o snd) x
end
overloading dest-port-int-TCPUDP ≡ dest-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
dest-port-int-TCPUDP (x ::(adr ipp,
′β) packet) ≡ (fst o snd o fst o snd o snd) x
end




subnet-of-int-TCPUDP (x ::(adr ipp)) ≡ {{(a,b,c). a = fst x}}::adr ipp net
end
overloading src-protocol-int-TCPUDP ≡ src-protocol :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ protocol
begin
definition
src-protocol-int-TCPUDP (x ::(adr ipp,
′β) packet) ≡ (snd o snd o fst o snd) x
end




dest-protocol-int-TCPUDP (x ::(adr ipp,
′β) packet) ≡ (snd o snd o fst o snd o snd) x
end
lemma src-port : src-port (a,x ::adr ipp,d ,e) = fst (snd x )
by (simp add : src-port-int-TCPUDP-def in-subnet)
lemma dest-port : dest-port (a,d ,x ::adr ipp,e) = fst (snd x )
by (simp add : dest-port-int-TCPUDP-def in-subnet)
Common test constraints:
definition port-positive :: (adr ipp,
′b) packet ⇒ bool where
port-positive x = (dest-port x > (0 ::port))
definition fix-values :: (adr ipp,DummyContent) packet ⇒ bool where
fix-values x = (src-port x = (1 ::port) ∧ src-protocol x = udp ∧ content x = data ∧
id x = 1 )




lemmas adr ippTestConstraints = port-positive-def fix-values-def
end







A theory describing IPv4 addresses with ports. The host address is a four-tuple of
Integers, the port number is a single Integer.
type-synonym




ipv4 = (ipv4-ip × port)
overloading src-port-ipv4 ≡ src-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
src-port-ipv4 (x ::(ipv4 , ′β) packet) ≡ (snd o fst o snd) x
end
overloading dest-port-ipv4 ≡ dest-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
dest-port-ipv4 (x ::(ipv4 , ′β) packet) ≡ (snd o fst o snd o snd) x
end
overloading subnet-of-ipv4 ≡ subnet-of :: ′α::adr ⇒ ′α net
begin
definition
subnet-of-ipv4 (x ::ipv4 ) ≡ {{(a,b::int). a = fst x}}
end
definition subnet-of-ip :: ipv4-ip ⇒ ipv4 net
where subnet-of-ip ip = {{(a,b). (a = ip)}}
lemma src-port : src-port (a,(x ::ipv4 ),d ,e) = snd x
by (simp add : src-port-ipv4-def in-subnet)
lemma dest-port : dest-port (a,d ,(x ::ipv4 ),e) = snd x
by (simp add : dest-port-ipv4-def in-subnet)
18
lemmas IPv4Lemmas = src-port dest-port src-port-ipv4-def dest-port-ipv4-def
end






ipv4-TCPUDP = (ipv4-ip × port × protocol)
instance protocol :: adr ..
overloading src-port-ipv4-TCPUDP ≡ src-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
src-port-ipv4-TCPUDP (x ::(ipv4-TCPUDP , ′β) packet) ≡ (fst o snd o fst o snd) x
end
overloading dest-port-ipv4-TCPUDP ≡ dest-port :: ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ′γ::port
begin
definition
dest-port-ipv4-TCPUDP (x ::(ipv4-TCPUDP , ′β) packet) ≡ (fst o snd o fst o snd o
snd) x
end
overloading subnet-of-ipv4-TCPUDP ≡ subnet-of :: ′α::adr ⇒ ′α net
begin
definition
subnet-of-ipv4-TCPUDP (x ::ipv4-TCPUDP) ≡ {{(a,b). a = fst x}}::(ipv4-TCPUDP
net)
end








definition subnet-of-ip :: ipv4-ip ⇒ ipv4-TCPUDP net
where subnet-of-ip ip = {{(a,b). (a = ip)}}
lemma src-port : src-port (a,(x ::ipv4-TCPUDP),d ,e) = fst (snd x )
by (simp add : src-port-ipv4-TCPUDP-def in-subnet)
lemma dest-port : dest-port (a,d ,(x ::ipv4-TCPUDP),e) = fst (snd x )
by (simp add : dest-port-ipv4-TCPUDP-def in-subnet)




















A policy is seen as a partial mapping from packet to packet out.
type-synonym ( ′α, ′β) FWPolicy = ( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit
When combining several rules, the firewall is supposed to apply the first matching
one. In our setting this means the first rule which maps the packet in question to Some
(packet out). This is exactly what happens when using the map-add operator (rule1 ++
rule2 ). The only difference is that the rules must be given in reverse order.
The constant p-accept is True iff the policy accepts the packet.
definition
p-accept :: ( ′α, ′β) packet ⇒ ( ′α, ′β) FWPolicy ⇒ bool where
20








In order to ease the specification of a concrete policy, we define some combinators.
Using these combinators, the specification of a policy gets very easy, and can be done
similarly as in tools like IPTables.
definition
allow-all-from :: ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-all-from src-net = {pa. src pa @ src-net} / AU
definition
deny-all-from :: ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-all-from src-net = {pa. src pa @ src-net} /DU
definition
allow-all-to :: ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-all-to dest-net = {pa. dest pa @ dest-net} / AU
definition
deny-all-to :: ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-all-to dest-net = {pa. dest pa @ dest-net} /DU
definition
allow-all-from-to :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-all-from-to src-net dest-net =
{pa. src pa @ src-net ∧ dest pa @ dest-net} / AU
definition
deny-all-from-to :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-all-from-to src-net dest-net = {pa. src pa @ src-net ∧ dest pa @ dest-net} / DU
All these combinators and the default rules are put into one single lemma called
PolicyCombinators to facilitate proving over policies.











This theory defines policy combinators for those network models which have ports.
They are provided in addition to the the ones defined in the PolicyCombinators theory.
This theory requires from the network models a definition for the two following con-
stants:
• src port :: (′α,′ β)packet⇒ (′γ :: port)
• dest port :: (′α,′ β)packet⇒ (′γ :: port)
definition
allow-all-from-port :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ( ′γ::port) ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-all-from-port src-net s-port = {pa. src-port pa = s-port} / allow-all-from src-net
definition
deny-all-from-port :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-all-from-port src-net s-port = {pa. src-port pa = s-port} / deny-all-from src-net
definition
allow-all-to-port :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-all-to-port dest-net d-port = {pa. dest-port pa = d-port} / allow-all-to dest-net
definition
deny-all-to-port :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-all-to-port dest-net d-port = {pa. dest-port pa = d-port} / deny-all-to dest-net
definition
allow-all-from-port-to:: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit)
where
allow-all-from-port-to src-net s-port dest-net
= {pa. src-port pa = s-port} / allow-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
22
deny-all-from-port-to:: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit)
where
deny-all-from-port-to src-net s-port dest-net
= {pa. src-port pa = s-port} / deny-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
allow-all-from-port-to-port :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-all-from-port-to-port src-net s-port dest-net d-port =
{pa. dest-port pa = d-port} / allow-all-from-port-to src-net s-port dest-net
definition
deny-all-from-port-to-port :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-all-from-port-to-port src-net s-port dest-net d-port =
{pa. dest-port pa = d-port} / deny-all-from-port-to src-net s-port dest-net
definition
allow-all-from-to-port :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-all-from-to-port src-net dest-net d-port =
{pa. dest-port pa = d-port} / allow-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
deny-all-from-to-port :: ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-all-from-to-port src-net dest-net d-port =
{pa. dest-port pa = d-port} / deny-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
allow-from-port-to :: ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit)
where
allow-from-port-to port src-net dest-net =
{pa. src-port pa = port} / allow-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
deny-from-port-to :: ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit)
where
deny-from-port-to port src-net dest-net =
{pa. src-port pa = port} / deny-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
allow-from-to-port :: ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit)
where
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allow-from-to-port port src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-port pa = port} / allow-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
deny-from-to-port :: ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit)
where
deny-from-to-port port src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-port pa = port} / deny-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
allow-from-ports-to :: ′γ::port set ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-from-ports-to ports src-net dest-net =
{pa. src-port pa ∈ ports} / allow-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
allow-from-to-ports :: ′γ::port set ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-from-to-ports ports src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-port pa ∈ ports} / allow-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
deny-from-ports-to :: ′γ::port set ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-from-ports-to ports src-net dest-net =
{pa. src-port pa ∈ ports} / deny-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
deny-from-to-ports :: ′γ::port set ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-from-to-ports ports src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-port pa ∈ ports} / deny-all-from-to src-net dest-net
definition
allow-all-from-port-tos:: ′α::adr net ⇒ ( ′γ::port) set ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet
7→ unit)
where
allow-all-from-port-tos src-net s-port dest-net
= {pa. dest-port pa ∈ s-port} / allow-all-from-to src-net dest-net












lemmas PortCombinators = PortCombinatorsCore PolicyCombinators
end






This theory defines policy combinators for those network models which have ports.
They are provided in addition to the the ones defined in the PolicyCombinators theory.
This theory requires from the network models a definition for the two following con-
stants:
• src port :: (′α,′ β)packet⇒ (′γ :: port)
• dest port :: (′α,′ β)packet⇒ (′γ :: port)
definition
allow-all-from-port-prot :: protocol ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ( ′γ::port) ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→
unit) where
allow-all-from-port-prot p src-net s-port =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / allow-all-from-port src-net s-port
definition
deny-all-from-port-prot :: protocol => ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→
unit) where
deny-all-from-port-prot p src-net s-port =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / deny-all-from-port src-net s-port
definition
allow-all-to-port-prot :: protocol => ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit)
where
allow-all-to-port-prot p dest-net d-port =
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{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / allow-all-to-port dest-net d-port
definition
deny-all-to-port-prot :: protocol => ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit)
where
deny-all-to-port-prot p dest-net d-port =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / deny-all-to-port dest-net d-port
definition
allow-all-from-port-to-prot :: protocol => ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit)
where
allow-all-from-port-to-prot p src-net s-port dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / allow-all-from-port-to src-net s-port dest-net
definition
deny-all-from-port-to-prot ::protocol ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β)
packet 7→ unit)
where
deny-all-from-port-to-prot p src-net s-port dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / deny-all-from-port-to src-net s-port dest-net
definition
allow-all-from-port-to-port-prot ::protocol ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
′γ::port ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-all-from-port-to-port-prot p src-net s-port dest-net d-port =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / allow-all-from-port-to-port src-net s-port dest-net
d-port
definition
deny-all-from-port-to-port-prot :: protocol => ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-all-from-port-to-port-prot p src-net s-port dest-net d-port =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / deny-all-from-port-to-port src-net s-port dest-net
d-port
definition
allow-all-from-to-port-prot :: protocol => ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
′γ::port ⇒ (( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-all-from-to-port-prot p src-net dest-net d-port =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / allow-all-from-to-port src-net dest-net d-port
definition
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deny-all-from-to-port-prot :: protocol => ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′γ::port ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-all-from-to-port-prot p src-net dest-net d-port =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / deny-all-from-to-port src-net dest-net d-port
definition
allow-from-port-to-prot :: protocol => ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β)
packet 7→ unit)
where
allow-from-port-to-prot p port src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / allow-from-port-to port src-net dest-net
definition
deny-from-port-to-prot :: protocol => ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β)
packet 7→ unit)
where
deny-from-port-to-prot p port src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / deny-from-port-to port src-net dest-net
definition
allow-from-to-port-prot :: protocol => ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β)
packet 7→ unit)
where
allow-from-to-port-prot p port src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / allow-from-to-port port src-net dest-net
definition
deny-from-to-port-prot :: protocol => ′γ::port ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ (( ′α, ′β)
packet 7→ unit)
where
deny-from-to-port-prot p port src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / deny-from-to-port port src-net dest-net
definition
allow-from-ports-to-prot :: protocol => ′γ::port set ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-from-ports-to-prot p ports src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / allow-from-ports-to ports src-net dest-net
definition
allow-from-to-ports-prot :: protocol => ′γ::port set ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
allow-from-to-ports-prot p ports src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / allow-from-to-ports ports src-net dest-net
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definition
deny-from-ports-to-prot :: protocol => ′γ::port set ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-from-ports-to-prot p ports src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / deny-from-ports-to ports src-net dest-net
definition
deny-from-to-ports-prot :: protocol => ′γ::port set ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒ ′α::adr net ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) packet 7→ unit) where
deny-from-to-ports-prot p ports src-net dest-net =
{pa. dest-protocol pa = p} / deny-from-to-ports ports src-net dest-net


















This theory can be used if we want to specify the port numbers by names denoting
their default Integer values. If you want to use them, please add Ports to the simplifier.
definition http::int where http = 80
lemma http1 : x 6= 80 =⇒ x 6= http
by (simp add : http-def )
lemma http2 : x 6= 80 =⇒ http 6= x
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by (simp add : http-def )
definition smtp::int where smtp = 25
lemma smtp1 : x 6= 25 =⇒ x 6= smtp
by (simp add : smtp-def )
lemma smtp2 : x 6= 25 =⇒ smtp 6= x
by (simp add : smtp-def )
definition ftp::int where ftp = 21
lemma ftp1 : x 6= 21 =⇒ x 6= ftp
by (simp add : ftp-def )
lemma ftp2 : x 6= 21 =⇒ ftp 6= x
by (simp add : ftp-def )
And so on for all desired port numbers.
lemmas Ports = http1 http2 ftp1 ftp2 smtp1 smtp2
end






definition src2pool :: ′α set ⇒ ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet ⇒ ( ′α, ′β) packet set where
src2pool t = (λ p. ({(i ,s,d ,da). (i = id p ∧ s ∈ t ∧ d = dest p ∧ da = content p)}))
definition src2poolAP where
src2poolAP t = Af (src2pool t)
definition srcNat2pool :: ′α set ⇒ ′α set ⇒ ( ′α::adr , ′β) packet 7→ ( ′α, ′β) packet set
where
srcNat2pool srcs transl = {x . src x ∈ srcs} / (src2poolAP transl)
definition src2poolPort :: int set ⇒ (adr ip, ′β) packet ⇒ (adr ip, ′β) packet set where
src2poolPort t = (λ p. ({(i ,(s1 ,s2 ),(d1 ,d2 ),da).
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(i = id p ∧ s1 ∈ t ∧ s2 = (snd (src p)) ∧ d1 = (fst (dest p)) ∧
d2 = snd (dest p) ∧ da = content p)}))
definition src2poolPort-Protocol :: int set ⇒ (adr ipp, ′β) packet ⇒ (adr ipp, ′β) packet
set where
src2poolPort-Protocol t = (λ p. ({(i ,(s1 ,s2 ,s3 ),(d1 ,d2 ,d3 ), da).
(i = id p ∧ s1 ∈ t ∧ s2 = (fst (snd (src p))) ∧ s3 = snd (snd (src p)) ∧
(d1 ,d2 ,d3 ) = dest p ∧ da = content p)}))
definition srcNat2pool-IntPort :: address set ⇒ address set ⇒
(adr ip,
′β) packet 7→ (adr ip, ′β) packet set where
srcNat2pool-IntPort srcs transl =
{x . fst (src x ) ∈ srcs} / (Af (src2poolPort transl))
definition srcNat2pool-IntProtocolPort :: int set ⇒ int set ⇒
(adr ipp,
′β) packet 7→ (adr ipp, ′β) packet set where
srcNat2pool-IntProtocolPort srcs transl =
{x . (fst ( (src x ))) ∈ srcs} / (Af (src2poolPort-Protocol transl))
definition srcPat2poolPort-t :: int set ⇒ (adr ip, ′β) packet ⇒ (adr ip, ′β) packet set
where
srcPat2poolPort-t t = (λ p. ({(i ,(s1 ,s2 ),(d1 ,d2 ),da).
(i = id p ∧ s1 ∈ t ∧ d1 = (fst (dest p)) ∧ d2 = snd (dest p)∧ da = content
p)}))
definition srcPat2poolPort-Protocol-t :: int set ⇒ (adr ipp, ′β) packet ⇒ (adr ipp, ′β)
packet set where
srcPat2poolPort-Protocol-t t = (λ p. ({(i ,(s1 ,s2 ,s3 ),(d1 ,d2 ,d3 ),da).
(i = id p ∧ s1 ∈ t ∧ s3 = src-protocol p ∧ (d1 ,d2 ,d3 ) = dest p ∧ da = content p)}))
definition srcPat2pool-IntPort :: int set ⇒ int set ⇒ (adr ip, ′β) packet 7→
(adr ip,
′β) packet set where
srcPat2pool-IntPort srcs transl =
{x . (fst (src x )) ∈ srcs} / (Af (srcPat2poolPort-t transl))
definition srcPat2pool-IntProtocol ::
int set ⇒ int set ⇒ (adr ipp, ′β) packet 7→ (adr ipp, ′β) packet set where
srcPat2pool-IntProtocol srcs transl =
{x . (fst (src x )) ∈ srcs} / (Af (srcPat2poolPort-Protocol-t transl))
The following lemmas are used for achieving a normalized output format of packages
after applying NAT. This is used, e.g., by our firewall execution tool.
lemma datasimp: {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
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∀ a aa b ba. aba = ((a, aa, b), ba) −→ i = i1 ∧ s1 = i101 ∧
s3 = iudp ∧ a = i110 ∧ aa = X606X3 ∧ b = X607X4 ∧ ba
= data}
= {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
i = i1 ∧ s1 = i101 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ (λ ((a,aa,b),ba). a = i110 ∧ aa =
X606X3 ∧
b = X607X4 ∧ ba = data) aba}
by auto
lemma datasimp2 : {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
∀ a aa b ba. aba = ((a, aa, b), ba) −→ i = i1 ∧ s1 = i132 ∧ s3 = iudp
∧
s2 = i1 ∧ a = i110 ∧ aa = i4 ∧ b = iudp ∧ ba = data}
= {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
i = i1 ∧ s1 = i132 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ s2 = i1 ∧ (λ ((a,aa,b),ba). a =
i110 ∧
aa = i4 ∧ b = iudp ∧ ba = data) aba}
by auto
lemma datasimp3 : {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
∀ a aa b ba. aba = ((a, aa, b), ba) −→ i = i1 ∧ i115 < s1 ∧ s1 <
i124 ∧
s3 = iudp ∧ s2 = ii1 ∧ a = i110 ∧ aa = i3 ∧ b = itcp ∧ ba =
data}
= {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
i = i1 ∧ i115 < s1 ∧ s1 < i124 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ s2 = ii1 ∧
(λ ((a,aa,b),ba). a = i110 & aa = i3 & b = itcp & ba = data) aba}
by auto
lemma datasimp4 : {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
∀ a aa b ba. aba = ((a, aa, b), ba) −→ i = i1 ∧ s1 = i132 ∧ s3 = iudp
∧
s2 = ii1 ∧ a = i110 ∧ aa = i7 ∧ b = itcp ∧ ba = data}
= {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
i = i1 ∧ s1 = i132 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ s2 = ii1 ∧
(λ ((a,aa,b),ba). a = i110 ∧ aa = i7 ∧ b = itcp ∧ ba = data) aba}
by auto
lemma datasimp5 : {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
i = i1 ∧ s1 = i101 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ (λ ((a,aa,b),ba). a = i110 ∧ aa =
X606X3 ∧
b = X607X4 ∧ ba = data) aba}
= {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), (a,aa,b),ba).
i = i1 ∧ s1 = i101 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ a = i110 ∧ aa = X606X3 ∧
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b = X607X4 ∧ ba = data}
by auto
lemma datasimp6 : {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
i = i1 ∧ s1 = i132 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ s2 = i1 ∧
(λ ((a,aa,b),ba). a = i110 ∧ aa = i4 ∧ b = iudp ∧ ba = data) aba}
= {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), (a,aa,b),ba).
i = i1 ∧ s1 = i132 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ s2 = i1 ∧ a = i110 ∧
aa = i4 ∧ b = iudp ∧ ba = data}
by auto
lemma datasimp7 : {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba).
i = i1 ∧ i115 < s1 ∧ s1 < i124 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ s2 = ii1 ∧
(λ ((a,aa,b),ba). a = i110 ∧ aa = i3 ∧ b = itcp ∧ ba = data) aba}
= {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), (a,aa,b),ba).
i = i1 ∧ i115 < s1 ∧ s1 < i124 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ s2 = ii1
∧ a = i110 ∧ aa = i3 ∧ b = itcp ∧ ba = data}
by auto
lemma datasimp8 : {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), aba). i = i1 ∧ s1 = i132 ∧ s3 = iudp ∧ s2 =
ii1 ∧
(λ ((a,aa,b),ba). a = i110 ∧ aa = i7 ∧ b = itcp ∧ ba = data) aba}
= {(i , (s1 , s2 , s3 ), (a,aa,b),ba). i = i1 ∧ s1 = i132 ∧ s3 = iudp
∧ s2 = ii1 ∧ a = i110 ∧ aa = i7 ∧ b = itcp ∧ ba = data}
by auto
lemmas datasimps = datasimp datasimp2 datasimp3 datasimp4
datasimp5 datasimp6 datasimp7 datasimp8





















This theory contains all the definitions used for policy normalisation as described
in [3, 7].
The normalisation procedure transforms policies into semantically equivalent ones
which are “easier” to test. It is organized into nine phases. We impose the following two
restrictions on the input policies:
• Each policy must contain a DenyAll rule. If this restriction were to be lifted, the
insertDenies phase would have to be adjusted accordingly.
• For each pair of networks n1 and n2, the networks are either disjoint or equal.
If this restriction were to be lifted, we would need some additional phases before
the start of the normalisation procedure presented below. This rule would split
single rules into several by splitting up the networks such that they are all pairwise
disjoint or equal. Such a transformation is clearly semantics-preserving and the
condition would hold after these phases.
As a result, the procedure generates a list of policies, in which:
• each element of the list contains a policy which completely specifies the blocking
behavior between two networks, and
• there are no shadowed rules.
This result is desirable since the test case generation for rules between networks A and B
is independent of the rules that specify the behavior for traffic flowing between networks
C and D. Thus, the different segments of the policy can be processed individually. The
normalization procedure does not aim to minimize the number of rules. While it does
remove unnecessary ones, it also adds new ones, enabling a policy to be split into several
independent parts.
Policy transformations are functions that map policies to policies. We decided to rep-
resent policy transformations as syntactic rules; this choice paves the way for expressing




We define a very simple policy language:
datatype ( ′α, ′β) Combinators =
DenyAll
| DenyAllFromTo ′α ′α
| AllowPortFromTo ′α ′α ′β
| Conc (( ′α, ′β) Combinators) (( ′α, ′β) Combinators) (infixr ⊕ 80 )
And define the semantic interpretation of it. For technical reasons, we fix here the
type to policies over IntegerPort addresses. However, we could easily provide definitions
for other address types as well, using a generic constants for the type definition and a
primitive recursive definition for each desired address model.
Auxiliary definitions and functions.
This section defines several functions which are useful later for the combinators, invari-
ants, and proofs.
fun srcNet where
srcNet (DenyAllFromTo x y) = x
|srcNet (AllowPortFromTo x y p) = x
|srcNet DenyAll = undefined
|srcNet (v ⊕ va) = undefined
fun destNet where
destNet (DenyAllFromTo x y) = y
|destNet (AllowPortFromTo x y p) = y
|destNet DenyAll = undefined
|destNet (v ⊕ va) = undefined
fun srcnets where
srcnets DenyAll = []
|srcnets (DenyAllFromTo x y) = [x ]
|srcnets (AllowPortFromTo x y p) = [x ]
|(srcnets (x ⊕ y)) = (srcnets x )@(srcnets y)
fun destnets where
destnets DenyAll = []
|destnets (DenyAllFromTo x y) = [y ]
|destnets (AllowPortFromTo x y p) = [y ]
|(destnets (x ⊕ y)) = (destnets x )@(destnets y)
fun (sequential) net-list-aux where
net-list-aux [] = []
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|net-list-aux (DenyAll#xs) = net-list-aux xs
|net-list-aux ((DenyAllFromTo x y)#xs) = x#y#(net-list-aux xs)
|net-list-aux ((AllowPortFromTo x y p)#xs) = x#y#(net-list-aux xs)
|net-list-aux ((x⊕y)#xs) = (net-list-aux [x ])@(net-list-aux [y ])@(net-list-aux xs)
fun net-list where net-list p = remdups (net-list-aux p)
definition bothNets where bothNets x = (zip (srcnets x ) (destnets x ))
fun (sequential) normBothNets where
normBothNets ((a,b)#xs) = (if ((b,a) ∈ set xs) ∨ (a,b) ∈ set (xs)
then (normBothNets xs)
else (a,b)#(normBothNets xs))
|normBothNets x = x
fun makeSets where
makeSets ((a,b)#xs) = ({a,b}#(makeSets xs))
|makeSets [] = []
fun bothNet where
bothNet DenyAll = {}
|bothNet (DenyAllFromTo a b) = {a,b}
|bothNet (AllowPortFromTo a b p) = {a,b}
|bothNet (v ⊕ va) = undefined
Nets List provides from a list of rules a list where the entries are the appearing sets
of source and destination network of each rule.
definition Nets-List
where
Nets-List x = makeSets (normBothNets (bothNets x ))
fun (sequential) first-srcNet where
first-srcNet (x⊕y) = first-srcNet x
| first-srcNet x = srcNet x
fun (sequential) first-destNet where
first-destNet (x⊕y) = first-destNet x
| first-destNet x = destNet x
fun (sequential) first-bothNet where
first-bothNet (x⊕y) = first-bothNet x
|first-bothNet x = bothNet x
fun (sequential) in-list where
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in-list DenyAll l = True
|in-list x l = (bothNet x ∈ set l)
fun all-in-list where
all-in-list [] l = True
|all-in-list (x#xs) l = (in-list x l ∧ all-in-list xs l)
fun (sequential) member where
member a (x⊕xs) = ((member a x ) ∨ (member a xs))
|member a x = (a = x )
fun sdnets where
sdnets DenyAll = {}
| sdnets (DenyAllFromTo a b) = {(a,b)}
| sdnets (AllowPortFromTo a b c) = {(a,b)}
| sdnets (a ⊕ b) = sdnets a ∪ sdnets b
definition packet-Nets where packet-Nets x a b = ((src x @ a ∧ dest x @ b) ∨
(src x @ b ∧ dest x @ a))
definition subnetsOfAdr where subnetsOfAdr a = {x . a @ x}
definition fst-set where fst-set s = {a. ∃ b. (a,b) ∈ s}
definition snd-set where snd-set s = {a. ∃ b. (b,a) ∈ s}
fun memberP where
memberP r (x#xs) = (member r x ∨ memberP r xs)
|memberP r [] = False
fun firstList where
firstList (x#xs) = (first-bothNet x )
|firstList [] = {}
Invariants
If there is a DenyAll, it is at the first position
fun wellformed-policy1 :: (( ′α, ′β) Combinators) list ⇒ bool where
wellformed-policy1 [] = True
| wellformed-policy1 (x#xs) = (DenyAll /∈ (set xs))
There is a DenyAll at the first position
fun wellformed-policy1-strong :: (( ′α, ′β) Combinators) list ⇒ bool
where
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wellformed-policy1-strong [] = False
| wellformed-policy1-strong (x#xs) = (x=DenyAll ∧ (DenyAll /∈ (set xs)))
All two networks are either disjoint or equal.
definition netsDistinct where netsDistinct a b = (¬ (∃ x . x @ a ∧ x @ b))
definition twoNetsDistinct where
twoNetsDistinct a b c d = (netsDistinct a c ∨ netsDistinct b d)
definition allNetsDistinct where
allNetsDistinct p = (∀ a b. (a 6= b ∧ a ∈ set (net-list p) ∧
b ∈ set (net-list p)) −→ netsDistinct a b)
definition disjSD-2 where
disjSD-2 x y = (∀ a b c d . ((a,b)∈sdnets x ∧ (c,d) ∈sdnets y −→
(twoNetsDistinct a b c d ∧ twoNetsDistinct a b d c)))
The policy is given as a list of single rules.
fun singleCombinators where
singleCombinators [] = True
|singleCombinators ((x⊕y)#xs) = False
|singleCombinators (x#xs) = singleCombinators xs
definition onlyTwoNets where
onlyTwoNets x = ((∃ a b. (sdnets x = {(a,b)})) ∨ (∃ a b. sdnets x = {(a,b),(b,a)}))
Each entry of the list contains rules between two networks only.
fun OnlyTwoNets where
OnlyTwoNets (DenyAll#xs) = OnlyTwoNets xs
|OnlyTwoNets (x#xs) = (onlyTwoNets x ∧ OnlyTwoNets xs)
|OnlyTwoNets [] = True
fun noDenyAll where
noDenyAll (x#xs) = ((¬ member DenyAll x ) ∧ noDenyAll xs)
|noDenyAll [] = True
fun noDenyAll1 where
noDenyAll1 (DenyAll#xs) = noDenyAll xs
| noDenyAll1 xs = noDenyAll xs
fun separated where
separated (x#xs) = ((∀ s. s ∈ set xs −→ disjSD-2 x s) ∧ separated xs)
| separated [] = True
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fun NetsCollected where
NetsCollected (x#xs) = (((first-bothNet x 6= firstList xs) −→
(∀ a∈set xs. first-bothNet x 6= first-bothNet a)) ∧ NetsCollected (xs))
| NetsCollected [] = True
fun NetsCollected2 where
NetsCollected2 (x#xs) = (xs = [] ∨ (first-bothNet x 6= firstList xs ∧
NetsCollected2 xs))
|NetsCollected2 [] = True
Transformations
The following two functions transform a policy into a list of single rules and vice-versa
(by staying on the combinator level).
fun policy2list ::( ′α, ′β) Combinators ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) Combinators) list where
policy2list (x ⊕ y) = (concat [(policy2list x ),(policy2list y)])
|policy2list x = [x ]
fun list2FWpolicy ::(( ′α, ′β) Combinators) list ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) Combinators) where
list2FWpolicy [] = undefined
|list2FWpolicy (x#[]) = x
|list2FWpolicy (x#y) = x ⊕ (list2FWpolicy y)
Remove all the rules appearing before a DenyAll. There are two alternative versions.
fun removeShadowRules1 where
removeShadowRules1 (x#xs) = (if (DenyAll ∈ set xs)
then ((removeShadowRules1 xs))
else x#xs)
| removeShadowRules1 [] = []
fun removeShadowRules1-alternative-rev where
removeShadowRules1-alternative-rev [] = []
| removeShadowRules1-alternative-rev (DenyAll#xs) = [DenyAll ]





rev (removeShadowRules1-alternative-rev (rev p))
Remove all the rules which allow a port, but are shadowed by a deny between these
subnets.
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fun removeShadowRules2 :: (( ′α, ′β) Combinators) list ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) Combinators) list
where
(removeShadowRules2 ((AllowPortFromTo x y p)#z )) =
(if (((DenyAllFromTo x y) ∈ set z ))
then ((removeShadowRules2 z ))
else (((AllowPortFromTo x y p)#(removeShadowRules2 z ))))
| removeShadowRules2 (x#y) = x#(removeShadowRules2 y)
| removeShadowRules2 [] = []
Sorting a policies: We first need to define an ordering on rules. This ordering depends
on the Nets List of a policy.
fun smaller :: ( ′α, ′β) Combinators ⇒
( ′α, ′β) Combinators ⇒
(( ′α) set) list ⇒ bool
where
smaller DenyAll x l = True
| smaller x DenyAll l = False
| smaller x y l =
((x = y) ∨ (if (bothNet x ) = (bothNet y) then
(case y of (DenyAllFromTo a b) ⇒ (x = DenyAllFromTo b a)
| - ⇒ True)
else
(position (bothNet x ) l <= position (bothNet y) l)))
We provide two different sorting algorithms: Quick Sort (qsort) and Insertion Sort
(sort)
fun qsort where
qsort [] l = []
| qsort (x#xs) l = (qsort [y←xs. ¬ (smaller x y l)] l) @ [x ] @ (qsort [y←xs. smaller x
y l ] l)
lemma qsort-permutes:
set (qsort xs l) = set xs
apply (induct xs l rule: qsort .induct)
by (auto)
lemma set-qsort [simp]: set (qsort xs l) = set xs
by (simp add : qsort-permutes)
fun insort where
insort a [] l = [a]
| insort a (x#xs) l = (if (smaller a x l) then a#x#xs else x#(insort a xs l))
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fun sort where
sort [] l = []
| sort (x#xs) l = insort x (sort xs l) l
fun sorted where
sorted [] l = True
| sorted [x ] l = True
| sorted (x#y#zs) l = (smaller x y l ∧ sorted (y#zs) l)
fun separate where
separate (DenyAll#x ) = DenyAll#(separate x )
| separate (x#y#z ) = (if (first-bothNet x = first-bothNet y)
then (separate ((x⊕y)#z ))
else (x#(separate(y#z ))))
|separate x = x
Insert the DenyAllFromTo rules, such that traffic between two networks can be tested
individually.
fun insertDenies where
insertDenies (x#xs) = (case x of DenyAll ⇒ (DenyAll#(insertDenies xs))
| - ⇒ (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet x ) (first-destNet x ) ⊕
(DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet x ) (first-srcNet x )) ⊕ x )#
(insertDenies xs))
| insertDenies [] = []
Remove duplicate rules. This is especially necessary as insertDenies might have in-
serted duplicate rules. The second function is supposed to work on a list of policies.
Only rules which are duplicated within the same policy are removed.
fun removeDuplicates where
removeDuplicates (x⊕xs) = (if member x xs then (removeDuplicates xs)
else x⊕(removeDuplicates xs))
| removeDuplicates x = x
fun removeAllDuplicates where
removeAllDuplicates (x#xs) = ((removeDuplicates (x ))#(removeAllDuplicates xs))
|removeAllDuplicates x = x
Insert a DenyAll at the beginning of a policy.
fun insertDeny where
insertDeny (DenyAll#xs) = DenyAll#xs
|insertDeny xs = DenyAll#xs
definition sort ′ p l = sort l p
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definition qsort ′ p l = qsort l p
declare dom-eq-empty-conv [simp del ]
fun list2policyR::(( ′α, ′β) Combinators) list ⇒
(( ′α, ′β) Combinators) where
list2policyR (x#[]) = x
|list2policyR (x#y) = (list2policyR y) ⊕ x
|list2policyR [] = undefined
We provide the definitions for two address representations.
IntPort
fun C :: (adr ip net , port) Combinators ⇒ (adr ip,DummyContent) packet 7→ unit
where
C DenyAll = deny-all
|C (DenyAllFromTo x y) = deny-all-from-to x y
|C (AllowPortFromTo x y p) = allow-from-to-port p x y
|C (x ⊕ y) = C x ++ C y
fun CRotate :: (adr ip net , port) Combinators ⇒ (adr ip,DummyContent) packet 7→ unit
where
CRotate DenyAll = C DenyAll
|CRotate (DenyAllFromTo x y) = C (DenyAllFromTo x y)
|CRotate (AllowPortFromTo x y p) = C (AllowPortFromTo x y p)
|CRotate (x ⊕ y) = ((CRotate y) ++ ((CRotate x )))
fun rotatePolicy where
rotatePolicy DenyAll = DenyAll
| rotatePolicy (DenyAllFromTo a b) = DenyAllFromTo a b
| rotatePolicy (AllowPortFromTo a b p) = AllowPortFromTo a b p
| rotatePolicy (a⊕b) = (rotatePolicy b) ⊕ (rotatePolicy a)
lemma check : rev (policy2list (rotatePolicy p)) = policy2list p
apply (induct p)
by (simp-all)
All rules appearing at the left of a DenyAllFromTo, have disjunct domains from it
(except DenyAll).
fun (sequential) wellformed-policy2 where
wellformed-policy2 [] = True
| wellformed-policy2 (DenyAll#xs) = wellformed-policy2 xs
| wellformed-policy2 (x#xs) = ((∀ c a b. c = DenyAllFromTo a b ∧ c ∈ set xs −→
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Map.dom (C x ) ∩ Map.dom (C c) = {}) ∧ wellformed-policy2 xs)
An allow rule is disjunct with all rules appearing at the right of it. This invariant is
not necessary as it is a consequence from others, but facilitates some proofs.
fun (sequential) wellformed-policy3 ::((adr ip net ,port) Combinators) list ⇒ bool where
wellformed-policy3 [] = True
| wellformed-policy3 ((AllowPortFromTo a b p)#xs) = ((∀ r . r ∈ set xs −→
dom (C r) ∩ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) = {}) ∧ wellformed-policy3 xs)
| wellformed-policy3 (x#xs) = wellformed-policy3 xs
definition
normalize ′ p = (removeAllDuplicates o insertDenies o separate o
(sort ′ (Nets-List p)) o removeShadowRules2 o remdups o
(rm-MT-rules C ) o insertDeny o removeShadowRules1 o
policy2list) p
definition
normalizeQ ′ p = (removeAllDuplicates o insertDenies o separate o
(qsort ′ (Nets-List p)) o removeShadowRules2 o remdups o
(rm-MT-rules C ) o insertDeny o removeShadowRules1 o
policy2list) p
definition normalize ::
(adr ip net , port) Combinators ⇒
(adr ip net , port) Combinators list
where
normalize p = (removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate (sort
(removeShadowRules2 (remdups ((rm-MT-rules C ) (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) ((Nets-List p))))))
definition
normalize-manual-order p l = removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate
(sort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups ((rm-MT-rules C ) (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) ((l)))))
definition normalizeQ ::
(adr ip net , port) Combinators ⇒
(adr ip net , port) Combinators list
where
normalizeQ p = (removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate (qsort
(removeShadowRules2 (remdups ((rm-MT-rules C ) (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) ((Nets-List p))))))
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definition
normalize-manual-orderQ p l = removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate
(qsort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups ((rm-MT-rules C ) (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) ((l)))))
Of course, normalize is equal to normalize’, the latter looks nicer though.
lemma normalize = normalize ′
by (rule ext , simp add : normalize-def normalize ′-def sort ′-def )
declare C .simps [simp del ]
TCP UDP IntegerPort
fun Cp :: (adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators ⇒
(adr ipp,DummyContent) packet 7→ unit
where
Cp DenyAll = deny-all
|Cp (DenyAllFromTo x y) = deny-all-from-to x y
|Cp (AllowPortFromTo x y p) = allow-from-to-port-prot (fst p) (snd p) x y
|Cp (x ⊕ y) = Cp x ++ Cp y
fun Dp :: (adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators ⇒
(adr ipp,DummyContent) packet 7→ unit
where
Dp DenyAll = Cp DenyAll
|Dp (DenyAllFromTo x y) = Cp (DenyAllFromTo x y)
|Dp (AllowPortFromTo x y p) = Cp (AllowPortFromTo x y p)
|Dp (x ⊕ y) = Cp (y ⊕ x )
All rules appearing at the left of a DenyAllFromTo, have disjunct domains from it
(except DenyAll).
fun (sequential) wellformed-policy2Pr where
wellformed-policy2Pr [] = True
| wellformed-policy2Pr (DenyAll#xs) = wellformed-policy2Pr xs
| wellformed-policy2Pr (x#xs) = ((∀ c a b. c = DenyAllFromTo a b ∧ c ∈ set xs −→
Map.dom (Cp x ) ∩ Map.dom (Cp c) = {}) ∧ wellformed-policy2Pr xs)
An allow rule is disjunct with all rules appearing at the right of it. This invariant is
not necessary as it is a consequence from others, but facilitates some proofs.
fun (sequential) wellformed-policy3Pr ::((adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators) list
⇒ bool where
wellformed-policy3Pr [] = True
| wellformed-policy3Pr ((AllowPortFromTo a b p)#xs) = ((∀ r . r ∈ set xs −→
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dom (Cp r) ∩ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) = {}) ∧ wellformed-policy3Pr
xs)
| wellformed-policy3Pr (x#xs) = wellformed-policy3Pr xs
definition
normalizePr ′ :: (adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators
⇒ (adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators list where
normalizePr ′ p = (removeAllDuplicates o insertDenies o separate o
(sort ′ (Nets-List p)) o removeShadowRules2 o remdups o
(rm-MT-rules Cp) o insertDeny o removeShadowRules1 o
policy2list) p
definition normalizePr ::
(adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators
⇒ (adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators list where
normalizePr p = (removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate (sort
(removeShadowRules2 (remdups ((rm-MT-rules Cp) (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) ((Nets-List p))))))
definition
normalize-manual-orderPr p l = removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate
(sort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups ((rm-MT-rules Cp) (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) ((l)))))
definition
normalizePrQ ′ :: (adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators
⇒ (adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators list where
normalizePrQ ′ p = (removeAllDuplicates o insertDenies o separate o
(qsort ′ (Nets-List p)) o removeShadowRules2 o remdups o
(rm-MT-rules Cp) o insertDeny o removeShadowRules1 o
policy2list) p
definition normalizePrQ ::
(adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators
⇒ (adr ipp net , protocol × port) Combinators list where
normalizePrQ p = (removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate (qsort
(removeShadowRules2 (remdups ((rm-MT-rules Cp) (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) ((Nets-List p))))))
definition
normalize-manual-orderPrQ p l = removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate
(qsort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups ((rm-MT-rules Cp) (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) ((l)))))
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Of course, normalize is equal to normalize’, the latter looks nicer though.
lemma normalizePr = normalizePr ′
by (rule ext , simp add : normalizePr-def normalizePr ′-def sort ′-def )
The following definition helps in creating the test specification for the individual parts
of a normalized policy.
definition makeFUTPr where
makeFUTPr FUT p x n =
(packet-Nets x (fst (normBothNets (bothNets p)!n))
(snd(normBothNets (bothNets p)!n)) −→
FUT x = Cp ((normalizePr p)!Suc n) x )
declare Cp.simps [simp del ]





adr ippLemmas adr ippLemmas
lemma aux : [[x 6= a; y 6=b; (x 6= y ∧ x 6= b) ∨ (a 6= b ∧ a 6= y)]] =⇒ {x ,a} 6= {y ,b}
by (auto)
lemma aux2 : {a,b} = {b,a}
by auto
end






This theory contains the generic proofs of the normalisation procedure, i.e. those
which are independent from the concrete semantical interpretation function.
lemma domNMT : dom X 6= {} =⇒ X 6= ∅
by auto
lemma denyNMT : deny-all 6= ∅
apply (rule domNMT )
by (simp add : deny-all-def dom-def )
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lemma wellformed-policy1-charn[rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy1 p −→ DenyAll ∈ set p −→ (∃ p ′. p = DenyAll # p ′ ∧ DenyAll /∈
set p ′)
by(induct p,simp-all)
lemma singleCombinatorsConc: singleCombinators (x#xs) =⇒ singleCombinators xs
by (case-tac x ,simp-all)
lemma aux0-0 : singleCombinators x =⇒ ¬ (∃ a b. (a⊕b) ∈ set x )
apply (induct x , simp-all)
subgoal for a b
by (case-tac a,simp-all)
done
lemma aux0-4 : (a ∈ set x ∨ a ∈ set y) = (a ∈ set (x@y))
by auto
lemma aux0-1 : [[singleCombinators xs; singleCombinators [x ]]] =⇒
singleCombinators (x#xs)
by (case-tac x ,simp-all)
lemma aux0-6 : [[singleCombinators xs; ¬ (∃ a b. x = a ⊕ b)]] =⇒
singleCombinators(x#xs)
apply (rule aux0-1 ,simp-all)
apply (case-tac x ,simp-all)
by auto
lemma aux0-5 : ¬ (∃ a b. (a⊕b) ∈ set x ) =⇒ singleCombinators x
apply (induct x )
apply simp-all
by (metis aux0-6 )
lemma ANDConc[rule-format ]: allNetsDistinct (a#p) −→ allNetsDistinct (p)
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
apply (case-tac a)
by simp-all
lemma aux6 : twoNetsDistinct a1 a2 a b =⇒
dom (deny-all-from-to a1 a2 ) ∩ dom (deny-all-from-to a b) = {}
by (auto simp: twoNetsDistinct-def netsDistinct-def src-def dest-def
in-subnet-def PolicyCombinators.PolicyCombinators dom-def )
lemma aux5 [rule-format ]: (DenyAllFromTo a b) ∈ set p −→ a ∈ set (net-list p)
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by (rule net-list-aux .induct ,simp-all)
lemma aux5a[rule-format ]: (DenyAllFromTo b a) ∈ set p −→ a ∈ set (net-list p)
by (rule net-list-aux .induct ,simp-all)
lemma aux5c[rule-format ]:
(AllowPortFromTo a b po) ∈ set p −→ a ∈ set (net-list p)
by (rule net-list-aux .induct ,simp-all)
lemma aux5d [rule-format ]:
(AllowPortFromTo b a po) ∈ set p −→ a ∈ set (net-list p)
by (rule net-list-aux .induct ,simp-all)
lemma aux10 [rule-format ]: a ∈ set (net-list p) −→ a ∈ set (net-list-aux p)
by simp
lemma srcInNetListaux [simp]:
[[x ∈ set p; singleCombinators[x ]; x 6= DenyAll ]] =⇒ srcNet x ∈ set (net-list-aux p)
apply (induct p)
apply simp-all
subgoal for a p
apply (case-tac x = a, simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)




[[x ∈ set p; singleCombinators[x ]; x 6= DenyAll ]] =⇒ destNet x ∈ set (net-list-aux p)
apply (induct p)
apply simp-all
subgoal for a p
apply (case-tac x = a, simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
done
done
lemma tND1 : [[allNetsDistinct p; x ∈ set p; y ∈ set p; a = srcNet x ;
b = destNet x ; c = srcNet y ; d = destNet y ; a 6= c;
singleCombinators[x ]; x 6= DenyAll ; singleCombinators[y ];
y 6= DenyAll ]] =⇒ twoNetsDistinct a b c d
by (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def twoNetsDistinct-def )
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lemma tND2 : [[allNetsDistinct p; x ∈ set p; y ∈ set p; a = srcNet x ;
b = destNet x ; c = srcNet y ; d = destNet y ; b 6= d ;
singleCombinators[x ]; x 6= DenyAll ; singleCombinators[y ];
y 6= DenyAll ]] =⇒ twoNetsDistinct a b c d
by (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def twoNetsDistinct-def )
lemma tND : [[allNetsDistinct p; x ∈ set p; y ∈ set p; a = srcNet x ;
b = destNet x ; c = srcNet y ; d = destNet y ; a 6= c ∨ b 6= d ;
singleCombinators[x ]; x 6= DenyAll ; singleCombinators[y ]; y 6= DenyAll ]]
=⇒ twoNetsDistinct a b c d
apply (case-tac a 6= c, simp-all)
apply (erule-tac x = x and y =y in tND1 , simp-all)
apply (erule-tac x = x and y =y in tND2 , simp-all)
done
lemma aux7 : [[DenyAllFromTo a b ∈ set p; allNetsDistinct ((DenyAllFromTo c d)#p);
a 6= c∨ b 6= d ]] =⇒ twoNetsDistinct a b c d
apply (erule-tac x = DenyAllFromTo a b and y = DenyAllFromTo c d in tND)
by simp-all
lemma aux7a: [[DenyAllFromTo a b ∈ set p;
allNetsDistinct ((AllowPortFromTo c d po)#p); a 6= c∨ b 6= d ]] =⇒
twoNetsDistinct a b c d
apply (erule-tac x = DenyAllFromTo a b and
y = AllowPortFromTo c d po in tND)
by simp-all
lemma nDComm: assumes ab: netsDistinct a b shows ba: netsDistinct b a
apply (insert ab)
by (auto simp: netsDistinct-def in-subnet-def )
lemma tNDComm:
assumes abcd : twoNetsDistinct a b c d shows twoNetsDistinct c d a b
apply (insert abcd)
by (metis twoNetsDistinct-def nDComm)
lemma aux [rule-format ]: a ∈ set (removeShadowRules2 p) −→ a ∈ set p
apply (case-tac a)
by (rule removeShadowRules2 .induct , simp-all)+
lemma aux12 : [[a ∈ x ; b /∈ x ]] =⇒ a 6= b
by auto
lemma ND0aux1 [rule-format ]: DenyAllFromTo x y ∈ set b =⇒
48
x ∈ set (net-list-aux b)
by (metis aux5 net-list .simps set-remdups)
lemma ND0aux2 [rule-format ]: DenyAllFromTo x y ∈ set b =⇒
y ∈ set (net-list-aux b)
by (metis aux5a net-list .simps set-remdups)
lemma ND0aux3 [rule-format ]: AllowPortFromTo x y p ∈ set b =⇒
x ∈ set (net-list-aux b)
by (metis aux5c net-list .simps set-remdups)
lemma ND0aux4 [rule-format ]: AllowPortFromTo x y p ∈ set b =⇒
y ∈ set (net-list-aux b)
by (metis aux5d net-list .simps set-remdups)
lemma aNDSubsetaux [rule-format ]: singleCombinators a −→ set a ⊆ set b −→




apply (drule mp, erule singleCombinatorsConc)
subgoal for a a ′ x
apply (case-tac a)
apply (simp-all add : contra-subsetD)
apply (metis contra-subsetD)
apply (metis ND0aux1 ND0aux2 contra-subsetD)
apply (metis ND0aux3 ND0aux4 contra-subsetD)
done
done
lemma aNDSetsEqaux [rule-format ]: singleCombinators a −→ singleCombinators b −→
set a = set b −→ set (net-list-aux a) = set (net-list-aux b)
apply (rule impI )+
apply (rule equalityI )
apply (rule aNDSubsetaux , simp-all)+
done
lemma aNDSubset : [[singleCombinators a;set a ⊆ set b; allNetsDistinct b]] =⇒
allNetsDistinct a
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
apply (rule allI )+
apply (rule impI )+
subgoal for x y
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apply (drule-tac x = x in spec, drule-tac x = y in spec)
using aNDSubsetaux by blast
done
lemma aNDSetsEq : [[singleCombinators a; singleCombinators b; set a = set b;
allNetsDistinct b]] =⇒ allNetsDistinct a
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
apply (rule allI )+
apply (rule impI )+
subgoal for x y
apply (drule-tac x = x in spec, drule-tac x = y in spec)
using aNDSetsEqaux by auto
done
lemma SCConca: [[singleCombinators p; singleCombinators [a]]] =⇒
singleCombinators (a#p)
by(metis aux0-1 )
lemma aux3 [simp]: [[singleCombinators p; singleCombinators [a];
allNetsDistinct (a#p)]] =⇒ allNetsDistinct (a#a#p)
by (metis aNDSetsEq aux0-1 insert-absorb2 list .set(2 ))
lemma wp1-aux1a[rule-format ]: xs 6= [] −→ wellformed-policy1-strong (xs @ [x ]) −→
wellformed-policy1-strong xs
by (induct xs,simp-all)
lemma wp1alternative-RS1 [rule-format ]: DenyAll ∈ set p −→
wellformed-policy1-strong (removeShadowRules1 p)
by (induct p,simp-all)
lemma wellformed-eq : DenyAll ∈ set p −→
((wellformed-policy1 p) = (wellformed-policy1-strong p))
by (induct p,simp-all)
lemma set-insort : set(insort x xs l) = insert x (set xs)
by (induct xs) auto
lemma set-sort [simp]: set(sort xs l) = set xs
by (induct xs) (simp-all add :set-insort)
lemma set-sortQ : set(qsort xs l) = set xs
by simp
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lemma aux79 [rule-format ]: y ∈ set (insort x a l) −→ y 6= x −→ y ∈ set a
apply (induct a)
by auto
lemma aux80 : [[y /∈ set p; y 6= x ]] =⇒ y /∈ set (insort x (sort p l) l)
apply (metis aux79 set-sort)
done
lemma WP1Conca: DenyAll /∈ set p =⇒ wellformed-policy1 (a#p)
by (case-tac a,simp-all)
lemma saux [simp]: (insort DenyAll p l) = DenyAll#p
by (induct-tac p,simp-all)
lemma saux3 [rule-format ]: DenyAllFromTo a b ∈ set list −→
DenyAllFromTo c d /∈ set list −→ (a 6= c) ∨ (b 6= d)
by blast
lemma waux2 [rule-format ]: (DenyAll /∈ set xs) −→ wellformed-policy1 xs
by (induct-tac xs,simp-all)
lemma waux3 [rule-format ]: [[x 6= a; x /∈ set p]] =⇒ x /∈ set (insort a p l)
by (metis aux79 )
lemma wellformed1-sorted-aux [rule-format ]: wellformed-policy1 (x#p) =⇒
wellformed-policy1 (insort x p l)
by (metis NormalisationGenericProofs.set-insort list .set(2 ) saux waux2 wellformed-eq
wellformed-policy1-strong .simps(2 ))
lemma wellformed1-sorted-auxQ [rule-format ]: wellformed-policy1 (p) =⇒
wellformed-policy1 (qsort p l)
proof (induct p)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a S ) then show ?case
apply simp-all
apply (cases a,simp-all)




lemma SR1Subset : set (removeShadowRules1 p) ⊆ set p
apply (induct-tac p, simp-all)
subgoal for x xs




lemma SCSubset [rule-format ]: singleCombinators b −→ set a ⊆ set b −→
singleCombinators a
proof (induct a)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons x xs) thus ?case
by (meson aux0-0 aux0-5 subsetCE )
qed
lemma setInsert [simp]: set list ⊆ insert a (set list)
by auto




using ANDConc singleCombinatorsConc by blast
lemma RS2Set [rule-format ]: set (removeShadowRules2 p) ⊆ set p
apply(induct p, simp-all)




lemma WP1 : a /∈ set list =⇒ a /∈ set (removeShadowRules2 list)
using RS2Set [of list ] by blast
lemma denyAllDom[simp]: x ∈ dom (deny-all)
by (simp add : UPFDefs(24 ) domI )
lemma lCdom2 : (list2FWpolicy (a @ (b @ c))) = (list2FWpolicy ((a@b)@c))
by auto
lemma SCConcEnd : singleCombinators (xs @ [xa]) =⇒ singleCombinators xs
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apply (induct xs, simp-all)
subgoal for a as
by (case-tac a , simp-all)
done
lemma list2FWpolicyconc[rule-format ]: a 6= [] −→
(list2FWpolicy (xa # a)) = (xa) ⊕ (list2FWpolicy a)
by (induct a,simp-all)
lemma wp1n-tl [rule-format ]: wellformed-policy1-strong p −→
p = (DenyAll#(tl p))
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma foo2 : a /∈ set ps =⇒
a /∈ set ss =⇒
set p = set s =⇒
p = (a#(ps)) =⇒
s = (a#ss) =⇒
set (ps) = set (ss)
by auto
lemma SCnotConc[rule-format ,simp]: a⊕b ∈ set p −→ singleCombinators p −→False
apply (induct p, simp-all)
subgoal for p ps
by(case-tac p, simp-all)
done
lemma auxx8 : removeShadowRules1-alternative-rev [x ] = [x ]
by (case-tac x , simp-all)
lemma RS1End [rule-format ]: x 6= DenyAll −→ removeShadowRules1 (xs @ [x ]) =
(removeShadowRules1 xs)@[x ]
by (induct-tac xs, simp-all)
lemma aux114 : x 6= DenyAll =⇒ removeShadowRules1-alternative-rev (x#xs) =
x#(removeShadowRules1-alternative-rev xs)
apply (induct-tac xs)
apply (auto simp: auxx8 )
by (case-tac x , simp-all)
lemma aux115 [rule-format ]: x 6= DenyAll=⇒removeShadowRules1-alternative (xs@[x ])
= (removeShadowRules1-alternative xs)@[x ]
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apply (simp add : removeShadowRules1-alternative-def aux114 )
done
lemma RS1-DA[simp]: removeShadowRules1 (xs @ [DenyAll ]) = [DenyAll ]
by (induct-tac xs, simp-all)
lemma rSR1-eq : removeShadowRules1-alternative = removeShadowRules1
apply (rule ext)
apply (simp add : removeShadowRules1-alternative-def )
subgoal for x
apply (rule-tac xs = x in rev-induct)
apply simp-all
subgoal for x xs
apply (case-tac x = DenyAll , simp-all)




lemma domInterMT [rule-format ]: [[dom a ∩ dom b = {}; x ∈ dom a]] =⇒ x /∈ dom b
by auto
lemma domComm: dom a ∩ dom b = dom b ∩ dom a
by auto
lemma r-not-DA-in-tl [rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy1-strong p −→ a ∈ set p−→ a 6= DenyAll −→ a ∈ set (tl p)
by (induct p,simp-all)
lemma wp1-aux1aa[rule-format ]: wellformed-policy1-strong p −→ DenyAll ∈ set p
by (induct p,simp-all)
lemma mauxa: (∃ r . a b = brc) = (a b 6= ⊥)
by auto
lemma l2p-aux [rule-format ]: list 6= [] −→
list2FWpolicy (a # list) = a ⊕(list2FWpolicy list)
by (induct list , simp-all)
lemma l2p-aux2 [rule-format ]: list = [] =⇒ list2FWpolicy (a # list) = a
by simp
lemma aux7aa:
assumes 1 : AllowPortFromTo a b poo ∈ set p
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and 2 : allNetsDistinct ((AllowPortFromTo c d po) # p)
and 3 : a 6= c ∨ b 6= d
shows twoNetsDistinct a b c d (is ?H )
proof(cases a 6= c) print-cases
case True assume ∗:a 6= c show ?H
by (meson 1 2 True allNetsDistinct-def aux5c list .set-intros(1 )
list .set-intros(2 ) twoNetsDistinct-def )
next
case False assume ∗:¬(a 6= c) show twoNetsDistinct a b c d
by (meson 1 2 3 False allNetsDistinct-def aux5d list .set-intros(1 )
list .set-intros(2 ) twoNetsDistinct-def )
qed
lemma ANDConcEnd : [[ allNetsDistinct (xs @ [xa]); singleCombinators xs]] =⇒
allNetsDistinct xs
by (rule aNDSubset , auto)
lemma WP1ConcEnd [rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy1 (xs@[xa]) −→ wellformed-policy1 xs
by (induct xs, simp-all)
lemma NDComm: netsDistinct a b = netsDistinct b a
by (auto simp: netsDistinct-def in-subnet-def )
lemma wellformed1-sorted [simp]:
assumes wp1 : wellformed-policy1 p
shows wellformed-policy1 (sort p l)
proof (cases p)
case Nil thus ?thesis by simp
next
case (Cons x xs) thus ?thesis
proof (cases x = DenyAll)
case True thus ?thesis using assms Cons by simp
next
case False thus ?thesis using assms





assumes wp1 : wellformed-policy1 p
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shows wellformed-policy1 (qsort p l)
proof (cases p)
case Nil thus ?thesis by simp
next
case (Cons x xs) thus ?thesis
proof (cases x = DenyAll)
case True thus ?thesis using assms Cons by simp
next
case False thus ?thesis using assms




lemma SC1 [simp]: singleCombinators p =⇒singleCombinators (removeShadowRules1
p)
by (erule SCSubset) (rule SR1Subset)
lemma SC2 [simp]: singleCombinators p =⇒singleCombinators (removeShadowRules2
p)
by (erule SCSubset) (rule RS2Set)
lemma SC3 [simp]: singleCombinators p =⇒ singleCombinators (sort p l)
by (erule SCSubset) simp
lemma SC3Q [simp]: singleCombinators p =⇒ singleCombinators (qsort p l)
by (erule SCSubset) simp
lemma aND-RS1 [simp]: [[singleCombinators p; allNetsDistinct p]] =⇒
allNetsDistinct (removeShadowRules1 p)
apply (rule aNDSubset)
apply (erule SC-RS1 , simp-all)
apply (rule SR1Subset)
done
lemma aND-RS2 [simp]: [[singleCombinators p; allNetsDistinct p]] =⇒
allNetsDistinct (removeShadowRules2 p)
apply (rule aNDSubset)
apply (erule SC2 , simp-all)
apply (rule RS2Set)
done
lemma aND-sort [simp]: [[singleCombinators p; allNetsDistinct p]] =⇒
allNetsDistinct (sort p l)
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apply (rule aNDSubset)
by (erule SC3 , simp-all)
lemma aND-sortQ [simp]: [[singleCombinators p; allNetsDistinct p]] =⇒
allNetsDistinct (qsort p l)
apply (rule aNDSubset)
by (erule SC3Q , simp-all)
lemma inRS2 [rule-format ,simp]: x /∈ set p −→ x /∈ set (removeShadowRules2 p)
apply (insert RS2Set [of p])
by blast









lemma setPaireq : {x , y} = {a, b} =⇒ x = a ∧ y = b ∨ x = b ∧ y = a
by (metis doubleton-eq-iff )
lemma position-positive[rule-format ]: a ∈ set l −→ position a l > 0
by (induct l , simp-all)
lemma pos-noteq [rule-format ]:
a ∈ set l −→ b ∈ set l −→ c ∈ set l −→
a 6= b −→ position a l ≤ position b l −→ position b l ≤ position c l −→
a 6= c
proof(induct l)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a R) show ?case
by (metis (no-types, lifting) Cons.hyps One-nat-def Suc-le-mono le-antisym
length-greater-0-conv list .size(3 ) nat .inject position.simps(2 )
position-positive set-ConsD)
qed
lemma setPair-noteq : {a,b} 6= {c,d} =⇒ ¬ ((a = c) ∧ (b = d))
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by auto
lemma setPair-noteq-allow : {a,b} 6= {c,d} =⇒ ¬ ((a = c) ∧ (b = d) ∧ P)
by auto
lemma order-trans:
[[in-list x l ; in-list y l ; in-list z l ; singleCombinators [x ];
singleCombinators [y ]; singleCombinators [z ]; smaller x y l ; smaller y z l ]] =⇒
smaller x z l
apply (case-tac x , simp-all)
apply (case-tac z , simp-all)
apply (case-tac y , simp-all)
apply (case-tac y , simp-all)
apply (rule conjI |rule impI )+
apply (simp add : setPaireq)
apply (rule conjI |rule impI )+
apply (simp-all split : if-splits)
apply metis+
apply auto[1 ]
apply (simp add : setPaireq)
apply (rule impI ,case-tac y , simp-all)
apply (simp-all split : if-splits, metis,simp-all add : setPair-noteq setPair-noteq-allow)
apply (case-tac z , simp-all)
apply (case-tac y , simp-all)
apply (case-tac y , simp-all)
apply (intro impI |rule conjI )+
apply (simp-all split : if-splits)
apply (simp add : setPair-noteq)
apply (erule pos-noteq , simp-all)
apply auto[1 ]
apply (rule conjI ,simp add : setPair-noteq-allow)
apply (erule pos-noteq , simp-all)
apply auto[1 ]
apply (rule impI ,rule disjI2 )
apply (case-tac y , simp-all split : if-splits )
apply metis
apply (simp-all add : setPair-noteq-allow)
done
lemma sortedConcStart [rule-format ]:
sorted (a # aa # p) l −→ in-list a l −→ in-list aa l −→ all-in-list p l−→





apply (rule impI )+
apply simp
apply (rule-tac y = aa in order-trans)
apply simp-all
subgoal for p ps
apply (case-tac p, simp-all)
done
done
lemma singleCombinatorsStart [simp]: singleCombinators (x#xs) =⇒
singleCombinators [x ]
by (case-tac x , simp-all)
lemma sorted-is-smaller [rule-format ]:
sorted (a # p) l −→ in-list a l −→ in-list b l −→ all-in-list p l −→
singleCombinators [a] −→ singleCombinators p −→ b ∈ set p −→ smaller a b l
apply (induct p)
apply (auto intro: singleCombinatorsConc sortedConcStart)
done
lemma sortedConcEnd [rule-format ]: sorted (a # p) l −→ in-list a l −→
all-in-list p l −→ singleCombinators [a] −→
singleCombinators p −→ sorted p l
apply (induct p)
apply (auto intro: singleCombinatorsConc sortedConcStart)
done
lemma in-set-in-list [rule-format ]: a ∈ set p −→ all-in-list p l−→ in-list a l
by (induct p) auto
lemma sorted-Consb[rule-format ]:
all-in-list (x#xs) l −→ singleCombinators (x#xs) −→
(sorted xs l & (ALL y :set xs. smaller x y l)) −→ (sorted (x#xs) l)
apply(induct xs arbitrary : x )
apply (auto simp: order-trans)
done
lemma sorted-Cons: [[all-in-list (x#xs) l ; singleCombinators (x#xs)]] =⇒
(sorted xs l & (ALL y :set xs. smaller x y l)) = (sorted (x#xs) l)
apply auto
apply (rule sorted-Consb, simp-all)
apply (metis singleCombinatorsConc singleCombinatorsStart sortedConcEnd)
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apply (erule sorted-is-smaller)
apply (auto intro: singleCombinatorsConc singleCombinatorsStart in-set-in-list)
done
lemma smaller-antisym: [[¬ smaller a b l ; in-list a l ; in-list b l ;
singleCombinators[a]; singleCombinators [b]]] =⇒










apply (simp-all split : if-splits)
done
lemma set-insort-insert : set (insort x xs l) ⊆ insert x (set xs)
by (induct xs) auto
lemma all-in-listSubset [rule-format ]: all-in-list b l −→singleCombinators a −→
set a ⊆ set b −→ all-in-list a l
by (induct-tac a) (auto intro: in-set-in-list singleCombinatorsConc)
lemma singleCombinators-insort : [[singleCombinators [x ]; singleCombinators xs]] =⇒
singleCombinators (insort x xs l)
by (metis NormalisationGenericProofs.set-insort aux0-0 aux0-1 aux0-5 list .simps(15 ))
lemma all-in-list-insort : [[all-in-list xs l ; singleCombinators (x#xs);
in-list x l ]] =⇒ all-in-list (insort x xs l) l
apply (rule-tac b = x#xs in all-in-listSubset)
apply simp-all




lemma sorted-ConsA:[[all-in-list (x#xs) l ; singleCombinators (x#xs)]] =⇒
(sorted (x#xs) l) = (sorted xs l & (ALL y :set xs. smaller x y l))
by (metis sorted-Cons)
lemma is-in-insort : y ∈ set xs =⇒ y ∈ set (insort x xs l)
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by (simp add : NormalisationGenericProofs.set-insort)
lemma sorted-insorta[rule-format ]:
assumes 1 : sorted (insort x xs l) l
and 2 : all-in-list (x#xs) l
and 3 : all-in-list (x#xs) l
and 4 : distinct (x#xs)
and 5 : singleCombinators [x ]
and 6 : singleCombinators xs
shows sorted xs l
proof (insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 , induct xs)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a xs)
then show ?case
apply simp
apply (auto intro: is-in-insort sorted-ConsA set-insort singleCombinators-insort
singleCombinatorsConc sortedConcEnd all-in-list-insort) [1 ]
apply(cases smaller x a l , simp-all)
by (metis NormalisationGenericProofs.set-insort NormalisationGener-
icProofs.sorted-Cons




sorted xs l −→ all-in-list (x#xs) l −→ distinct (x#xs) −→
singleCombinators [x ] −→ singleCombinators xs −→ sorted (insort x xs l) l
proof (induct xs)
case Nil show ?case by simp-all
next
case (Cons a xs)
have ∗ : sorted (a # xs) l =⇒ all-in-list (x # a # xs) l =⇒
distinct (x # a # xs) =⇒ singleCombinators [x ] =⇒
singleCombinators (a # xs) =⇒ sorted (insort x xs l) l
apply(insert Cons.hyps, simp-all)




apply (rule impI )+
apply (insert ∗, auto intro!: sorted-Consb)
proof (rule-tac b = x#xs in all-in-listSubset)
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show in-list x l =⇒ all-in-list xs l =⇒ all-in-list (x # xs) l
by simp-all
next
show singleCombinators [x ] =⇒
singleCombinators (a # xs) =⇒
FWNormalisationCore.sorted (FWNormalisationCore.insort x xs l) l
=⇒
singleCombinators (FWNormalisationCore.insort x xs l)
apply (rule singleCombinators-insort , simp-all)
by (erule singleCombinatorsConc)
next
show set (FWNormalisationCore.insort x xs l) ⊆ set (x # xs)
using NormalisationGenericProofs.set-insort-insert by auto
next
show singleCombinators [x ] =⇒
singleCombinators (a # xs) =⇒
singleCombinators (a # FWNormalisationCore.insort x xs l)




show FWNormalisationCore.sorted (a # xs) l =⇒
singleCombinators [x ] =⇒ singleCombinators (a # xs) =⇒
in-list x l =⇒ in-list a l =⇒ all-in-list xs l =⇒
¬ smaller x a l =⇒ y ∈ set (FWNormalisationCore.insort x xs l) =⇒
smaller a y l






[[all-in-list (x#xs) l ; distinct(x#xs); singleCombinators [x ];
singleCombinators xs]] =⇒
sorted (insort x xs l) l = sorted xs l
by (auto intro: sorted-insorta sorted-insortb)
lemma distinct-insort : distinct (insort x xs l) = (x /∈ set xs ∧ distinct xs)
by(induct xs)(auto simp:set-insort)
lemma distinct-sort [simp]: distinct (sort xs l) = distinct xs
by(induct xs)(simp-all add :distinct-insort)
62
lemma sort-is-sorted [rule-format ]:
all-in-list p l −→ distinct p −→ singleCombinators p −→ sorted (sort p l) l
apply (induct p)
apply simp
by (metis (no-types, lifting) NormalisationGenericProofs.distinct-sort
NormalisationGenericProofs.set-sort SC3 all-in-list .simps(2 ) all-in-listSubset
distinct .simps(2 ) set-subset-Cons singleCombinatorsConc singleCombinatorsStart
sort .simps(2 ) sorted-insortb)
lemma smaller-sym[rule-format ]: all-in-list [a] l −→ smaller a a l
by (case-tac a,simp-all)
lemma SC-sublist [rule-format ]:
singleCombinators xs =⇒ singleCombinators (qsort [y←xs. P y ] l)
by (auto intro: SCSubset)
lemma all-in-list-sublist [rule-format ]:
singleCombinators xs −→ all-in-list xs l −→ all-in-list (qsort [y←xs. P y ] l) l
by (auto intro: all-in-listSubset SC-sublist)
lemma SC-sublist2 [rule-format ]:
singleCombinators xs −→ singleCombinators ([y←xs. P y ])
by (auto intro: SCSubset)
lemma all-in-list-sublist2 [rule-format ]:
singleCombinators xs −→ all-in-list xs l −→ all-in-list ( [y←xs. P y ]) l
by (auto intro: all-in-listSubset SC-sublist2 )
lemma all-in-listAppend [rule-format ]:
all-in-list (xs) l −→ all-in-list (ys) l −→ all-in-list (xs @ ys) l
by (induct xs) simp-all
lemma distinct-sortQ [rule-format ]:
singleCombinators xs −→ all-in-list xs l −→ distinct xs −→ distinct (qsort xs l)
apply (induct xs l rule: qsort .induct)
apply simp
apply (auto simp: SC-sublist2 singleCombinatorsConc all-in-list-sublist2 )
done
lemma singleCombinatorsAppend [rule-format ]:
singleCombinators (xs) −→ singleCombinators (ys) −→ singleCombinators (xs @ ys)
apply (induct xs, auto)








lemma sorted-append1 [rule-format ]:
all-in-list xs l −→ singleCombinators xs −→
all-in-list ys l −→ singleCombinators ys −→
(sorted (xs@ys) l −→
(sorted xs l & sorted ys l & (∀ x ∈ set xs. ∀ y ∈ set ys. smaller x y l)))
apply(induct xs)
apply(simp-all)
by (metis NormalisationGenericProofs.sorted-Cons all-in-list .simps(2 )
all-in-listAppend aux0-1
aux0-4 singleCombinatorsAppend singleCombinatorsConc singleCombinatorsStart)
lemma sorted-append2 [rule-format ]:
all-in-list xs l−→ singleCombinators xs −→
all-in-list ys l −→ singleCombinators ys −→




by (metis NormalisationGenericProofs.sorted-Cons all-in-list .simps(2 )
all-in-listAppend aux0-1
aux0-4 singleCombinatorsAppend singleCombinatorsConc singleCombinatorsStart)
lemma sorted-append [rule-format ]:
all-in-list xs l −→ singleCombinators xs −→
all-in-list ys l −→ singleCombinators ys −→
(sorted (xs@ys) l) =
(sorted xs l & sorted ys l & (∀ x ∈ set xs. ∀ y ∈ set ys. smaller x y l))
apply (rule impI )+
apply (rule iffI )
apply (rule sorted-append1 ,simp-all)
apply (rule sorted-append2 ,simp-all)
done
lemma sort-is-sortedQ [rule-format ]:
all-in-list p l −→ singleCombinators p −→ sorted (qsort p l) l
proof (induct p l rule: qsort .induct) print-cases
case 1 show ?case by simp
64
next
case 2 fix x ::( ′a, ′b) Combinators fix xs::( ′a, ′b) Combinators list fix l
show all-in-list [y←xs . ¬ smaller x y l ] l −→
singleCombinators [y←xs . ¬ smaller x y l ] −→
sorted (qsort [y←xs . ¬ smaller x y l ] l) l =⇒
all-in-list [y←xs . smaller x y l ] l −→
singleCombinators [y←xs . smaller x y l ] −→
sorted (qsort [y←xs . smaller x y l ] l) l =⇒
all-in-list(x#xs) l −→ singleCombinators(x#xs) −→ sorted (qsort(x#xs)
l) l
apply (intro impI )
apply (simp-all add : SC-sublist all-in-list-sublist all-in-list-sublist2
singleCombinatorsConc SC-sublist2 )
proof (subst sorted-append)
show in-list x l ∧ all-in-list xs l =⇒
singleCombinators (x # xs) =⇒
all-in-list (qsort [y←xs . ¬ smaller x y l ] l) l
by (metis all-in-list-sublist singleCombinatorsConc)
next
show in-list x l ∧ all-in-list xs l =⇒
singleCombinators (x # xs) =⇒
singleCombinators (qsort [y←xs . ¬ smaller x y l ] l)
apply (auto simp: SC-sublist all-in-list-sublist SC-sublist2
all-in-list-sublist2 sorted-Cons sorted-append not-le)
apply (metis SC3Q SC-sublist2 singleCombinatorsConc)
done
next
show sorted (qsort [y←xs . ¬ smaller x y l ] l) l =⇒
sorted (qsort [y←xs . smaller x y l ] l) l =⇒
in-list x l ∧ all-in-list xs l =⇒ singleCombinators (x # xs) =⇒
all-in-list (x # qsort [y←xs . smaller x y l ] l) l
using all-in-list .simps(2 ) all-in-list-sublist singleCombinatorsConc by blast
next
show sorted (qsort [y←xs . smaller x y l ] l) l =⇒
in-list x l ∧ all-in-list xs l =⇒ singleCombinators (x # xs) =⇒
singleCombinators (x # qsort [y←xs . smaller x y l ] l)
using SC-sublist aux0-1 singleCombinatorsConc singleCombinatorsStart by blast
next
show sorted (qsort [y←xs . ¬ smaller x y l ] l) l =⇒
sorted (qsort [y←xs . smaller x y l ] l) l =⇒
in-list x l ∧ all-in-list xs l =⇒
singleCombinators (x # xs) =⇒
FWNormalisationCore.sorted (qsort [y←xs . ¬ smaller x y l ] l) l ∧
FWNormalisationCore.sorted (x # qsort [y←xs . smaller x y l ] l) l ∧
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(∀ x ′∈set (qsort [y←xs . ¬ smaller x y l ] l).
∀ y∈set (x # qsort [y←xs . smaller x y l ] l). smaller x ′ y l)
apply(auto)[1 ]
apply (metis (mono-tags, lifting) SC-sublist all-in-list .simps(2 )
all-in-list-sublist aux0-1 mem-Collect-eq set-filter set-qsort
singleCombinatorsConc singleCombinatorsStart sorted-Consb)
apply (metis aux0-0 aux0-6 in-set-in-list singleCombinatorsConc
singleCombinatorsStart smaller-antisym)





lemma inSet-not-MT : a ∈ set p =⇒ p 6= []
by auto
lemma RS1n-assoc:
x 6= DenyAll =⇒ removeShadowRules1-alternative xs @ [x ] =
removeShadowRules1-alternative (xs @ [x ])
by (simp add : removeShadowRules1-alternative-def aux114 )
lemma RS1n-nMT [rule-format ,simp]: p 6= []−→ removeShadowRules1-alternative p 6=
[]
apply (simp add : removeShadowRules1-alternative-def )
apply (rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct , simp-all)
subgoal for x xs
apply (case-tac xs = [], simp-all)
apply (case-tac x , simp-all)
apply (rule-tac xs = xs in rev-induct , simp-all)
apply (case-tac x , simp-all)+
done
done
lemma RS1N-DA[simp]: removeShadowRules1-alternative (a@[DenyAll ]) = [DenyAll ]
by (simp add : removeShadowRules1-alternative-def )
lemma WP1n-DA-notinSet [rule-format ]: wellformed-policy1-strong p −→
DenyAll /∈ set (tl p)
by (induct p) (simp-all)




xs 6= [] −→ wellformed-policy1 (xs @ [DenyAll ]) −→ False
by (induct xs, simp-all)
lemma AND-tl [rule-format ]: allNetsDistinct ( p) −→ allNetsDistinct (tl p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)
by (auto intro: ANDConc)
lemma distinct-tl [rule-format ]: distinct p −→ distinct (tl p)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma SC-tl [rule-format ]: singleCombinators ( p) −→ singleCombinators (tl p)
by (induct p, simp-all) (auto intro: singleCombinatorsConc)
lemma Conc-not-MT : p = x#xs =⇒ p 6= []
by auto
lemma wp1-tl [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] ∧ wellformed-policy1 p −→ wellformed-policy1 (tl p)
by (induct p) (auto intro: waux2 )
lemma wp1-eq [rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ wellformed-policy1 p
apply (case-tac DenyAll ∈ set p)
apply (subst wellformed-eq)
apply (auto elim: waux2 )
done
lemma wellformed1-alternative-sorted :
wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ wellformed-policy1-strong (sort p l)
by (case-tac p, simp-all)
lemma wp1n-RS2 [rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy1-strong p −→ wellformed-policy1-strong (removeShadowRules2 p)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma RS2-NMT [rule-format ]: p 6= [] −→ removeShadowRules2 p 6= []
apply (induct p, simp-all)
subgoal for a p
apply (case-tac p 6= [], simp-all)




lemma wp1-alternative-not-mt [simp]: wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ p 6= []
by auto
lemma AIL1 [rule-format ,simp]: all-in-list p l −→
all-in-list (removeShadowRules1 p) l
by (induct-tac p, simp-all)
lemma wp1ID : wellformed-policy1-strong (insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 p))
apply (induct p, simp-all)
subgoal for a p
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
done
done
lemma dRD [simp]: distinct (remdups p)
by simp
lemma AILrd [rule-format ,simp]: all-in-list p l −→ all-in-list (remdups p) l
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma AILiD [rule-format ,simp]: all-in-list p l −→ all-in-list (insertDeny p) l
apply (induct p, simp-all)
apply (rule impI , simp)
subgoal for a p
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
done
done
lemma SCrd [rule-format ,simp]:singleCombinators p−→ singleCombinators(remdups p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)
subgoal for a p
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
done
done
lemma SCRiD [rule-format ,simp]: singleCombinators p −→
singleCombinators(insertDeny p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)
subgoal for a p




lemma WP1rd [rule-format ,simp]:
wellformed-policy1-strong p −→ wellformed-policy1-strong (remdups p)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma ANDrd [rule-format ,simp]:
singleCombinators p −→ allNetsDistinct p −→ allNetsDistinct (remdups p)
apply (rule impI )+
apply (rule-tac b = p in aNDSubset)
apply simp-all
done
lemma ANDiD [rule-format ,simp]:
allNetsDistinct p −→ allNetsDistinct (insertDeny p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
apply (auto intro: ANDConc)
subgoal for a p
apply (case-tac a,simp-all add : allNetsDistinct-def )
done
done
lemma mr-iD [rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy1-strong p −→ matching-rule x p = matching-rule x (insertDeny p)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma WP1iD [rule-format ,simp]: wellformed-policy1-strong p −→
wellformed-policy1-strong (insertDeny p)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma DAiniD : DenyAll ∈ set (insertDeny p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)




lemma p2lNmt : policy2list p 6= []
by (rule policy2list .induct , simp-all)
lemma AIL2 [rule-format ,simp]:
all-in-list p l −→ all-in-list (removeShadowRules2 p) l
apply (induct-tac p, simp-all)





lemma SCConc: singleCombinators x =⇒ singleCombinators y =⇒ singleCombinators
(x@y)
apply (rule aux0-5 )
apply (metis aux0-0 aux0-4 )
done
lemma SCp2l : singleCombinators (policy2list p)
by (induct-tac p) (auto intro: SCConc)
lemma subnetAux : Dd ∩ A 6= {} =⇒ A ⊆ B =⇒ Dd ∩ B 6= {}
by auto
lemma soadisj : x ∈ subnetsOfAdr a =⇒ y ∈ subnetsOfAdr a =⇒ ¬ netsDistinct x y
by(simp add : subnetsOfAdr-def netsDistinct-def ,auto)
lemma not-member : ¬ member a (x⊕y) =⇒ ¬ member a x
by auto
lemma soadisj2 : (∀ a x y . x ∈ subnetsOfAdr a ∧ y ∈ subnetsOfAdr a −→ ¬ netsDistinct
x y)
by (simp add : subnetsOfAdr-def netsDistinct-def , auto)
lemma ndFalse1 :
(∀ a b c d . (a,b)∈A ∧ (c,d)∈B −→ netsDistinct a c) =⇒
∃ (a, b)∈A. a ∈ subnetsOfAdr D =⇒
∃ (a, b)∈B . a ∈ subnetsOfAdr D =⇒ False
apply (auto simp: soadisj )
using soadisj2 by blast
lemma ndFalse2 : (∀ a b c d . (a,b)∈A ∧ (c,d)∈B −→ netsDistinct b d) =⇒
∃ (a, b)∈A. b ∈ subnetsOfAdr D =⇒
∃ (a, b)∈B . b ∈ subnetsOfAdr D =⇒ False
apply (auto simp: soadisj )
using soadisj2 by blast
lemma tndFalse: (∀ a b c d . (a,b)∈A ∧ (c,d)∈B −→ twoNetsDistinct a b c d) =⇒
∃ (a, b)∈A. a ∈ subnetsOfAdr (D ::( ′a::adr)) ∧ b ∈ subnetsOfAdr (F :: ′a) =⇒
∃ (a, b)∈B . a ∈ subnetsOfAdr D∧ b∈ subnetsOfAdr F
=⇒ False
apply (simp add : twoNetsDistinct-def )
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apply (auto simp: ndFalse1 ndFalse2 )
apply (metis soadisj )
done
lemma sepnMT [rule-format ]: p 6= [] −→ (separate p) 6= []
by (induct p rule: separate.induct) simp-all
lemma sepDA[rule-format ]: DenyAll /∈ set p −→ DenyAll /∈ set (separate p)
by (induct p rule: separate.induct) simp-all
lemma setnMT : set a = set b =⇒ a 6= [] =⇒ b 6= []
by auto
lemma sortnMT : p 6= [] =⇒ sort p l 6= []
by (metis set-sort setnMT )
lemma idNMT [rule-format ]: p 6= [] −→ insertDenies p 6= []
apply (induct p, simp-all)




lemma OTNoTN [rule-format ]: OnlyTwoNets p −→ x 6= DenyAll −→ x ∈ set p −→
onlyTwoNets x
apply (induct p, simp-all , rename-tac a p)
apply (intro impI conjI , simp)
subgoal for a p
apply(case-tac a, simp-all)
done




lemma first-isIn[rule-format ]: ¬ member DenyAll x −→ (first-srcNet x ,first-destNet
x ) ∈ sdnets x
by (induct x ,case-tac x , simp-all)
lemma sdnets2 :
∃ a b. sdnets x = {(a, b), (b, a)} =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll x =⇒
sdnets x = {(first-srcNet x , first-destNet x ), (first-destNet x , first-srcNet x )}
proof −
have ∗ : ∃ a b. sdnets x = {(a, b), (b, a)} =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll x
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=⇒ (first-srcNet x , first-destNet x ) ∈ sdnets x
by (erule first-isIn)
show ∃ a b. sdnets x = {(a, b), (b, a)} =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll x =⇒
sdnets x = {(first-srcNet x , first-destNet x ), (first-destNet x , first-srcNet
x )}
using ∗ by auto
qed
lemma alternativelistconc1 [rule-format ]:
a ∈ set (net-list-aux [x ]) −→ a ∈ set (net-list-aux [x ,y ])
by (induct x ,simp-all)
lemma alternativelistconc2 [rule-format ]:
a ∈ set (net-list-aux [x ]) −→ a ∈ set (net-list-aux [y ,x ])
by (induct y , simp-all)
lemma noDA[rule-format ]:
noDenyAll xs −→ s ∈ set xs −→ ¬ member DenyAll s
by (induct xs, simp-all)
lemma isInAlternativeList :




x ∈ set (net-list-aux (a # p))=⇒ x ∈ set (net-list-aux ([a])) ∨ x ∈ set (net-list-aux
(p))
apply (case-tac x ∈ set (net-list-aux [a]), simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
done
lemma firstInNet [rule-format ]:
¬ member DenyAll a −→ first-destNet a ∈ set (net-list-aux (a # p))
apply (rule Combinators.induct , simp-all)
apply (metis netlistaux )
done
lemma firstInNeta[rule-format ]:
¬ member DenyAll a −→ first-srcNet a ∈ set (net-list-aux (a # p))
apply (rule Combinators.induct , simp-all)
apply (metis netlistaux )
done
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lemma disjComm: disjSD-2 a b =⇒ disjSD-2 b a
apply (simp add : disjSD-2-def )
apply (intro allI impI conjI )
using tNDComm apply blast
by (meson tNDComm twoNetsDistinct-def )
lemma disjSD2aux :
disjSD-2 a b =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll a =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll b =⇒
disjSD-2 (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a) ⊕ a)
b
apply (drule disjComm,rule disjComm)
apply (simp add : disjSD-2-def )
using first-isIn by blast
lemma noDA1eq [rule-format ]: noDenyAll p −→ noDenyAll1 p
apply (induct p, simp,rename-tac a p)




lemma noDA1C [rule-format ]: noDenyAll1 (a#p) −→ noDenyAll1 p
by (case-tac a, simp-all ,rule impI , rule noDA1eq , simp)+
lemma disjSD-2IDa:
disjSD-2 x y =⇒
¬ member DenyAll x =⇒
¬ member DenyAll y =⇒
a = first-srcNet x =⇒
b = first-destNet x =⇒
disjSD-2 (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕ x ) y
by(simp add :disjSD2aux )
lemma noDAID [rule-format ]: noDenyAll p −→ noDenyAll (insertDenies p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)





noDenyAll p −→ s ∈ set (insertDenies p) −→
(∃ ! a. s = (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a)) ⊕
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(DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a)) ⊕ a ∧ a ∈ set p)
apply (induct p, simp, rename-tac a p)
subgoal for a p
apply (case-tac a = DenyAll , simp)
apply (case-tac a, auto)
done
done
lemma id-aux1 [rule-format ]: DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet s) (first-destNet s) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet s) (first-srcNet s) ⊕ s∈ set (insertDenies p)
−→ s ∈ set p
apply (induct p, simp-all , rename-tac a p)






∀ s. s ∈ set p −→ disjSD-2 a s =⇒
¬ member DenyAll a =⇒
DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet s) (first-destNet s) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet s) (first-srcNet s) ⊕ s ∈ set (insertDenies p) =⇒
disjSD-2 a (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet s) (first-destNet s) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet s) (first-srcNet s) ⊕ s)
by (metis disjComm disjSD2aux isInIDo noDA)
lemma id-aux4 [rule-format ]:
noDenyAll p =⇒ ∀ s. s ∈ set p −→ disjSD-2 a s =⇒
s ∈ set (insertDenies p) =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll a =⇒
disjSD-2 a s
apply (subgoal-tac ∃ a. s =
DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a) ⊕ a ∧
a ∈ set p)
apply (drule-tac Q = disjSD-2 a s in exE , simp-all , rule id-aux2 , simp-all)
using isInIDo by blast
lemma sepNetsID [rule-format ]:
noDenyAll1 p −→ separated p −→ separated (insertDenies p)
apply (induct p, simp)
apply (rename-tac a p, auto)
using noDA1C apply blast
subgoal for a p
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apply (case-tac a = DenyAll , auto)
apply (simp add : disjSD-2-def )
apply (case-tac a,auto)
apply (rule disjSD-2IDa, simp-all , rule id-aux4 , simp-all , metis noDA noDAID)+
done
done
lemma aNDDA[rule-format ]: allNetsDistinct p −→ allNetsDistinct(DenyAll#p)
by (case-tac p,auto simp: allNetsDistinct-def )
lemma OTNConc[rule-format ]: OnlyTwoNets (y # z ) −→ OnlyTwoNets z
by (case-tac y , simp-all)
lemma first-bothNetsd : ¬ member DenyAll x =⇒ first-bothNet x = {first-srcNet x ,
first-destNet x}
by (induct x ) simp-all
lemma bNaux :
¬ member DenyAll x =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll y =⇒
first-bothNet x = first-bothNet y =⇒
{first-srcNet x , first-destNet x} = {first-srcNet y , first-destNet y}
by (simp add : first-bothNetsd)
lemma setPair : {a,b} = {a,d} =⇒ b = d
by (metis setPaireq)
lemma setPair1 : {a,b} = {d ,a} =⇒ b = d
by (metis Un-empty-right Un-insert-right insert-absorb2 setPaireq)
lemma setPair4 : {a,b} = {c,d} =⇒ a 6= c =⇒ a = d
by auto
lemma otnaux1 : {x , y , x , y} = {x ,y}
by auto
lemma OTNIDaux4 : {x ,y ,x} = {y ,x}
by auto
lemma setPair5 : {a,b} = {c,d} =⇒ a 6= c =⇒ a = d
by auto
lemma otnaux :
[[first-bothNet x = first-bothNet y ; ¬ member DenyAll x ; ¬ member DenyAll y ;
onlyTwoNets y ; onlyTwoNets x ]] =⇒
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onlyTwoNets (x ⊕ y)
apply (simp add : onlyTwoNets-def )
apply (subgoal-tac {first-srcNet x , first-destNet x} =
{first-srcNet y , first-destNet y})
apply (case-tac (∃ a b. sdnets y = {(a, b)}))
apply simp-all
apply (case-tac (∃ a b. sdnets x = {(a, b)}))
apply simp-all
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets x = {(first-srcNet x , first-destNet x )})
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets y = {(first-srcNet y , first-destNet y)})
apply simp
apply (case-tac first-srcNet x = first-srcNet y)
apply simp-all
apply (rule disjI1 )
apply (rule setPair)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet x = first-destNet y)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet x = first-srcNet y)
apply simp
apply (rule-tac x =first-srcNet y in exI , rule-tac x = first-destNet y in exI ,simp)
apply (rule setPair1 )
apply simp
apply (rule setPair4 )
apply simp-all
apply (metis first-isIn singletonE )
apply (metis first-isIn singletonE )
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets x = {(first-srcNet x , first-destNet x ),
(first-destNet x , first-srcNet x )})
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets y = {(first-srcNet y , first-destNet y)})
apply simp
apply (case-tac first-srcNet x = first-srcNet y)
apply simp-all




apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet x = first-destNet y)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet x = first-srcNet y)
apply simp
apply (rule-tac x =first-srcNet y in exI , rule-tac x = first-destNet y in exI )
apply (metis OTNIDaux4 insert-commute )
apply (rule setPair1 )
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apply simp
apply (rule setPair5 )
apply assumption
apply simp
apply (metis first-isIn singletonE )
apply (rule sdnets2 )
apply simp-all
apply (case-tac (∃ a b. sdnets x = {(a, b)}))
apply simp-all
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets x = {(first-srcNet x , first-destNet x )})
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets y = {(first-srcNet y , first-destNet y),
(first-destNet y , first-srcNet y)})
apply simp
apply (case-tac first-srcNet x = first-srcNet y)
apply simp-all
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet x = first-destNet y)
apply simp
apply (rule-tac x =first-srcNet y in exI , rule-tac x = first-destNet y in exI )
apply (metis OTNIDaux4 insert-commute )
apply (rule setPair)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet x = first-destNet y)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet x = first-srcNet y)
apply simp
apply (rule setPair1 )
apply simp
apply (rule setPair4 )
apply assumption
apply simp
apply (rule sdnets2 )
apply simp
apply simp
apply (metis singletonE first-isIn)
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets x = {(first-srcNet x , first-destNet x ),
(first-destNet x , first-srcNet x )})
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets y = {(first-srcNet y , first-destNet y),
(first-destNet y , first-srcNet y)})
apply simp
apply (case-tac first-srcNet x = first-srcNet y)
apply simp-all
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet x = first-destNet y)
apply simp
apply (rule-tac x =first-srcNet y in exI , rule-tac x = first-destNet y in exI )
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apply (rule otnaux1 )
apply (rule setPair)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet x = first-destNet y)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet x = first-srcNet y)
apply simp
apply (rule-tac x =first-srcNet y in exI , rule-tac x = first-destNet y in exI )
apply (metis OTNIDaux4 insert-commute)
apply (rule setPair1 )
apply simp
apply (rule setPair4 )
apply assumption
apply simp
apply (rule sdnets2 ,simp-all)+
apply (rule bNaux , simp-all)
done
lemma OTNSepaux :
onlyTwoNets (a ⊕ y) ∧ OnlyTwoNets z −→ OnlyTwoNets (separate (a ⊕ y # z ))
=⇒
¬ member DenyAll a =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll y =⇒
noDenyAll z =⇒ onlyTwoNets a =⇒ OnlyTwoNets (y # z ) =⇒ first-bothNet a =
first-bothNet y =⇒
OnlyTwoNets (separate (a ⊕ y # z ))
apply (drule mp)
apply simp-all
apply (rule conjI )
apply (rule otnaux )
apply simp-all
apply (rule-tac p = (y # z ) in OTNoTN )
apply simp-all
apply (metis member .simps(2 ))
apply (simp add : onlyTwoNets-def )
apply (rule-tac y = y in OTNConc,simp)
done
lemma OTNSEp[rule-format ]:
noDenyAll1 p −→ OnlyTwoNets p −→ OnlyTwoNets (separate p)
apply (induct p rule: separate.induct)
by (simp-all add : OTNSepaux noDA1eq)
lemma nda[rule-format ]:
singleCombinators (a#p) −→ noDenyAll p −→ noDenyAll1 (a # p)
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apply (induct p,simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)+
done
lemma nDAcharn[rule-format ]: noDenyAll p = (∀ r ∈ set p. ¬ member DenyAll r)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma nDAeqSet : set p = set s =⇒ noDenyAll p = noDenyAll s
by (simp add : nDAcharn)
lemma nDASCaux [rule-format ]:
DenyAll /∈ set p −→ singleCombinators p −→ r ∈ set p −→ ¬ member DenyAll r
apply (case-tac r , simp-all)
using SCnotConc by blast
lemma nDASC [rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy1 p −→ singleCombinators p −→ noDenyAll1 p
apply (induct p, simp-all)
using nDASCaux nDAcharn nda singleCombinatorsConc by blast
lemma noDAAll [rule-format ]: noDenyAll p = (¬ memberP DenyAll p)
by (induct p) simp-all
lemma memberPsep[symmetric]: memberP x p = memberP x (separate p)
by (induct p rule: separate.induct) simp-all
lemma noDAsep[rule-format ]: noDenyAll p =⇒ noDenyAll (separate p)
by (simp add :noDAAll ,subst memberPsep, simp)
lemma noDA1sep[rule-format ]: noDenyAll1 p −→ noDenyAll1 (separate p)
by (induct p rule:separate.induct , simp-all add : noDAsep)
lemma isInAlternativeLista:
(aa ∈ set (net-list-aux [a]))=⇒ aa ∈ set (net-list-aux (a # p))
by (case-tac a,auto)
lemma isInAlternativeListb:
(aa ∈ set (net-list-aux p))=⇒ aa ∈ set (net-list-aux (a # p))
by (case-tac a,simp-all)
lemma ANDSepaux : allNetsDistinct (x # y # z ) =⇒ allNetsDistinct (x ⊕ y # z )
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
apply (intro allI impI , rename-tac a b)
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subgoal for a b




net-list-aux [y ] @ net-list-aux z = net-list-aux (y # z )
by (case-tac y , simp-all)
lemma netlistalternativeSeparate: net-list-aux p = net-list-aux (separate p)
by (induct p rule:separate.induct , simp-all) (simp-all add : netlistalternativeSepa-
rateaux )
lemma ANDSepaux2 :
allNetsDistinct(x#y#z ) =⇒ allNetsDistinct(separate(y#z )) =⇒ allNetsDis-
tinct(x#separate(y#z ))
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
by (metis isInAlternativeList netlistalternativeSeparate netlistaux )
lemma ANDSep[rule-format ]: allNetsDistinct p −→ allNetsDistinct(separate p)
apply (induct p rule: separate.induct , simp-all)
apply (metis ANDConc aNDDA)
apply (metis ANDConc ANDSepaux ANDSepaux2 )
apply (metis ANDConc ANDSepaux ANDSepaux2 )
apply (metis ANDConc ANDSepaux ANDSepaux2 )
done
lemma wp1-alternativesep[rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy1-strong p −→ wellformed-policy1-strong (separate p)
by (metis sepDA separate.simps(1 ) wellformed-policy1-strong .simps(2 ) wp1n-tl)
lemma noDAsort [rule-format ]: noDenyAll1 p −→ noDenyAll1 (sort p l)
apply (case-tac p,simp-all)
subgoal for a as
apply (case-tac a = DenyAll , auto)
using NormalisationGenericProofs.set-sort nDAeqSet apply blast
proof −
fix a::( ′a, ′b)Combinators fix list
have ∗ : a 6= DenyAll =⇒ noDenyAll1 (a # list) =⇒ noDenyAll (a#list) by
(case-tac a, simp-all)
show a 6= DenyAll =⇒ noDenyAll1 (a # list) =⇒ noDenyAll1 (insort a (sort list
l) l)
apply(cases insort a (sort list l) l , simp-all)
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by (metis ∗ NormalisationGenericProofs.set-insort NormalisationGener-
icProofs.set-sort
list .simps(15 ) nDAeqSet noDA1eq)
qed
done
lemma OTNSC [rule-format ]: singleCombinators p −→ OnlyTwoNets p
apply (induct p,simp-all)
apply (rename-tac a p)
apply (rule impI ,drule mp)
apply (erule singleCombinatorsConc)
subgoal for a b
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
apply (simp add : onlyTwoNets-def )+
done
done
lemma fMTaux : ¬ member DenyAll x =⇒ first-bothNet x 6= {}
by (metis first-bothNetsd insert-commute insert-not-empty)
lemma fl2 [rule-format ]: firstList (separate p) = firstList p
by (rule separate.induct) simp-all
lemma fl3 [rule-format ]: NetsCollected p −→ (first-bothNet x 6= firstList p −→
(∀ a∈set p. first-bothNet x 6= first-bothNet a))−→ NetsCollected (x#p)
by (induct p) simp-all
lemma sortedConc[rule-format ]: sorted (a # p) l −→ sorted p l
by (induct p) simp-all
lemma smalleraux2 :
{a,b} ∈ set l =⇒ {c,d} ∈ set l =⇒ {a,b} 6= {c,d} =⇒
smaller (DenyAllFromTo a b) (DenyAllFromTo c d) l =⇒
¬ smaller (DenyAllFromTo c d) (DenyAllFromTo a b) l
by (metis bothNet .simps(2 ) pos-noteq smaller .simps(5 ))
lemma smalleraux2a:
{a,b} ∈ set l =⇒ {c,d} ∈ set l =⇒ {a,b} 6= {c,d} =⇒
smaller (DenyAllFromTo a b) (AllowPortFromTo c d p) l =⇒
¬ smaller (AllowPortFromTo c d p) (DenyAllFromTo a b) l
by (simp) (metis eq-imp-le pos-noteq)
lemma smalleraux2b:
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{a,b} ∈ set l =⇒ {c,d} ∈ set l =⇒ {a,b} 6= {c,d} =⇒ y = DenyAllFromTo a b =⇒
smaller (AllowPortFromTo c d p) y l =⇒
¬ smaller y (AllowPortFromTo c d p) l
by (simp) (metis eq-imp-le pos-noteq)
lemma smalleraux2c:
{a,b} ∈ set l=⇒{c,d}∈set l=⇒{a,b} 6= {c,d} =⇒ y = AllowPortFromTo a b q =⇒
smaller (AllowPortFromTo c d p) y l =⇒ ¬ smaller y (AllowPortFromTo c d p) l
by (simp) (metis pos-noteq)
lemma smalleraux3 :
assumes x ∈ set l and y ∈ set l and x 6= y and x = bothNet a and y = bothNet b
and smaller a b l and singleCombinators [a] and singleCombinators [b]
shows ¬ smaller b a l
proof (cases a)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using assms by (case-tac b,simp-all)
next
case (DenyAllFromTo c d) thus ?thesis
proof (cases b)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using assms DenyAll DenyAllFromTo by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo e f ) thus ?thesis using assms DenyAllFromTo
by (metis DenyAllFromTo 〈a = DenyAllFromTo c d 〉 bothNet .simps(2 ) smaller-
aux2 )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo e f g) thus ?thesis
using assms DenyAllFromTo AllowPortFromTo by simp (metis eq-imp-le pos-noteq)
next
case (Conc e f ) thus ?thesis using assms by simp
qed
next
case (AllowPortFromTo c d p) thus ?thesis
proof (cases b)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using assms AllowPortFromTo DenyAll by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo e f ) thus ?thesis
using assms by simp (metis AllowPortFromTo DenyAllFromTo bothNet .simps(3 )
smalleraux2a)
next
case (AllowPortFromTo e f g) thus ?thesis
using assms by(simp)(metis AllowPortFromTo 〈a = AllowPortFromTo c d p〉
bothNet .simps(3 ) smalleraux2c)
next




case (Conc c d) thus ?thesis using assms by simp
qed
lemma smalleraux3a:
a 6= DenyAll =⇒ b 6= DenyAll =⇒ in-list b l =⇒ in-list a l =⇒
bothNet a 6= bothNet b =⇒ smaller a b l =⇒ singleCombinators [a] =⇒
singleCombinators [b] =⇒ ¬ smaller b a l
apply (rule smalleraux3 ,simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
apply (case-tac b, simp-all)
done
lemma posaux [rule-format ]: position a l < position b l −→ a 6= b
by (induct l , simp-all)
lemma posaux6 [rule-format ]:
a ∈ set l −→ b ∈ set l −→ a 6= b −→ position a l 6= position b l
by (induct l) (simp-all add : position-positive)
lemma notSmallerTransaux [rule-format ]:
x 6= DenyAll =⇒ r 6= DenyAll =⇒
singleCombinators [x ] =⇒ singleCombinators [y ] =⇒ singleCombinators [r ] =⇒
¬ smaller y x l =⇒ smaller x y l =⇒ smaller x r l =⇒ smaller y r l =⇒
in-list x l =⇒ in-list y l =⇒ in-list r l =⇒ ¬ smaller r x l
by (metis order-trans)
lemma notSmallerTrans[rule-format ]:
x 6= DenyAll −→ r 6= DenyAll −→ singleCombinators (x#y#z ) −→
¬ smaller y x l −→ sorted (x#y#z ) l −→ r ∈ set z −→
all-in-list (x#y#z ) l −→ ¬ smaller r x l
apply (rule impI )+
apply (rule notSmallerTransaux , simp-all)
apply (metis singleCombinatorsConc singleCombinatorsStart)
apply (metis SCSubset equalityE remdups.simps(2 ) set-remdups
singleCombinatorsConc singleCombinatorsStart)
apply metis
apply (metis sorted .simps(3 ) in-set-in-list singleCombinatorsConc
singleCombinatorsStart sortedConcStart sorted-is-smaller)





lemma NCSaux1 [rule-format ]:
noDenyAll p −→ {x , y} ∈ set l −→ all-in-list p l−→ singleCombinators p −→
sorted (DenyAllFromTo x y # p) l −→ {x , y} 6= firstList p −→
DenyAllFromTo u v ∈ set p −→ {x , y} 6= {u, v}
proof (cases p)
case Nil thus ?thesis by simp
next
case (Cons a list)
then show ?thesis apply simp
apply (intro impI conjI )
apply (metis bothNet .simps(2 ) first-bothNet .simps(3 ))
proof −
assume 1 : {x , y} ∈ set l and 2 : in-list a l ∧ all-in-list list l
and 3 : singleCombinators (a # list)
and 4 : smaller (DenyAllFromTo x y) a l ∧ sorted (a # list) l
and 5 : DenyAllFromTo u v ∈ set list
and 6 : ¬ member DenyAll a ∧ noDenyAll list
have ∗ : smaller ((DenyAllFromTo x y)::(( ′a, ′b)Combinators)) (DenyAllFromTo u
v) l
apply (insert 1 2 3 4 5 , rule-tac y = a in order-trans, simp-all)
using in-set-in-list apply fastforce
by (simp add : sorted-ConsA)
have ∗∗ :{x , y} 6= first-bothNet a =⇒
¬ smaller ((DenyAllFromTo u v)::( ′a, ′b) Combinators) (DenyAllFromTo
x y) l
apply (insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 ,
rule-tac y = a and z = list in notSmallerTrans,
simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (rule smalleraux3a,simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all del : smaller .simps)
by (metis aux0-0 first-bothNet .elims list .set-intros(1 ))
show {x , y} 6= first-bothNet a =⇒ {x , y} 6= {u, v}
using 3 ∗ ∗∗ by force
qed
qed
lemma posaux3 [rule-format ]:a ∈ set l −→ b ∈ set l −→ a 6= b −→ position a l 6=
position b l
apply (induct l , auto)
by(metis position-positive)+
lemma posaux4 [rule-format ]:
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singleCombinators [a] −→ a 6= DenyAll −→ b 6= DenyAll −→ in-list a l −→in-list b l
−→
smaller a b l−→ x = (bothNet a) −→ y = (bothNet b) −→
position x l <= position y l
proof (cases a)
case DenyAll then show ?thesis by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo c d) thus ?thesis
proof (cases b)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo e f ) thus ?thesis using DenyAllFromTo
by (auto simp: eq-imp-le 〈a = DenyAllFromTo c d 〉)
next
case (AllowPortFromTo e f p) thus ?thesis using 〈a = DenyAllFromTo c d 〉 by
simp
next
case (Conc e f ) thus ?thesis using Conc 〈a = DenyAllFromTo c d 〉 by simp
qed
next
case (AllowPortFromTo c d p) thus ?thesis
proof (cases b)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo e f ) thus ?thesis using AllowPortFromTo by simp
next
case (AllowPortFromTo e f p2 ) thus ?thesis using 〈a = AllowPortFromTo c d p〉
by simp
next
case (Conc e f ) thus ?thesis using AllowPortFromTo by simp
qed
next
case (Conc c d) thus ?thesis by simp
qed
lemma NCSaux2 [rule-format ]:
noDenyAll p −→ {a, b} ∈ set l −→ all-in-list p l −→singleCombinators p −→
sorted (DenyAllFromTo a b # p) l −→ {a, b} 6= firstList p −→
AllowPortFromTo u v w ∈ set p −→ {a, b} 6= {u, v}
proof (cases p)
case Nil then show ?thesis by simp
next
case (Cons aa list)
have ∗ : {a, b} ∈ set l =⇒ in-list aa l ∧ all-in-list list l =⇒
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singleCombinators (aa # list) =⇒ AllowPortFromTo u v w ∈ set list
=⇒
smaller (DenyAllFromTo a b) aa l ∧ sorted (aa # list) l =⇒
smaller (DenyAllFromTo a b) (AllowPortFromTo u v w) l
apply (rule-tac y = aa in order-trans,simp-all del : smaller .simps)
using in-set-in-list apply fastforce
using NormalisationGenericProofs.sorted-Cons all-in-list .simps(2 ) by blast
have ∗∗: AllowPortFromTo u v w ∈ set list =⇒
in-list aa l =⇒ all-in-list list l =⇒
in-list (AllowPortFromTo u v w) l
apply (rule-tac p = list in in-set-in-list)
apply simp-all
done
assume p = aa # list
then show ?thesis
apply simp
apply (intro impI conjI ,hypsubst , simp)
apply (subgoal-tac smaller (DenyAllFromTo a b) (AllowPortFromTo u v w) l)
apply (subgoal-tac ¬ smaller (AllowPortFromTo u v w) (DenyAllFromTo a b) l)
apply (rule-tac l = l in posaux )
apply (rule-tac y = position (first-bothNet aa) l in basic-trans-rules(22 ))
apply (simp-all split : if-splits)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all)
subgoal for x x ′
apply (case-tac a = x ∧ b = x ′, simp-all)
apply (case-tac a = x , simp-all)
apply (simp add : order .not-eq-order-implies-strict posaux6 )
apply (simp add : order .not-eq-order-implies-strict posaux6 )
done
apply (simp add : order .not-eq-order-implies-strict posaux6 )
apply (rule basic-trans-rules(18 ))
apply (rule-tac a = DenyAllFromTo a b and b = aa in posaux4 , simp-all)
apply (case-tac aa,simp-all)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all)
apply (rule posaux3 , simp-all)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all)
apply (rule-tac a = aa and b = AllowPortFromTo u v w in posaux4 , simp-all)
apply (case-tac aa,simp-all)
apply (rule-tac p = list in sorted-is-smaller , simp-all)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all)
apply (rule-tac a = aa and b = AllowPortFromTo u v w in posaux4 , simp-all)
apply (case-tac aa,simp-all)
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using ∗∗ apply auto[1 ]
apply (metis all-in-list .simps(2 ) sorted-Cons)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all)
apply (metis ∗∗ bothNet .simps(3 ) in-list .simps(3 ) posaux6 )
using ∗ by force
qed
lemma NCSaux3 [rule-format ]:
noDenyAll p −→ {a, b} ∈ set l −→ all-in-list p l −→singleCombinators p −→
sorted (AllowPortFromTo a b w # p) l −→ {a, b} 6= firstList p −→
DenyAllFromTo u v ∈ set p −→ {a, b} 6= {u, v}
apply (case-tac p, simp-all ,intro impI conjI ,hypsubst ,simp)
proof −
fix aa::( ′a, ′b) Combinators fix list ::( ′a, ′b) Combinators list
assume 1 : ¬ member DenyAll aa ∧ noDenyAll list and 2 : {a, b} ∈ set l
and 3 : in-list aa l ∧ all-in-list list l and 4 : singleCombinators (aa # list)
and 5 : smaller (AllowPortFromTo a b w) aa l ∧ sorted (aa # list) l
and 6 : {a, b} 6= first-bothNet aa and 7 : DenyAllFromTo u v ∈ set list
have ∗: ¬ smaller (DenyAllFromTo u v) (AllowPortFromTo a b w) l
apply (insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 , rule-tac y = aa and z = list in notSmallerTrans)
apply (simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (rule smalleraux3a,simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all del : smaller .simps)
done
have ∗∗: smaller (AllowPortFromTo a b w) (DenyAllFromTo u v) l
apply (insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ,rule-tac y = aa in order-trans,simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (subgoal-tac in-list (DenyAllFromTo u v) l , simp)
apply (rule-tac p = list in in-set-in-list , simp-all)
apply (rule-tac p = list in sorted-is-smaller ,simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (subgoal-tac in-list (DenyAllFromTo u v) l , simp)
apply (rule-tac p = list in in-set-in-list , simp-all)
apply (erule singleCombinatorsConc)
done
show {a, b} 6= {u, v} by (insert ∗ ∗∗, simp split : if-splits)
qed
lemma NCSaux4 [rule-format ]:
noDenyAll p −→ {a, b} ∈ set l −→ all-in-list p l −→ singleCombinators p −→
sorted (AllowPortFromTo a b c # p) l −→ {a, b} 6= firstList p −→
AllowPortFromTo u v w ∈ set p −→ {a, b} 6= {u, v}
apply (cases p, simp-all)




fix aa::( ′a, ′b) Combinators fix list ::( ′a, ′b) Combinators list
assume 1 : ¬ member DenyAll aa ∧ noDenyAll list and 2 : {a, b} ∈ set l
and 3 : in-list aa l ∧ all-in-list list l and 4 : singleCombinators (aa # list)
and 5 : smaller (AllowPortFromTo a b c) aa l ∧ sorted (aa # list) l
and 6 : {a, b} 6= first-bothNet aa and 7 : AllowPortFromTo u v w ∈ set list
have ∗: ¬ smaller (AllowPortFromTo u v w) (AllowPortFromTo a b c) l
apply (insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 , rule-tac y = aa and z = list in notSmallerTrans)
apply (simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (rule smalleraux3a,simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all del : smaller .simps)
done
have ∗∗: smaller (AllowPortFromTo a b c) (AllowPortFromTo u v w) l
apply(insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 )
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (rule-tac y = aa in order-trans,simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (subgoal-tac in-list (AllowPortFromTo u v w) l , simp)
apply (rule-tac p = list in in-set-in-list , simp)
apply (case-tac aa, simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (rule-tac p = list in sorted-is-smaller ,simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (subgoal-tac in-list (AllowPortFromTo u v w) l , simp)
apply (rule-tac p = list in in-set-in-list , simp, simp)
apply (rule-tac y = aa in order-trans,simp-all del : smaller .simps)
apply (subgoal-tac in-list (AllowPortFromTo u v w) l , simp)
using in-set-in-list apply blast
by (metis all-in-list .simps(2 ) bothNet .simps(3 ) in-list .simps(3 )
singleCombinators.simps(5 ) sorted-ConsA)
show {a, b} 6= {u, v} by (insert ∗ ∗∗, simp-all split : if-splits)
qed
lemma NetsCollectedSorted [rule-format ]:




apply (intro impI ,drule mp,erule noDA1C ,drule mp,simp)
apply (drule mp,erule singleCombinatorsConc)
apply (drule mp,erule sortedConc)
proof −
fix a:: ( ′a, ′b) Combinators fix p:: ( ′a, ′b) Combinators list
assume 1 : noDenyAll1 (a # p) and 2 :all-in-list (a # p) l
and 3 : singleCombinators (a # p) and 4 : sorted (a # p) l and 5 : NetsCollected
p
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show NetsCollected (a # p)




fix aa::( ′a, ′b) Combinators
assume 6 : aa ∈ set p
show first-bothNet a 6= first-bothNet aa
apply(insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 〈a = DenyAll 〉, simp-all)
using fMTaux noDA by blast
next
case (DenyAllFromTo x21 x22 )
fix aa::( ′a, ′b) Combinators
assume 6 : first-bothNet a 6= firstList p and 7 :aa ∈ set p
show first-bothNet a 6= first-bothNet aa
apply(insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 〈a = DenyAllFromTo x21 x22 〉)
apply(case-tac aa, simp-all)
apply (meson NCSaux1 )
apply (meson NCSaux2 )
using SCnotConc by auto[1 ]
next
case (AllowPortFromTo x31 x32 x33 )
fix aa::( ′a, ′b) Combinators
assume 6 : first-bothNet a 6= firstList p and 7 :aa ∈ set p
show first-bothNet a 6= first-bothNet aa
apply(insert 1 2 3 4 6 7 〈a = AllowPortFromTo x31 x32 x33 〉)
apply(case-tac aa, simp-all)
apply (meson NCSaux3 )
apply (meson NCSaux4 )
using SCnotConc by auto
next
case (Conc x41 x42 )
fix aa::( ′a, ′b) Combinators
show first-bothNet a 6= first-bothNet aa
by(insert 3 4 〈a = x41 ⊕ x42 〉,simp)
qed
qed
lemma NetsCollectedSort : distinct p =⇒noDenyAll1 p =⇒ all-in-list p l =⇒
singleCombinators p =⇒ NetsCollected (sort p l)
apply (rule-tac l = l in NetsCollectedSorted ,rule noDAsort , simp-all)
apply (rule-tac b=p in all-in-listSubset)
by (auto intro: sort-is-sorted)
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lemma fBNsep[rule-format ]: (∀ a∈set z . {b,c} 6= first-bothNet a) −→
(∀ a∈set (separate z ). {b,c} 6= first-bothNet a)
apply (induct z rule: separate.induct , simp)
by (rule impI , simp)+
lemma fBNsep1 [rule-format ]: (∀ a∈set z . first-bothNet x 6= first-bothNet a) −→
(∀ a∈set (separate z ). first-bothNet x 6= first-bothNet a)
apply (induct z rule: separate.induct , simp)
by (rule impI , simp)+
lemma NetsCollectedSepauxa:
{b,c}6=firstList z =⇒ noDenyAll1 z =⇒ ∀ a∈set z . {b,c}6=first-bothNet a =⇒ NetsCol-
lected z =⇒
NetsCollected (separate z ) =⇒ {b, c} 6= firstList (separate z ) =⇒ a ∈ set (separate
z ) =⇒
{b, c} 6= first-bothNet a
by (rule fBNsep) simp-all
lemma NetsCollectedSepaux :
first-bothNet (x ::( ′a, ′b)Combinators) 6= first-bothNet y =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll y ∧
noDenyAll z =⇒
(∀ a∈set z . first-bothNet x 6= first-bothNet a) ∧ NetsCollected (y # z ) =⇒
NetsCollected (separate (y # z )) =⇒ first-bothNet x 6= firstList (separate (y # z ))
=⇒
a ∈ set (separate (y # z )) =⇒
first-bothNet (x ::( ′a, ′b)Combinators) 6= first-bothNet (a::( ′a, ′b)Combinators)
by (rule fBNsep1 ) auto
lemma NetsCollectedSep[rule-format ]:
noDenyAll1 p −→ NetsCollected p −→ NetsCollected (separate p)
proof (induct p rule: separate.induct , simp-all , goal-cases)
fix x ::( ′a, ′b) Combinators list
case 1 then show ?case
by (metis fMTaux noDA noDA1eq noDAsep)
next
fix v va y fix z ::( ′a, ′b) Combinators list
case 2 then show ?case
apply (intro conjI impI , simp)
apply (metis NetsCollectedSepaux fl3 noDA1eq noDenyAll .simps(1 ))
by (metis noDA1eq noDenyAll .simps(1 ))
next
fix v va vb y fix z ::( ′a, ′b) Combinators list
case 3 then show ?case
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apply (intro conjI impI )
apply (metis NetsCollectedSepaux fl3 noDA1eq noDenyAll .simps(1 ))
by (metis noDA1eq noDenyAll .simps(1 ))
next
fix v va y fix z ::( ′a, ′b) Combinators list
case 4 then show ?case
by (metis NetsCollectedSepaux fl3 noDA1eq noDenyAll .simps(1 ))
qed
lemma OTNaux :
onlyTwoNets a =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll a =⇒ (x ,y) ∈ sdnets a =⇒
(x = first-srcNet a ∧ y = first-destNet a) ∨ (x = first-destNet a ∧ y = first-srcNet
a)
apply (case-tac (x = first-srcNet a ∧ y = first-destNet a),simp-all add :
onlyTwoNets-def )
apply (case-tac (∃ aa b. sdnets a = {(aa, b)}), simp-all)
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a,first-destNet a)}, simp-all)
apply (metis singletonE first-isIn)
apply (subgoal-tacsdnets a = {(first-srcNet a,first-destNet a),(first-destNet a,
first-srcNet a)})
by(auto intro!: sdnets2 )
lemma sdnets-charn: onlyTwoNets a =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll a =⇒
sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a,first-destNet a)} ∨
sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a),(first-destNet a, first-srcNet a)}
apply (case-tac sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a)}, simp-all add :
onlyTwoNets-def )
apply (case-tac (∃ aa b. sdnets a = {(aa, b)}), simp-all)
apply (metis singletonE first-isIn)
apply (subgoal-tac sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a,first-destNet a),(first-destNet
a,first-srcNet a)})
by( auto intro!: sdnets2 )
lemma first-bothNet-charn[rule-format ]:
¬ member DenyAll a −→ first-bothNet a = {first-srcNet a, first-destNet a}
by (induct a) simp-all
lemma sdnets-noteq :
onlyTwoNets a =⇒ onlyTwoNets aa =⇒ first-bothNet a 6= first-bothNet aa =⇒
¬ member DenyAll a =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll aa =⇒ sdnets a 6= sdnets aa
apply (insert sdnets-charn [of a])
apply (insert sdnets-charn [of aa])
apply (insert first-bothNet-charn [of a])
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apply (insert first-bothNet-charn [of aa])
by(metis OTNaux first-isIn insert-absorb2 insert-commute)
lemma fbn-noteq :
onlyTwoNets a =⇒ onlyTwoNets aa =⇒ first-bothNet a 6= first-bothNet aa =⇒
¬ member DenyAll a =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll aa =⇒ allNetsDistinct [a, aa] =⇒
first-srcNet a 6= first-srcNet aa ∨ first-srcNet a 6= first-destNet aa ∨
first-destNet a 6= first-srcNet aa ∨ first-destNet a 6= first-destNet aa
apply (insert sdnets-charn [of a])
apply (insert sdnets-charn [of aa])
by (metis first-bothNet-charn)
lemma NCisSD2aux :
assumes 1 : onlyTwoNets a and 2 : onlyTwoNets aa and 3 : first-bothNet a 6=
first-bothNet aa
and 4 : ¬ member DenyAll a and 5 : ¬ member DenyAll aa and 6 : allNetsDistinct
[a, aa]
shows disjSD-2 a aa
apply (insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 )
apply (simp add : disjSD-2-def )
apply (intro allI impI )
apply (insert sdnets-charn [of a] sdnets-charn [of aa], simp)
apply (insert sdnets-noteq [of a aa] fbn-noteq [of a aa], simp)
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def twoNetsDistinct-def )
proof −
fix ab b c d
assume 7 : ∀ ab b. ab 6=b ∧ ab∈set(net-list-aux [a,aa]) ∧ b∈set(net-list-aux [a,aa]) −→
netsDistinct ab b
and 8 : (ab, b) ∈ sdnets a ∧ (c, d) ∈ sdnets aa
and 9 : sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a)} ∨
sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a), (first-destNet a, first-srcNet a)}
and 10 : sdnets aa = {(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa)} ∨
sdnets aa = {(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa), (first-destNet aa, first-srcNet
aa)}
and 11 : sdnets a 6= sdnets aa
and 12 : first-destNet a = first-srcNet aa −→ first-srcNet a = first-destNet aa −→
first-destNet aa 6= first-srcNet aa
show (netsDistinct ab c ∨ netsDistinct b d) ∧ (netsDistinct ab d ∨ netsDistinct
b c)
proof (rule conjI )
show netsDistinct ab c ∨ netsDistinct b d
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apply(insert 7 8 9 10 11 12 )
apply (cases sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a)})
apply (cases sdnets aa = {(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa)}, simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (case-tac (c = first-srcNet aa ∧ d = first-destNet aa), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (first-srcNet a) 6= (first-srcNet aa),simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 firstInNeta alternativelistconc2 )
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet a 6= first-destNet aa)
apply (metis 4 5 firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis 3 4 5 first-bothNetsd)
apply (case-tac (first-destNet aa) 6= (first-srcNet a),simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (case-tac first-destNet aa 6= first-destNet a,simp-all)
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet aa 6= first-destNet a)
apply (metis 4 5 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis 3 4 5 first-bothNetsd insert-commute)
apply (metis 5 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (case-tac (c = first-srcNet aa ∧ d = first-destNet aa), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (ab = first-srcNet a ∧ b = first-destNet a), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (first-srcNet a) 6= (first-srcNet aa),simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 firstInNeta alternativelistconc2 )
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet a 6= first-destNet aa)
apply (metis 4 5 firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis 3 4 5 first-bothNetsd )
apply (case-tac (first-destNet aa) 6= (first-srcNet a),simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (case-tac first-destNet aa 6= first-destNet a, simp)
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet aa 6= first-destNet a)
apply (metis 4 5 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis 3 4 5 first-bothNetsd insert-commute)
apply (metis)
proof −
assume 14 : (ab = first-srcNet a ∧ b = first-destNet a ∨ ab = first-destNet a ∧
b = first-srcNet a) ∧ (c, d) ∈ sdnets aa
and 15 : sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a), (first-destNet a,
first-srcNet a)}
and 16 : sdnets aa = {(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa)} ∨ sdnets aa =
{(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa), (first-destNet aa, first-srcNet aa)}
and 17 : {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a), (first-destNet a, first-srcNet a)} 6=
sdnets aa
and 18 : first-destNet a = first-srcNet aa −→ first-srcNet a = first-destNet
aa −→ first-destNet aa 6= first-srcNet aa
and 19 : first-destNet a 6= first-srcNet a
and 20 : c = first-srcNet aa −→ d 6= first-destNet aa
93
show netsDistinct ab c ∨ netsDistinct b d
apply (case-tac (ab = first-srcNet a ∧ b = first-destNet a),simp-all)
apply (case-tac c = first-srcNet aa, simp-all)
apply (metis 2 5 14 20 OTNaux )
apply (subgoal-tac c = first-destNet aa, simp)
apply (subgoal-tac d = first-srcNet aa, simp)
apply (case-tac (first-srcNet a) 6= (first-destNet aa),simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 7 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet a 6= first-srcNet aa)
apply (metis 4 5 7 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis 3 4 5 first-bothNetsd insert-commute)
apply (metis 2 5 14 OTNaux )
apply (metis 2 5 14 OTNaux )
apply (case-tac c = first-srcNet aa, simp-all)
apply (metis 2 5 14 20 OTNaux )
apply (subgoal-tac c = first-destNet aa, simp)
apply (subgoal-tac d = first-srcNet aa, simp)
apply (case-tac (first-destNet a) 6= (first-destNet aa),simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 7 14 firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet a 6= first-srcNet aa)
apply (metis 4 5 7 14 firstInNeta alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis 3 4 5 first-bothNetsd insert-commute)
apply (metis 2 5 14 OTNaux )




show netsDistinct ab d ∨ netsDistinct b c
apply (insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 )
apply (cases sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a)})
apply (cases sdnets aa = {(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa)}, simp-all)
apply (case-tac (c = first-srcNet aa ∧ d = first-destNet aa), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (first-srcNet a) 6= (first-destNet aa), simp-all)
apply (metis firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (subgoal-tac first-destNet a 6= first-srcNet aa)
apply (metis firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis first-bothNetsd insert-commute)
apply (case-tac (c = first-srcNet aa ∧ d = first-destNet aa), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (ab = first-srcNet a ∧ b = first-destNet a), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (first-destNet a) 6= (first-srcNet aa),simp-all)
apply (metis firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet a 6= first-destNet aa)
apply (metis firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis first-bothNetsd insert-commute)
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apply (case-tac (first-srcNet aa) 6= (first-srcNet a),simp-all)
apply (metis firstInNeta alternativelistconc2 )
apply (case-tac first-destNet aa 6= first-destNet a,simp-all)
apply (metis firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis first-bothNetsd)
proof −
assume 13 : ∀ ab b. ab 6= b ∧ ab∈set(net-list-aux [a,aa]) ∧ b ∈ set(net-list-aux [a,aa])
−→ netsDistinct ab b
and 14 : (ab = first-srcNet a ∧ b = first-destNet a ∨
ab = first-destNet a ∧ b = first-srcNet a) ∧ (c, d) ∈ sdnets aa
and 15 : sdnets a = {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a),
(first-destNet a, first-srcNet a)}
and 16 : sdnets aa = {(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa)} ∨
sdnets aa = {(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa),
(first-destNet aa, first-srcNet aa)}
and 17 : {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a),
(first-destNet a, first-srcNet a)} 6= sdnets aa
show first-destNet a 6= first-srcNet a =⇒ netsDistinct ab d ∨ netsDistinct b c
apply (insert 1 2 3 4 5 6 13 14 15 16 17 )
apply (cases sdnets aa = {(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa)}, simp-all)
apply (case-tac (c = first-srcNet aa ∧ d = first-destNet aa), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (ab = first-srcNet a ∧ b = first-destNet a), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (first-destNet a) 6= (first-srcNet aa),simp-all)
apply (metis firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet a 6= first-destNet aa)
apply (metis firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis first-bothNetsd insert-commute)
apply (case-tac (first-srcNet aa) 6= (first-srcNet a),simp-all)
apply (metis firstInNeta alternativelistconc2 )
apply (case-tac first-destNet aa 6= first-destNet a,simp-all)
apply (metis firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis first-bothNetsd)
proof −
assume 20 : {(first-srcNet a, first-destNet a), (first-destNet a, first-srcNet a)} 6=
{(first-srcNet aa, first-destNet aa), (first-destNet aa, first-srcNet aa)}
and 21 : first-destNet a 6= first-srcNet a
show netsDistinct ab d ∨ netsDistinct b c
apply (case-tac (c = first-srcNet aa ∧ d = first-destNet aa), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (ab = first-srcNet a ∧ b = first-destNet a), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (first-destNet a) 6= (first-srcNet aa), simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 7 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet a 6= first-destNet aa)
apply (metis 4 5 7 firstInNeta firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (metis 20 insert-commute)
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apply (case-tac (first-srcNet aa) 6= (first-srcNet a), simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 13 14 firstInNeta alternativelistconc2 )
apply (case-tac first-destNet aa 6= first-destNet a, simp-all)
apply (metis 4 5 13 14 firstInNet alternativelistconc2 )
apply (case-tac (ab = first-srcNet a ∧ b = first-destNet a), simp-all)
apply (case-tac (first-destNet a) 6= (first-srcNet aa), simp-all)
apply (metis 20 )
apply (subgoal-tac first-srcNet a 6= first-srcNet aa)
apply (metis 20 )
apply (metis 21 )
apply (case-tac (first-srcNet aa) 6= (first-destNet a))
apply (metis (no-types, lifting) 2 3 4 5 7 14 OTNaux
firstInNet firstInNeta first-bothNetsd isInAlternativeList)






lemma ANDaux3 [rule-format ]:
y ∈ set xs −→ a ∈ set (net-list-aux [y ]) −→ a ∈ set (net-list-aux xs)
by (induct xs) (simp-all add : isInAlternativeList)
lemma ANDaux2 :
allNetsDistinct (x # xs) =⇒ y ∈ set xs =⇒ allNetsDistinct [x ,y ]
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
by (meson ANDaux3 isInAlternativeList netlistaux )
lemma NCisSD2 [rule-format ]:
¬ member DenyAll a =⇒ OnlyTwoNets (a#p) =⇒
NetsCollected2 (a # p) =⇒ NetsCollected (a#p) =⇒
noDenyAll ( p) =⇒ allNetsDistinct (a # p) =⇒ s ∈ set p =⇒
disjSD-2 a s
by (metis ANDaux2 FWNormalisationCore.member .simps(2 ) NCisSD2aux NetsCol-
lected .simps(1 )
NetsCollected2 .simps(1 ) OTNConc OTNoTN empty-iff empty-set list .set-intros(1 )
noDA)
lemma separatedNC [rule-format ]:
OnlyTwoNets p −→ NetsCollected2 p −→ NetsCollected p −→ noDenyAll1 p −→
allNetsDistinct p −→ separated p
proof (induct p, simp-all , rename-tac a b, case-tac a = DenyAll , simp-all , goal-cases)
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fix a fix p::( ′a set set , ′b) Combinators list
show OnlyTwoNets p −→ NetsCollected2 p −→ NetsCollected p −→ noDenyAll1 p
−→
allNetsDistinct p −→ separated p =⇒ a 6= DenyAll =⇒ OnlyTwoNets (a # p)
−→
first-bothNet a 6= firstList p ∧ NetsCollected2 p −→
(∀ aa∈set p. first-bothNet a 6= first-bothNet aa) ∧ NetsCollected p −→
noDenyAll1 (a # p) −→ allNetsDistinct (a # p) −→ (∀ s. s ∈ set p −→
disjSD-2 a s) ∧ separated p
apply (intro impI ,drule mp, erule OTNConc,drule mp)
apply (case-tac p, simp-all)
apply (drule mp,erule noDA1C , intro conjI allI impI NCisSD2 , simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
using ANDConc by auto
next
fix a::( ′a set set , ′b) Combinators fix p ::( ′a set set , ′b) Combinators list
show OnlyTwoNets p −→ NetsCollected2 p −→ NetsCollected p −→ noDenyAll1 p
−→
allNetsDistinct p −→ separated p =⇒ a = DenyAll =⇒ OnlyTwoNets p −→
{}6=firstList p ∧ NetsCollected2 p −→ (∀ a∈set p. {}6=first-bothNet
a)∧NetsCollected p −→
noDenyAll p −→ allNetsDistinct (DenyAll # p) −→
(∀ s. s ∈ set p −→ disjSD-2 DenyAll s) ∧ separated p
by (simp add : ANDConc disjSD-2-def noDA1eq)
qed
lemma separatedNC ′[rule-format ]:
OnlyTwoNets p −→ NetsCollected2 p −→ NetsCollected p −→ noDenyAll1 p −→
allNetsDistinct p −→ separated p
proof (induct p)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) then show ?case
apply simp
proof (cases a = DenyAll) print-cases
case True
then show OnlyTwoNets (a # p) −→ first-bothNet a 6= firstList p ∧ NetsCollected2
p −→
(∀ aa∈set p. first-bothNet a 6= first-bothNet aa) ∧ NetsCollected p −→
noDenyAll1 (a # p) −→ allNetsDistinct (a # p) −→
(∀ s. s ∈ set p −→ disjSD-2 a s) ∧ separated p
apply(insert Cons.hyps 〈a = DenyAll 〉)
apply (intro impI ,drule mp, erule OTNConc,drule mp)
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apply (case-tac p, simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
apply (case-tac a, simp-all)
by (simp add : ANDConc disjSD-2-def noDA1eq)
next
case False
then show OnlyTwoNets (a # p) −→ first-bothNet a 6= firstList p ∧ NetsCollected2
p −→
(∀ aa∈set p. first-bothNet a 6= first-bothNet aa) ∧ NetsCollected p −→
noDenyAll1 (a # p) −→ allNetsDistinct (a # p) −→ (∀ s. s ∈ set p
−→
disjSD-2 a s) ∧ separated p
apply(insert Cons.hyps 〈a 6= DenyAll 〉)




lemma NC2Sep[rule-format ]: noDenyAll1 p −→ NetsCollected2 (separate p)
proof (induct p rule: separate.induct , simp-all , goal-cases)
fix x :: ( ′a, ′b) Combinators list
case 1 then show ?case
by (metis fMTaux firstList .simps(1 ) fl2 noDA1eq noDenyAll .elims(2 ) sepa-
rate.simps(5 ))
next
fix v va fix y :: ( ′a, ′b) Combinators fix z
case 2 then show ?case
by (simp add : fl2 noDA1eq)
next
fix v va vb fix y :: ( ′a, ′b) Combinators fix z
case 3 then show ?case
by (simp add : fl2 noDA1eq)
next
fix v va fix y :: ( ′a, ′b) Combinators fix z
case 4 then show ?case
by (simp add : fl2 noDA1eq)
qed
lemma separatedSep[rule-format ]:
OnlyTwoNets p −→ NetsCollected2 p −→ NetsCollected p −→
noDenyAll1 p −→ allNetsDistinct p −→ separated (separate p)
by (simp add : ANDSep NC2Sep NetsCollectedSep OTNSEp noDA1sep separatedNC )
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lemma rADnMT [rule-format ]: p 6= [] −→ removeAllDuplicates p 6= []
by (induct p) simp-all
lemma remDupsNMT [rule-format ]: p 6= [] −→ remdups p 6= []
by (metis remdups-eq-nil-iff )
lemma sets-distinct1 : (n::int) 6= m =⇒ {(a,b). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a = m}
by auto
lemma sets-distinct2 : (m::int) 6= n =⇒ {(a,b). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a = m}
by auto
lemma sets-distinct5 : (n::int) < m =⇒ {(a,b). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a = m}
by auto
lemma sets-distinct6 : (m::int) < n =⇒ {(a,b). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a = m}
by auto
end






Normalisation proofs which are specific to the IntegerPort address representation.
lemma ConcAssoc: C ((A ⊕ B) ⊕ D) = C (A ⊕ (B ⊕ D))
by (simp add : C .simps)
lemma aux26 [simp]: twoNetsDistinct a b c d =⇒
dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) ∩ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo c d)) = {}
apply (auto simp: PLemmas twoNetsDistinct-def netsDistinct-def )[1 ]
by auto
lemma wp2-aux [rule-format ]: wellformed-policy2 (xs @ [x ]) −→
wellformed-policy2 xs
apply (induct xs, simp-all)
subgoal for a xs




lemma Cdom2 : x ∈ dom(C b) =⇒ C (a ⊕ b) x = (C b) x
by (auto simp: C .simps)
lemma wp2Conc[rule-format ]: wellformed-policy2 (x#xs) =⇒ wellformed-policy2 xs
by (case-tac x ,simp-all)
lemma DAimpliesMR-E [rule-format ]: DenyAll ∈ set p −→
(∃ r . applied-rule-rev C x p = Some r)
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct , simp-all)
by (metis C .simps(1 ) denyAllDom)
lemma DAimplieMR[rule-format ]: DenyAll ∈ set p =⇒ applied-rule-rev C x p 6= None
by (auto intro: DAimpliesMR-E )
lemma MRList1 [rule-format ]: x ∈ dom (C a) =⇒ applied-rule-rev C x (b@[a]) = Some
a
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma MRList2 : x ∈ dom (C a) =⇒ applied-rule-rev C x (c@b@[a]) = Some a
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma MRList3 :
x /∈ dom (C xa) =⇒ applied-rule-rev C x (a @ b # xs @ [xa]) = applied-rule-rev C x
(a @ b # xs)
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma CConcEnd [rule-format ]:
C a x = Some y −→ C (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [a])) x = Some y
(is ?P xs)
apply (rule-tac P = ?P in list2FWpolicy .induct)
by (simp-all add :C .simps)
lemma CConcStartaux : C a x = None =⇒ (C aa ++ C a) x = C aa x
by (simp add : PLemmas)
lemma CConcStart [rule-format ]:
xs 6= [] −→ C a x = None −→ C (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [a])) x = C (list2FWpolicy
xs) x
apply (rule list2FWpolicy .induct)
by (simp-all add : PLemmas)
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lemma mrNnt [simp]: applied-rule-rev C x p = Some a =⇒ p 6= []
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
by auto
lemma mr-is-C [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev C x p = Some a −→ C (list2FWpolicy (p)) x = C a x
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule rev-induct ,auto)
apply (metis CConcEnd)
apply (metis CConcEnd)
by (metis CConcStart applied-rule-rev-def mrNnt option.exhaust)
lemma CConcStart2 :
p 6= [] =⇒ x /∈ dom (C a) =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy (p @ [a])) x = C (list2FWpolicy p)
x
by (erule CConcStart ,simp add : PLemmas)
lemma CConcEnd1 :
q @ p 6= [] =⇒ x /∈ dom (C a) =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy (q @ p @ [a])) x = C
(list2FWpolicy (q @ p)) x
apply (subst lCdom2 )
by (rule CConcStart2 , simp-all)
lemma CConcEnd2 [rule-format ]:
x ∈ dom (C a) −→ C (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [a])) x = C a x (is ?P xs)
apply (rule-tac P = ?P in list2FWpolicy .induct)
by (auto simp:C .simps)
lemma bar3 :
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [xa]))) =⇒ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy xs)) ∨ x
∈ dom (C xa)
by auto (metis CConcStart eq-Nil-appendI l2p-aux2 option.simps(3 ))
lemma CeqEnd [rule-format ,simp]:
a 6= [] −→ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy a)) −→ C (list2FWpolicy(b@a)) x = (C
(list2FWpolicy a)) x
apply (rule rev-induct ,simp-all)
subgoal for xa xs
apply (case-tac xs 6= [], simp-all)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C xa))
apply (metis CConcEnd2 MRList2 mr-is-C )
apply (metis CConcEnd1 CConcStart2 Nil-is-append-conv bar3 )





x ∈ dom (C a) −→ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (a # b))) (is ?P b)
apply (rule-tac P = ?P in list2FWpolicy .induct)
apply (simp-all add : C .simps)
done
lemma domConc:
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy b)) =⇒ b 6= [] =⇒ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (a @ b)))
by (auto simp: PLemmas)
lemma CeqStart [rule-format ,simp]:
x /∈dom(C (list2FWpolicy a)) −→ a 6=[] −→ b 6=[] −→ C (list2FWpolicy(b@a)) x =
(C (list2FWpolicy b)) x
apply (rule list2FWpolicy .induct ,simp-all)
apply (auto simp: list2FWpolicyconc PLemmas)
done
lemma C-eq-if-mr-eq2 :
applied-rule-rev C x a = brc =⇒
applied-rule-rev C x b = brc =⇒ a 6= [] =⇒ b 6= [] =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy a) x = C (list2FWpolicy b) x
by (metis mr-is-C )
lemma nMRtoNone[rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ applied-rule-rev C x p = None −→ C (list2FWpolicy p) x = None
apply (rule rev-induct , simp-all)
subgoal for xa xs
apply (case-tac xs = [], simp-all)
by (simp-all add : applied-rule-rev-def dom-def )
done
lemma C-eq-if-mr-eq :
applied-rule-rev C x b = applied-rule-rev C x a =⇒ a 6= [] =⇒ b 6= [] =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy a) x = C (list2FWpolicy b) x
apply (cases applied-rule-rev C x a = None, simp-all)
apply (subst nMRtoNone,simp-all)
apply (subst nMRtoNone, simp-all)
by (auto intro: C-eq-if-mr-eq2 )
lemma notmatching-notdom: applied-rule-rev C x (p@[a]) 6= Some a =⇒ x /∈ dom (C
a)
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by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def split : if-splits)
lemma foo3a[rule-format ]:




apply (intro impI conjI , simp)
subgoal for xa xs
apply (rule-tac p = a @ b # xs in notmatching-notdom,simp-all)
done
by (metis MRList2 MRList3 append-Cons option.inject)
lemma foo3D :
wellformed-policy1 p =⇒ p = DenyAll # ps =⇒
applied-rule-rev C x p = bDenyAllc =⇒ r ∈ set ps =⇒ x /∈ dom (C r)
by (rule-tac a = [] and b = DenyAll and c = ps in foo3a, simp-all)
lemma foo4 [rule-format ]:




x ∈ dom (C b) −→ (∀ r . r ∈ set c −→ x /∈ dom (C r)) −→ applied-rule-rev C x
(b#c) = Some b
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule-tac xs = c in rev-induct , simp-all)
done
lemma mr-first :
x ∈ dom (C b) =⇒ ∀ r . r ∈ set c −→ x /∈ dom (C r) =⇒ s = b # c =⇒ applied-rule-rev
C x s = bbc
by (simp add : foo5b)
lemma mr-charn[rule-format ]:
a ∈ set p −→ (x ∈ dom (C a)) −→ (∀ r . r ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (C r) −→ r = a)
−→
applied-rule-rev C x p = Some a
unfolding applied-rule-rev-def





∀ r . r ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (C r) −→ r = a =⇒ set p = set s =⇒
∀ r . r ∈ set s ∧ x ∈ dom (C r) −→ r = a
by auto
lemma mrConcEnd [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev C x (b # p) = Some a −→ a 6= b −→ applied-rule-rev C x p = Some
a
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
by (rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct ,auto)
lemma wp3tl [rule-format ]: wellformed-policy3 p −→ wellformed-policy3 (tl p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)




lemma wp3Conc[rule-format ]: wellformed-policy3 (a#p) −→ wellformed-policy3 p
by (induct p, simp-all , case-tac a, simp-all)
lemma foo98 [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev C x (aa # p) = Some a −→ x ∈ dom (C r) −→ r ∈ set p −→ a ∈
set p
unfolding applied-rule-rev-def
apply (rule rev-induct , simp-all)
subgoal for xa xs
apply (case-tac r = xa, simp-all)
done
done
lemma mrMTNone[simp]: applied-rule-rev C x [] = None
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma DAAux [simp]: x ∈ dom (C DenyAll)
by (simp add : dom-def PolicyCombinators.PolicyCombinators C .simps)
lemma mrSet [rule-format ]: applied-rule-rev C x p = Some r −→ r ∈ set p
unfolding applied-rule-rev-def
by (rule-tac xs=p in rev-induct , simp-all)
lemma mr-not-Conc: singleCombinators p =⇒ applied-rule-rev C x p 6= Some (a⊕b)
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lemma foo25 [rule-format ]: wellformed-policy3 (p@[x ]) −→ wellformed-policy3 p
by (induct p, simp-all , case-tac a, simp-all)
lemma mr-in-dom[rule-format ]: applied-rule-rev C x p = Some a −→ x ∈ dom (C a)
apply (rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct)
by (auto simp: applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma wp3EndMT [rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy3 (p@[xs]) −→ AllowPortFromTo a b po ∈ set p −→
dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b po)) ∩ dom (C xs) = {}
apply (induct p,simp-all)
apply (intro impI ,drule mp,erule wp3Conc)
by clarify auto
lemma foo29 : [[dom (C a) 6= {}; dom (C a) ∩ dom (C b) = {}]] =⇒ a 6= b by auto
lemma foo28 :
AllowPortFromTo a b po ∈ set p =⇒ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b po)) 6= {} =⇒
wellformed-policy3 (p @ [x ]) =⇒ x 6= AllowPortFromTo a b po
by (metis foo29 C .simps(3 ) wp3EndMT )
lemma foo28a[rule-format ]: x ∈ dom (C a) =⇒ dom (C a) 6= {} by auto
lemma allow-deny-dom[simp]:
dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b po)) ⊆ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a b))
by (simp-all add : twoNetsDistinct-def netsDistinct-def PLemmas) auto
lemma DenyAllowDisj :
dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) 6= {} =⇒
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a b)) ∩ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) 6= {}
by (metis Int-absorb1 allow-deny-dom)
lemma foo31 :
∀ r . r ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (C r) −→
r = AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r = DenyAllFromTo a b ∨ r = DenyAll =⇒
set p = set s =⇒
∀ r . r ∈ set s ∧ x ∈ dom (C r) −→ r=AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r = DenyAllFromTo
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a b ∨ r = DenyAll
by auto
lemma wp1-auxa:
wellformed-policy1-strong p=⇒(∃ r . applied-rule-rev C x p = Some r)
apply (rule DAimpliesMR-E )
by (erule wp1-aux1aa)
lemma deny-dom[simp]:
twoNetsDistinct a b c d =⇒ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a b)) ∩ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo
c d)) = {}
apply (simp add : C .simps)
by (erule aux6 )
lemma domTrans: dom a ⊆ dom b =⇒ dom b ∩ dom c = {} =⇒ dom a ∩ dom c =
{} by auto
lemma DomInterAllowsMT :
twoNetsDistinct a b c d =⇒
dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) ∩ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo c d po)) = {}
apply (case-tac p = po, simp-all)
apply (rule-tac b = C (DenyAllFromTo a b) in domTrans, simp-all)
apply (metis domComm aux26 tNDComm)
by (simp add : twoNetsDistinct-def netsDistinct-def PLemmas) auto
lemma DomInterAllowsMT-Ports:
p 6= po =⇒ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) ∩ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo c d po))
= {}
by (simp add : twoNetsDistinct-def netsDistinct-def PLemmas) auto
lemma wellformed-policy3-charn[rule-format ]:
singleCombinators p −→ distinct p −→ allNetsDistinct p −→
wellformed-policy1 p −→ wellformed-policy2 p −→ wellformed-policy3 p
apply (induct-tac p)
apply simp-all
apply (auto intro: singleCombinatorsConc ANDConc waux2 wp2Conc)
subgoal for a list
apply (case-tac a, simp-all , clarify)






DenyAllFromTo b c ∈ set p =⇒
AllowPortFromTo a d po ∈ set p =⇒
allNetsDistinct p =⇒ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo b c)) ∩ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a
d po)) 6= {} =⇒
b = a ∧ c = d
unfolding allNetsDistinct-def
apply (frule-tac x = b in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = d in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = a in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = c in spec)
apply (simp,metis Int-commute ND0aux1 ND0aux3 NDComm aux26
twoNetsDistinct-def ND0aux2 ND0aux4 )
done
lemma DistinctNetsAllowAllow :
AllowPortFromTo b c poo ∈ set p =⇒
AllowPortFromTo a d po ∈ set p =⇒
allNetsDistinct p =⇒
dom (C (AllowPortFromTo b c poo)) ∩ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a d po)) 6= {}
=⇒
b = a ∧ c = d ∧ poo = po
unfolding allNetsDistinct-def
apply (frule-tac x = b in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = d in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = a in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = c in spec)





singleCombinators p =⇒ distinct p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒
wellformed-policy2 (removeShadowRules2 p)
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons x xs)
have wp-xs: wellformed-policy2 (removeShadowRules2 xs)
by (metis Cons ANDConc distinct .simps(2 ) singleCombinatorsConc)
show ?case
proof (cases x )
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case DenyAll thus ?thesis using wp-xs by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b) thus ?thesis
using wp-xs Cons by (simp,metis DenyAllFromTo aux aux7 tNDComm deny-dom)
next
case (AllowPortFromTo a b p) thus ?thesis
using wp-xs by (simp, metis aux26 AllowPortFromTo Cons(4 ) aux aux7a tND-
Comm)
next
case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis




AllowPortFromTo a b po ∈ set p =⇒ DenyAllFromTo c d ∈ set p =⇒
allNetsDistinct p =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒ a 6= c ∨ b 6= d =⇒
dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b po)) ∩ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo c d)) = {}
by (rule aux26 ,rule-tac x =AllowPortFromTo a b po and y = DenyAllFromTo c d in
tND , auto)
lemma sorted-WP2 [rule-format ]: sorted p l −→ all-in-list p l −→ distinct p −→
allNetsDistinct p −→ singleCombinators p −→ wellformed-policy2 p
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) thus ?case
proof (cases a)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using Cons
by (auto intro: ANDConc singleCombinatorsConc sortedConcEnd)
next
case (DenyAllFromTo c d) thus ?thesis using Cons
apply simp
apply (intro impI conjI allI )
apply (rule deny-dom)




case (AllowPortFromTo c d e) thus ?thesis using Cons
apply simp
apply (intro impI conjI allI aux26 )




apply (subgoal-tac smaller (AllowPortFromTo c d e) (DenyAllFromTo aa b) l)
apply (simp split : if-splits)
apply metis
apply (erule sorted-is-smaller , simp-all)
apply (metis bothNet .simps(2 ) in-list .simps(2 ) in-set-in-list)
by (auto intro: aux7 tNDComm ANDConc singleCombinatorsConc sortedConcEnd)
next




all-in-list p l =⇒ distinct p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒
singleCombinators p =⇒ wellformed-policy2 (sort p l)
apply (rule sorted-WP2 ,erule sort-is-sorted , simp-all)
apply (auto elim: all-in-listSubset intro: SC3 singleCombinatorsConc sorted-insort)
done
lemma wellformed2-sortedQ [simp]: [[all-in-list p l ; distinct p; allNetsDistinct p;
singleCombinators p]] =⇒ wellformed-policy2 (qsort p l)
apply (rule sorted-WP2 ,erule sort-is-sortedQ , simp-all)
apply (auto elim: all-in-listSubset intro: SC3Q singleCombinatorsConc
distinct-sortQ)
done
lemma C-DenyAll [simp]: C (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [DenyAll ])) x = Some (deny ())
by (auto simp: PLemmas)
lemma C-eq-RS1n:
C (list2FWpolicy (removeShadowRules1-alternative p)) = C (list2FWpolicy p)
proof (cases p)print-cases
case Nil then show ?thesis apply(simp-all)
by (metis list2FWpolicy .simps(1 ) rSR1-eq removeShadowRules1 .simps(2 ))
next
case (Cons x list) show ?thesis
apply (rule rev-induct)
apply (metis rSR1-eq removeShadowRules1 .simps(2 ))
subgoal for x xs
apply (case-tac xs = [], simp-all)
unfolding removeShadowRules1-alternative-def
apply (case-tac x , simp-all)








p 6= [] =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy (removeShadowRules1 p)) = C (list2FWpolicy p)
by (metis rSR1-eq C-eq-RS1n)
lemma EX-MR-aux [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev C x (DenyAll # p) 6= Some DenyAll −→ (∃ y . applied-rule-rev C x p
= Some y)
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct , simp-all)
done
lemma EX-MR :
applied-rule-rev C x p 6= bDenyAllc =⇒ p = DenyAll # ps =⇒
applied-rule-rev C x p = applied-rule-rev C x ps
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac applied-rule-rev C x (DenyAll#ps) 6= None, auto)
apply (metis mrConcEnd)
by (metis DAimpliesMR-E list .sel(1 ) hd-in-set list .simps(3 ) not-Some-eq)
lemma mr-not-DA:
wellformed-policy1-strong s =⇒
applied-rule-rev C x p = bDenyAllFromTo a abc =⇒ set p = set s =⇒
applied-rule-rev C x s 6= bDenyAllc
apply (subst wp1n-tl , simp-all)
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a ab)))
apply (subgoal-tac DenyAllFromTo a ab ∈ set (tl s))
apply (metis wp1n-tl foo98 wellformed-policy1-strong .simps(2 ))
using mrSet r-not-DA-in-tl apply blast
by (simp add : mr-in-dom)
lemma domsMT-notND-DD :
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a b)) ∩ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo c d)) 6= {} =⇒ ¬ nets-
Distinct a c
using deny-dom twoNetsDistinct-def by blast
lemma domsMT-notND-DD2 :
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a b)) ∩ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo c d)) 6= {} =⇒ ¬ nets-
Distinct b d
using deny-dom twoNetsDistinct-def by blast
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lemma domsMT-notND-DD3 :








allNetsDistinct p =⇒ u ∈ set p =⇒ v ∈ set p =⇒ u = DenyAllFromTo a b =⇒
v = DenyAllFromTo c d =⇒ x ∈ dom (C u) =⇒ x ∈ dom (C v) =⇒ a = c ∧ b = d
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
by (metis ND0aux1 ND0aux2 domsMT-notND-DD3 domsMT-notND-DD4 )
lemma rule-charn1 :
assumes aND : allNetsDistinct p
and mr-is-allow : applied-rule-rev C x p = Some (AllowPortFromTo a b po)
and SC : singleCombinators p
and inp: r ∈ set p
and inDom: x ∈ dom (C r)
shows (r = AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r = DenyAllFromTo a b ∨ r = DenyAll)
proof (cases r)
case DenyAll show ?thesis by (metis DenyAll)
next
case (DenyAllFromTo x y) show ?thesis
by (metis AD-aux DenyAllFromTo SC aND domInterMT inDom inp mrSet
mr-in-dom mr-is-allow)
next
case (AllowPortFromTo x y b) show ?thesis
by (metis (no-types, lifting) AllowPortFromTo DistinctNetsAllowAllow aND dom-
InterMT
inDom inp mrSet mr-in-dom mr-is-allow)
next
case (Conc x y) thus ?thesis using assms by (metis aux0-0 )
qed
lemma none-MT-rulessubset [rule-format ]:
none-MT-rules C a −→ set b ⊆ set a −→ none-MT-rules C b
by (induct b,simp-all) (metis notMTnMT )
lemma nMTSort : none-MT-rules C p =⇒ none-MT-rules C (sort p l)
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by (metis set-sort nMTeqSet)
lemma nMTSortQ : none-MT-rules C p =⇒ none-MT-rules C (qsort p l)
by (metis set-sortQ nMTeqSet)
lemma wp3char [rule-format ]:
none-MT-rules C xs ∧ C (AllowPortFromTo a b po)=∅ ∧
wellformed-policy3 (xs@[DenyAllFromTo a b]) −→
AllowPortFromTo a b po /∈ set xs
apply (induct xs,simp-all)
by (metis domNMT wp3Conc)
lemma wp3charn[rule-format ]:
assumes domAllow : dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b po)) 6= {}
and wp3 : wellformed-policy3 (xs @ [DenyAllFromTo a b])
shows AllowPortFromTo a b po /∈ set xs
apply (insert assms)
proof (induct xs)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons x xs) show ?case using Cons
by (simp,auto intro: wp3Conc) (auto simp: DenyAllowDisj domAllow)
qed
lemma rule-charn2 :
assumes aND : allNetsDistinct p
and wp1 : wellformed-policy1 p
and SC : singleCombinators p
and wp3 : wellformed-policy3 p
and allow-in-list : AllowPortFromTo c d po ∈ set p
and x-in-dom-allow : x ∈ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo c d po))
shows applied-rule-rev C x p = Some (AllowPortFromTo c d po)
proof (insert assms, induct p rule: rev-induct)
case Nil show ?case using Nil by simp
next
case (snoc y ys)
show ?case using snoc
apply (case-tac y = (AllowPortFromTo c d po), simp-all )
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (subgoal-tac ys 6= [])
apply (subgoal-tac applied-rule-rev C x ys = Some (AllowPortFromTo c d po))
defer 1
apply (metis ANDConcEnd SCConcEnd WP1ConcEnd foo25 )
apply (metis inSet-not-MT )
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proof (cases y)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using DenyAll snoc
apply simp
by (metis DAnotTL DenyAll inSet-not-MT policy2list .simps(2 ))
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b) thus ?thesis using snoc apply simp
apply (simp-all add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule conjI )
apply (metis domInterMT wp3EndMT )
apply (rule impI )
by (metis ANDConcEnd DenyAllFromTo SCConcEnd WP1ConcEnd foo25 )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo a1 a2 b) thus ?thesis
using AllowPortFromTo snoc apply simp
apply (simp-all add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule conjI )
apply (metis domInterMT wp3EndMT )
by (metis ANDConcEnd AllowPortFromTo SCConcEnd WP1ConcEnd foo25
x-in-dom-allow)
next
case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis using Conc snoc apply simp




wellformed-policy1 p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
wellformed-policy3 p =⇒ applied-rule-rev C x p = bDenyAllFromTo c dc =⇒
AllowPortFromTo a b po ∈ set p =⇒ x /∈ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b po))
by (clarify , auto simp: rule-charn2 dom-def )
lemma rule-charn4 :
assumes wp1 : wellformed-policy1 p
and aND : allNetsDistinct p
and SC : singleCombinators p
and wp3 : wellformed-policy3 p
and DA: DenyAll /∈ set p
and mr : applied-rule-rev C x p = Some (DenyAllFromTo a b)
and rinp: r ∈ set p
and xindom: x ∈ dom (C r)
shows r = DenyAllFromTo a b
proof (cases r)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using DenyAll assms by simp
next
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case (DenyAllFromTo c d) thus ?thesis using assms apply simp
apply (erule-tac x = x and p = p and v = (DenyAllFromTo a b) and





case (AllowPortFromTo c d e) thus ?thesis using assms apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac x /∈ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo c d e)))
apply simp
apply (rule-tac p = p in rule-charn3 )
by (auto intro: SCnotConc)
next
case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis using assms apply simp
by (metis Conc aux0-0 )
qed
lemma foo31a:
∀ r . r ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (C r) −→ r=AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r=DenyAllFromTo
a b ∨ r=DenyAll =⇒
set p = set s =⇒ r ∈ set s =⇒ x ∈ dom (C r) =⇒
r = AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r = DenyAllFromTo a b ∨ r = DenyAll
by auto
lemma aux4 [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev C x (a#p) = Some a −→ a /∈ set (p) −→ applied-rule-rev C x p =
None
apply (rule rev-induct ,simp-all)
by (metis aux0-4 empty-iff empty-set insert-iff list .simps(15 ) mrSet mreq-end3 )
lemma mrDA-tl :
assumes mr-DA: applied-rule-rev C x p = Some DenyAll
and wp1n: wellformed-policy1-strong p
shows applied-rule-rev C x (tl p) = None
apply (rule aux4 [where a = DenyAll ])
apply (metis wp1n-tl mr-DA wp1n)
by (metis WP1n-DA-notinSet wp1n)
lemma rule-charnDAFT :
wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
wellformed-policy3 p =⇒ applied-rule-rev C x p = bDenyAllFromTo a bc =⇒ r ∈ set
(tl p) =⇒
x ∈ dom (C r) =⇒ r = DenyAllFromTo a b
apply (subgoal-tac p = DenyAll#(tl p))
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apply (metis AND-tl Combinators.distinct(1 ) SC-tl list .sel(3 ) mrConcEnd
rule-charn4 waux2 wellformed-policy1-charn wp1-aux1aa wp1-eq wp3tl)
using wp1n-tl by blast
lemma mrDenyAll-is-unique:
[[wellformed-policy1-strong p; applied-rule-rev C x p = Some DenyAll ;
r ∈ set (tl p)]] =⇒ x /∈ dom (C r)




assumes sets-eq : set p = set s
and SC : singleCombinators p
and wp1-p: wellformed-policy1-strong p
and wp1-s: wellformed-policy1-strong s
and wp3-p: wellformed-policy3 p
and wp3-s: wellformed-policy3 s
and aND : allNetsDistinct p
shows applied-rule-rev C x p = applied-rule-rev C x s
proof (cases applied-rule-rev C x p)
case None
have DA: DenyAll ∈ set p using wp1-p by (auto simp: wp1-aux1aa)
have notDA: DenyAll /∈ set p using None by (auto simp: DAimplieMR)
thus ?thesis using DA by (contradiction)
next
case (Some y) thus ?thesis
proof (cases y)
have tl-p: p = DenyAll#(tl p) by (metis wp1-p wp1n-tl)
have tl-s: s = DenyAll#(tl s) by (metis wp1-s wp1n-tl)
have tl-eq : set (tl p) = set (tl s)
by (metis list .sel(3 ) WP1n-DA-notinSet sets-eq foo2
wellformed-policy1-charn wp1-aux1aa wp1-eq wp1-p wp1-s)
{ case DenyAll
have mr-p-is-DenyAll : applied-rule-rev C x p = Some DenyAll
by (simp add : DenyAll Some)
hence x-notin-tl-p: ∀ r . r ∈ set (tl p) −→ x /∈ dom (C r) using wp1-p
by (auto simp: mrDenyAll-is-unique)
hence x-notin-tl-s: ∀ r . r ∈ set (tl s) −→ x /∈ dom (C r) using tl-eq
by auto
hence mr-s-is-DenyAll : applied-rule-rev C x s = Some DenyAll using tl-s
by (auto simp: mr-first)
thus ?thesis using mr-p-is-DenyAll by simp
}
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{case (DenyAllFromTo a b)
have mr-p-is-DAFT : applied-rule-rev C x p = Some (DenyAllFromTo a b)
by (simp add : DenyAllFromTo Some)
have DA-notin-tl : DenyAll /∈ set (tl p)
by (metis WP1n-DA-notinSet wp1-p)
have mr-tl-p: applied-rule-rev C x p = applied-rule-rev C x (tl p)
by (metis Combinators.simps(4 ) DenyAllFromTo Some mrConcEnd tl-p)
have dom-tl-p:
∧
r . r ∈ set (tl p) ∧ x ∈ dom (C r) =⇒ r = (DenyAllFromTo a
b)
using wp1-p aND SC wp3-p mr-p-is-DAFT
by (auto simp: rule-charnDAFT )
hence dom-tl-s:
∧
r . r ∈ set (tl s) ∧ x ∈ dom (C r) =⇒ r = (DenyAllFromTo a
b)
using tl-eq by auto
have DAFT-in-tl-s: DenyAllFromTo a b ∈ set (tl s) using mr-tl-p
by (metis DenyAllFromTo mrSet mr-p-is-DAFT tl-eq)
have x-in-dom-DAFT : x ∈ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a b))
by (metis mr-p-is-DAFT DenyAllFromTo mr-in-dom)
hence mr-tl-s-is-DAFT : applied-rule-rev C x (tl s) = Some (DenyAllFromTo a b)
using DAFT-in-tl-s dom-tl-s by (metis mr-charn)
hence mr-s-is-DAFT : applied-rule-rev C x s = Some (DenyAllFromTo a b)
using tl-s
by (metis DA-notin-tl DenyAllFromTo EX-MR mrDA-tl
not-Some-eq tl-eq wellformed-policy1-strong .simps(2 ))
thus ?thesis using mr-p-is-DAFT by simp
}
{case (AllowPortFromTo a b c)
have wp1s: wellformed-policy1 s by (metis wp1-eq wp1-s)
have mr-p-is-A: applied-rule-rev C x p = Some (AllowPortFromTo a b c)
by (simp add : AllowPortFromTo Some)
hence A-in-s: AllowPortFromTo a b c ∈ set s using sets-eq
by (auto intro: mrSet)
have x-in-dom-A: x ∈ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b c))
by (metis mr-p-is-A AllowPortFromTo mr-in-dom)
have SCs: singleCombinators s using SC sets-eq
by (auto intro: SCSubset)
hence ANDs: allNetsDistinct s using aND sets-eq SC
by (auto intro: aNDSetsEq)
hence mr-s-is-A: applied-rule-rev C x s = Some (AllowPortFromTo a b c)
using A-in-s wp1s mr-p-is-A aND SCs wp3-s x-in-dom-A
by (simp add : rule-charn2 )
thus ?thesis using mr-p-is-A by simp
}





singleCombinators p =⇒ wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ wellformed-policy1-strong
s =⇒
wellformed-policy3 p =⇒ wellformed-policy3 s =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ set p = set
s =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy p) x = C (list2FWpolicy s) x
by(auto intro: C-eq-if-mr-eq C-eq-Sets-mr [symmetric])
lemma C-eq-sorted :
distinct p =⇒ all-in-list p l =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒ wellformed-policy1-strong p
=⇒
wellformed-policy3 p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy (FWNormalisationCore.sort p l)) = C (list2FWpolicy p)
apply (rule ext)
by (auto intro: C-eq-Sets simp: nMTSort wellformed1-alternative-sorted
wellformed-policy3-charn wp1-eq)
lemma C-eq-sortedQ :
distinct p =⇒ all-in-list p l =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒ wellformed-policy1-strong p
=⇒
wellformed-policy3 p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy (qsort p l)) = C (list2FWpolicy p)
apply (rule ext)
apply (auto intro!: C-eq-Sets simp: nMTSortQ wellformed1-alternative-sorted
distinct-sortQ
wellformed-policy3-charn wp1-eq)
by (metis set-qsort wellformed1-sortedQ wellformed-eq wp1-aux1aa)
lemma C-eq-RS2-mr : applied-rule-rev C x (removeShadowRules2 p)= applied-rule-rev
C x p
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys) thus ?case
proof (cases ys = [])
case True thus ?thesis by (cases y , simp-all)
next
case False thus ?thesis
proof (cases y)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis by (simp, metis Cons DenyAll mreq-end2 )
next
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case (DenyAllFromTo a b) thus ?thesis
by (simp, metis Cons DenyAllFromTo mreq-end2 )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo a b p) thus ?thesis
proof (cases DenyAllFromTo a b ∈ set ys)
case True thus ?thesis using AllowPortFromTo Cons
apply (cases applied-rule-rev C x ys = None, simp-all)
apply (subgoal-tac x /∈ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo a b p)))
apply (subst mrconcNone, simp-all)
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule contra-subsetD [OF allow-deny-dom])
apply (erule mrNoneMT ,simp)
apply (metis AllowPortFromTo mrconc)
done
next
case False thus ?thesis using False Cons AllowPortFromTo
by (simp, metis AllowPortFromTo Cons mreq-end2 ) qed
next
case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis





p 6= [] −−> applied-rule-rev C x p = None −→ C (list2FWpolicy p) x = None
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule rev-induct , simp-all)
apply (intro impI , simp)
subgoal for xa xs
apply (case-tac xs 6= [])




a 6= [] =⇒ b 6= [] =⇒ applied-rule-rev C x a = ⊥ =⇒ applied-rule-rev C x b = ⊥ =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy a) x = C (list2FWpolicy b) x
by (auto simp: C-eq-None)
lemma C-eq-RS2 :




by (metis C-eq-RS2-mr C-eq-if-mr-eq wellformed-policy1-strong .simps(1 ) wp1n-RS2 )
lemma none-MT-rulesRS2 :
none-MT-rules C p =⇒ none-MT-rules C (removeShadowRules2 p)
by (auto simp: RS2Set none-MT-rulessubset)
lemma CconcNone:
dom (C a) = {} =⇒ p 6= [] =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy (a # p)) x = C (list2FWpolicy p)
x
apply (case-tac p = [], simp-all)
apply (case-tac x∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy(p))))
apply (metis Cdom2 list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis C .simps(4 ) map-add-dom-app-simps(2 ) inSet-not-MT
list2FWpolicyconc set-empty2 )
done
lemma none-MT-rulesrd [rule-format ]:
none-MT-rules C p −→ none-MT-rules C (remdups p)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma DARS3 [rule-format ]:
DenyAll /∈ set p−→DenyAll /∈ set (rm-MT-rules C p)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma DAnMT : dom (C DenyAll) 6= {}
by (simp add : dom-def C .simps PolicyCombinators.PolicyCombinators)
lemma DAnMT2 : C DenyAll 6= empty
by (metis DAAux dom-eq-empty-conv empty-iff )
lemma wp1n-RS3 [rule-format ,simp]:
wellformed-policy1-strong p −→ wellformed-policy1-strong (rm-MT-rules C p)
by (induct p, simp-all add : DARS3 DAnMT )
lemma AILRS3 [rule-format ,simp]:
all-in-list p l −→ all-in-list (rm-MT-rules C p) l
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma SCRS3 [rule-format ,simp]:
singleCombinators p −→ singleCombinators(rm-MT-rules C p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)





lemma RS3subset : set (rm-MT-rules C p) ⊆ set p
by (induct p, auto)
lemma ANDRS3 [simp]:
singleCombinators p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ allNetsDistinct (rm-MT-rules C p)
using RS3subset SCRS3 aNDSubset by blast
lemma nlpaux : x /∈ dom (C b) =⇒ C (a ⊕ b) x = C a x
by (metis C .simps(4 ) map-add-dom-app-simps(3 ))
lemma notindom[rule-format ]:
a ∈ set p −→ x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy p)) −→ x /∈ dom (C a)
apply (induct p, simp-all)
by (metis CConcStartA Cdom2 domIff empty-iff empty-set l2p-aux )
lemma C-eq-rd [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy (remdups p)) = C (list2FWpolicy p)
proof (rule ext ,induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys) thus ?case
proof (cases ys = [])
case True thus ?thesis by simp
next
case False thus ?thesis using Cons
apply (simp) apply (rule conjI , rule impI )
apply (cases x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy ys)))
apply (metis Cdom2 False list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis False domIff list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux notindom)
apply (rule impI )
apply (cases x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy ys)))
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (remdups ys))))
apply (metis Cdom2 False list2FWpolicyconc remdups-eq-nil-iff )
apply (metis domIff )
apply (subgoal-tac x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (remdups ys))))
apply (metis False list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux remdups-eq-nil-iff )






¬ not-MT C p =⇒ p 6= [] =⇒ r /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy p))
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons x xs) thus ?case
apply (simp split : if-splits)
apply (cases xs = [],simp-all )
by (metis CconcNone domIff )
qed
lemma C-eq-RS3-aux [rule-format ]:
not-MT C p =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy p) x = C (list2FWpolicy (rm-MT-rules C p)) x
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys)
thus ?case
proof (cases not-MT C ys)
case True thus ?thesis using Cons
apply (simp) apply(rule conjI , rule impI , simp)
apply (metis CconcNone True not-MTimpnotMT )
apply (rule impI , simp)
apply (cases x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy ys)))
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (rm-MT-rules C ys))))
apply (metis Cdom2 NMPrm l2p-aux not-MTimpnotMT )
apply (simp add : domIff )
apply (subgoal-tac x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (rm-MT-rules C ys))))
apply (metis l2p-aux l2p-aux2 nlpaux )
apply (metis domIff )
done
next
case False thus ?thesis using Cons False
proof (cases ys = [])
case True thus ?thesis using Cons by (simp) (rule impI , simp)
next
case False thus ?thesis
using Cons False 〈¬ not-MT C ys〉 apply (simp)





wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy (insertDeny p)) = C (list2FWpolicy
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p)
by (rule ext) (auto intro: C-eq-if-mr-eq elim: mr-iD)
lemma C-eq-RS3 :
not-MT C p =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy (rm-MT-rules C p)) = C (list2FWpolicy p)
by (rule ext) (erule C-eq-RS3-aux [symmetric])
lemma NMPrd [rule-format ]: not-MT C p −→ not-MT C (remdups p)
by (induct p) (auto simp: NMPcharn)
lemma NMPDA[rule-format ]: DenyAll ∈ set p −→ not-MT C p
by (induct p, simp-all add : DAnMT )
lemma NMPiD [rule-format ]: not-MT C (insertDeny p)
by (simp add : DAiniD NMPDA)
lemma list2FWpolicy2list [rule-format ]: C (list2FWpolicy(policy2list p)) = (C p)
apply (rule ext)
apply (induct-tac p, simp-all)
by (metis (no-types, lifting) Cdom2 CeqEnd CeqStart domIff nlpaux p2lNmt)
lemmas C-eq-Lemmas = none-MT-rulesRS2 none-MT-rulesrd SCp2l wp1n-RS2
wp1ID NMPiD wp1-eq
wp1alternative-RS1 p2lNmt list2FWpolicy2list wellformed-policy3-charn
waux2
lemmas C-eq-subst-Lemmas = C-eq-sorted C-eq-sortedQ C-eq-RS2 C-eq-rd C-eq-RS3
C-eq-id
lemma C-eq-All-untilSorted :




(removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)) =
C p
apply (subst C-eq-sorted ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-RS2 ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-rd ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-RS3 ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)




DenyAll∈set(policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list(policy2list p) l =⇒ allNetsDistinct(policy2list
p) =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy
(qsort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)) =
C p
apply (subst C-eq-sortedQ ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-RS2 ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-rd ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-RS3 ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-id ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
done
lemma C-eq-All-untilSorted-withSimps:




(removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)) =
C p
by (simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas C-eq-subst-Lemmas)
lemma C-eq-All-untilSorted-withSimpsQ :
DenyAll∈set(policy2list p)=⇒all-in-list(policy2list p) l =⇒ allNetsDistinct(policy2list
p) =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy
(qsort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)) =
C p
by (simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas C-eq-subst-Lemmas)
lemma InDomConc[rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (p))) −→ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (a#p)))
apply (induct p, simp-all)
subgoal for a ′ p
apply (case-tac p = [], simp-all add : dom-def C .simps)
done
done
lemma not-in-member [rule-format ]: member a b −→ x /∈ dom (C b) −→ x /∈ dom (C
a)
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by (induct b) (simp-all add : dom-def C .simps)
lemma src-in-sdnets[rule-format ]:
¬ member DenyAll x −→ p ∈ dom (C x ) −→ subnetsOfAdr (src p) ∩ (fst-set (sdnets
x )) 6= {}
apply (induct rule: Combinators.induct)
apply (simp-all add : fst-set-def subnetsOfAdr-def PLemmas fst-set-def )
apply (intro impI )
subgoal for x1 x2
apply (case-tac p ∈ dom (C x2 ))
apply (rule subnetAux )




¬ member DenyAll x −→ p ∈ dom (C x ) −→ subnetsOfAdr (dest p) ∩ (snd-set
(sdnets x )) 6= {}
apply (induct rule: Combinators.induct)
apply (simp-all add : snd-set-def subnetsOfAdr-def PLemmas)
apply (intro impI )
apply (simp add : snd-set-def )
subgoal for x1 x2
apply (case-tac p ∈ dom (C x2 ))
apply (rule subnetAux )




p∈ dom (C x ) −→ ¬ member DenyAll x −→
(∃ (a,b)∈sdnets x . a ∈ subnetsOfAdr (src p) ∧ b ∈ subnetsOfAdr (dest p))
apply (rule Combinators.induct)
apply (simp-all add : PLemmas subnetsOfAdr-def )
apply (intro impI , simp)
subgoal for x1 x2
apply (case-tac p ∈ dom (C (x2 )))




disjSD-2 x y =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll x =⇒ ¬ member DenyAll y =⇒ p ∈ dom(C x )
=⇒ p ∈ dom(C y) =⇒
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False
apply (rule-tac A = sdnets x and B = sdnets y and D = src p and F = dest p in
tndFalse)
by (auto simp: dest-in-sdnets src-in-sdnets sdnets-in-subnets disjSD-2-def )
lemma list2FWpolicy-eq :
zs 6= [] =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy (x ⊕ y # z )) p = C (x ⊕ list2FWpolicy (y # z )) p
by (metis ConcAssoc l2p-aux list2FWpolicy .simps(2 ))
lemma dom-sep[rule-format ]:
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy p)) −→ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy(separate p)))
proof (induct p rule: separate.induct , simp-all , goal-cases)
case (1 v va y z ) then show ?case
apply (intro conjI impI )
apply (simp,drule mp)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo v va)))
apply (metis CConcStartA domIff l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc not-Cons-self )
apply (metis Conc-not-MT domIff list2FWpolicy-eq , simp)
by (metis InDomConc domIff list .simps(3 ) list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux sepnMT )
next
case (2 v va vb y z )
assume ∗ : {v , va} = first-bothNet y =⇒
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (AllowPortFromTo v va vb ⊕ y # z ))) −→
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (separate (AllowPortFromTo v va vb ⊕ y #
z ))))
and ∗∗: {v , va} 6= first-bothNet y =⇒
x ∈ dom(C (list2FWpolicy(y#z ))) −→ x ∈ dom
(C (list2FWpolicy(separate(y#z ))))
show ?case
apply (insert ∗ ∗∗, rule impI | rule conjI )+
apply (simp,case-tac x ∈ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo v va vb)))
apply (metis CConcStartA domIff l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc not-Cons-self )
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (y #z ))))
apply (metis CConcStartA Cdom2 domIff l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
apply (simp add : dom-def C .simps)
apply (intro impI , simp-all)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (AllowPortFromTo v va vb)),simp-all)
by (metis Cdom2 domIff l2p-aux list2FWpolicy .simps(3 ) nlpaux sepnMT )
next
case (3 v va y z )
assume ∗ : (first-bothNet v = first-bothNet y =⇒
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy ((v ⊕ va) ⊕ y # z ))) −→
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (separate ((v ⊕ va) ⊕ y # z )))))
and ∗∗ : (first-bothNet v 6= first-bothNet y =⇒
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x ∈ dom(C (list2FWpolicy(y#z ))) −→ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (separate
(y # z )))))
show ?case
apply (insert ∗ ∗∗, rule conjI | rule impI )+
apply (simp,drule mp)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C ((v ⊕ va))))
apply (metis C .simps(4 ) CConcStartA ConcAssoc domIff list2FWpolicy2list
list2FWpolicyconc p2lNmt)
apply simp-all
apply (metis Conc-not-MT domIff list2FWpolicy-eq)
by (metis CConcStartA Conc-not-MT InDomConc domIff nlpaux sepnMT )
qed
lemma domdConcStart [rule-format ]:
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (a#b))) −→ x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy b)) −→ x ∈
dom (C (a))
by (induct b, simp-all) (auto simp: PLemmas)
lemma sep-dom2-aux :
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (a ⊕ y # z ))) =⇒ x ∈ dom (C (a ⊕ list2FWpolicy (y
# z )))
by (auto)[1 ] (metis list2FWpolicy-eq p2lNmt)
lemma sep-dom2-aux2 :
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (separate (y # z )))) −→ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (y
# z ))) =⇒
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (a # separate (y # z )))) =⇒ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy
(a ⊕ y # z )))
by (metis CConcStartA InDomConc domdConcStart list .simps(2 )
list2FWpolicy .simps(2 ) list2FWpolicyconc)
lemma sep-dom2 [rule-format ]:
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (separate p))) −→ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy( p)))
by (rule separate.induct) (simp-all add : sep-dom2-aux sep-dom2-aux2 )
lemma sepDom: dom (C (list2FWpolicy p)) = dom (C (list2FWpolicy (separate p)))
apply (rule equalityI )
by (rule subsetI , (erule dom-sep|erule sep-dom2 ))+
lemma C-eq-s-ext [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ C (list2FWpolicy (separate p)) a = C (list2FWpolicy p) a
proof (induct rule: separate.induct , goal-cases)
case (1 x ) thus ?case
apply simp
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apply (cases x = [])
apply (metis l2p-aux2 separate.simps(5 ))
apply simp
apply (cases a ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy x )))
apply (subgoal-tac a ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (separate x ))))
apply (metis Cdom2 list2FWpolicyconc sepDom sepnMT )
apply (metis sepDom)
apply (subgoal-tac a /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (separate x ))))
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc,simp add : sepnMT )
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc,simp add : sepnMT )




case (2 v va y z ) thus ?case
apply (cases z = [], simp-all)
apply (rule conjI |rule impI |simp)+
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis not-Cons-self sepnMT )
apply (metis C .simps(4 ) CConcStartaux Cdom2 domIff )
apply (rule conjI |rule impI |simp)+
apply (erule list2FWpolicy-eq)
apply (rule impI , simp)
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis list .simps(2 ) sepnMT )
by (metis C .simps(4 ) CConcStartaux Cdom2 domIff )
next
case (3 v va vb y z ) thus ?case
apply (cases z = [], simp-all)
apply (rule conjI |rule impI |simp)+
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis not-Cons-self sepnMT )
apply (metis C .simps(4 ) CConcStartaux Cdom2 domIff )
apply (rule conjI |rule impI |simp)+
apply (erule list2FWpolicy-eq)
apply (rule impI , simp)
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis list .simps(2 ) sepnMT )
by (metis C .simps(4 ) CConcStartaux Cdom2 domIff )
next
case (4 v va y z ) thus ?case
apply (cases z = [], simp-all)
apply (rule conjI |rule impI |simp)+
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc)
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apply (metis not-Cons-self sepnMT )
apply (metis C .simps(4 ) CConcStartaux Cdom2 domIff )
apply (rule conjI |rule impI |simp)+
apply (erule list2FWpolicy-eq)
apply (rule impI , simp)
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis list .simps(2 ) sepnMT )
by (metis C .simps(4 ) CConcStartaux Cdom2 domIff )
next
case 5 thus ?case by simp
next
case 6 thus ?case by simp
next
case 7 thus ?case by simp
next
case 8 thus ?case by simp
qed
lemma C-eq-s:
p 6= [] =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy (separate p)) = C (list2FWpolicy p)
apply (rule ext) using C-eq-s-ext by blast
lemma sortnMTQ : p 6= [] =⇒ qsort p l 6= []
by (metis set-sortQ setnMT )
lemmas C-eq-Lemmas-sep =
C-eq-Lemmas sortnMT sortnMTQ RS2-NMT NMPrd not-MTimpnotMT
lemma C-eq-until-separated :





(removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l))) =
C p
by (simp add : C-eq-All-untilSorted-withSimps C-eq-s wellformed1-alternative-sorted
wp1ID wp1n-RS2 )
lemma C-eq-until-separatedQ :




(separate (qsort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l))) =
C p
by (simp add : C-eq-All-untilSorted-withSimpsQ C-eq-s sortnMTQ wp1ID wp1n-RS2 )
lemma domID [rule-format ]: p 6= [] ∧ x ∈ dom(C (list2FWpolicy p)) −→
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy(insertDenies p)))
proof(induct p)
case Nil then show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) then show ?case
proof(cases p=[],goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
apply(simp) apply(rule impI )
apply (cases a, simp-all)
apply (simp-all add : C .simps dom-def )+
by auto
next
case 2 then show ?case
proof(cases x ∈ dom(C (list2FWpolicy p)), goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
apply simp apply (rule impI )
apply (cases a, simp-all)
using InDomConc idNMT apply blast
apply (rule InDomConc, simp-all add : idNMT )+
done
next
case 2 then show ?case
apply simp apply (rule impI )
proof(cases x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p))), goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
proof(induct a)
case DenyAll then show ?case by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo src dest) then show ?case
apply simp by( rule InDomConc, simp add : idNMT )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo src dest port) then show ?case
apply simp by(rule InDomConc, simp add : idNMT )
next
case (Conc - -) then show ?case




case 2 then show ?case
proof (induct a)
case DenyAll then show ?case by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo src dest) then show ?case
by(simp,metis domIff CConcStartA list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux Cdom2 )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo src dest port) then show ?case
by(simp,metis domIff CConcStartA list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux Cdom2 )
next
case (Conc - -) then show ?case







x ∈ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕ DenyAllFromTo a b)) =⇒
C (DenyAllFromTo a b⊕DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕ DenyAllFromTo a b) x = Some (deny
())
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a b)))
apply (simp-all add : PLemmas)
apply (simp-all split : if-splits)
done
lemma iDdomAux [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy p)) −→
x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p))) −→
C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)) x = Some (deny ())
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys) thus ?case
proof (cases y)
case DenyAll then show ?thesis by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b) then show ?thesis using DenyAllFromTo Cons
apply simp
apply (intro impI )
proof (cases ys = [], goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case by (simp add : DA-is-deny)
next
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case 2 then show ?case
apply simp
apply (drule mp)
apply (metis DenyAllFromTo InDomConc )
apply (cases x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))), simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 DenyAllFromTo idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (subgoal-tac C (list2FWpolicy (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕
DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕ DenyAllFromTo a b#insertDenies ys))
x =
C ((DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕ DenyAllFromTo
a b)) x )
apply simp
apply (rule DA-is-deny)
apply (metis DenyAllFromTo domdConcStart)




case (AllowPortFromTo a b c) then show ?thesis using Cons AllowPortFromTo
proof (cases ys = [], goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
apply simp
apply (intro impI )
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b a)))
apply (simp-all add : PLemmas)
apply (simp split : if-splits, auto)
done
next
case 2 then show ?case
apply simp
apply (intro impI )
apply (drule mp)
apply (metis AllowPortFromTo InDomConc)
apply (cases x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))))
apply simp-all
apply (metis AllowPortFromTo Cdom2 idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (subgoal-tac C (list2FWpolicy (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕
DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕ AllowPortFromTo a b c#insertDenies
ys)) x =
C ((DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b a)) x )
apply simp
defer 1
apply (metis AllowPortFromTo CConcStartA ConcAssoc idNMT
list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
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case (Conc a b) then show ?thesis
proof (cases ys = [], goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
apply simp
apply (rule impI )+
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a)
(first-destNet a) ⊕ DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet
a))))
apply (simp-all add : PLemmas)
apply (simp split : if-splits, auto)
done
next
case 2 then show ?case
apply simp
apply (intro impI )
apply (cases x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))))
apply (metis Cdom2 Conc Cons InDomConc idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (subgoal-tac C (list2FWpolicy (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a)
(first-destNet a) ⊕ DenyAllFromTo(first-destNet a)(first-srcNet
a)
⊕ a ⊕ b#insertDenies ys)) x =
C ((DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a) ⊕




apply (metis Conc l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
apply (subgoal-tac C ((DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a)
(first-destNet a) ⊕ DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a)
(first-srcNet a) ⊕ a ⊕ b)) x =
C ((DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a)(first-destNet a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo(first-destNet a)(first-srcNet a))) x )
apply simp
defer 1
apply (metis CConcStartA Conc ConcAssoc nlpaux )






lemma iD-isD [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy p)) −→
C (DenyAll ⊕ list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)) x = C DenyAll x
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p))))
apply (simp add : Cdom2 PLemmas(1 ) deny-all-def iDdomAux )
by (simp add : nlpaux )
lemma inDomConc:[[ x /∈dom (C a); x /∈dom (C (list2FWpolicy p))]] =⇒
x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy(a#p)))
by (metis domdConcStart)
lemma domsdisj [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ (∀ x s. s ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (C A) −→ x /∈ dom (C s)) −→ y ∈ dom (C
A) −→
y /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy p))
proof (induct p)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) then show ?case
apply (case-tac p = [])
apply fastforce
by (meson domdConcStart list .set-intros(1 ) list .set-intros(2 ))
qed
lemma isSepaux :
p 6= [] =⇒ noDenyAll (a # p) =⇒ separated (a # p) =⇒
x ∈ dom (C (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a) ⊕ a)) =⇒
x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy p))
apply (rule-tac A = (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a) ⊕ a) in domsdisj )
apply simp-all
by (metis Combinators.distinct(1 ) FWNormalisationCore.member .simps(1 )
FWNormalisationCore.member .simps(3 ) disjSD2aux disjSD-no-p-in-both noDA)
lemma none-MT-rulessep[rule-format ]: none-MT-rules C p −→ none-MT-rules C
(separate p)
apply(induct p rule: separate.induct)
by (simp-all add : C .simps map-add-le-mapE map-le-antisym)
lemma dom-id :
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noDenyAll(a#p) =⇒ separated(a#p) =⇒ p 6= [] =⇒ x /∈dom(C (list2FWpolicy p))
=⇒ x∈dom (C a) =⇒
x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)))
apply (rule-tac a = a in isSepaux , simp-all)
using idNMT apply blast
using noDAID apply blast
using id-aux4 noDA1eq sepNetsID apply blast
by (metis list .set-intros(1 ) list .set-intros(2 ) list2FWpolicy .simps(2 )
list2FWpolicy .simps(3 ) notindom)
lemma C-eq-iD-aux2 [rule-format ]:
noDenyAll1 p −→ separated p−→ p 6= []−→ x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy p))−→
C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)) x = C (list2FWpolicy p) x
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys) thus ?case using Cons
proof (cases y)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using Cons DenyAll apply simp
apply (case-tac ys = [], simp-all)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy ys)),simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 domID idNMT list2FWpolicyconc noDA1eq)
apply (metis DenyAll iD-isD idNMT list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
done
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b) thus ?thesis using Cons apply simp
apply (rule impI |rule allI |rule conjI |simp)+
apply (case-tac ys = [], simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 ConcAssoc DenyAllFromTo)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy ys)), simp-all)
apply (simp add : Cdom2 domID idNMT l2p-aux noDA1eq)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))))
apply (meson Combinators.distinct(1 ) FWNormalisationCore.member .simps(3 )
dom-id domdConcStart
noDenyAll .simps(1 ) separated .simps(1 ))
by (metis Cdom2 DenyAllFromTo domIff dom-def domdConcStart l2p-aux l2p-aux2
nlpaux )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo a b c) thus ?thesis
using AllowPortFromTo Cons apply simp
apply (rule impI |rule allI |rule conjI |simp)+
apply (case-tac ys = [], simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 ConcAssoc AllowPortFromTo)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy ys)), simp-all)
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apply (simp add : Cdom2 domID idNMT list2FWpolicyconc noDA1eq)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))))
apply (meson Combinators.distinct(3 ) FWNormalisationCore.member .simps(4 )
dom-id domdConcStart noDenyAll .simps(1 ) separated .simps(1 ))
by (metis Cdom2 ConcAssoc l2p-aux list2FWpolicy .simps(2 ) nlpaux )
next
case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis using Cons Conc
apply simp
apply (rule impI |rule allI |rule conjI |simp)+
apply (case-tac ys = [], simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 ConcAssoc Conc)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy ys)),simp-all)
apply (simp add : Cdom2 domID idNMT list2FWpolicyconc noDA1eq)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (a ⊕ b)))
apply (case-tac x /∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))),simp-all)
apply (simp add : Cdom2 domIff idNMT list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
apply (metis FWNormalisationCore.member .simps(1 ) dom-id
noDenyAll .simps(1 ) separated .simps(1 ))




separated p =⇒ noDenyAll1 p =⇒ wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)) = C (list2FWpolicy p)
by (rule ext) (metis CConcStartA C-eq-iD-aux2 DAAux wp1-alternative-not-mt
wp1n-tl)
lemma noDAsortQ [rule-format ]: noDenyAll1 p −→ noDenyAll1 (qsort p l)
apply (case-tac p,simp-all , rename-tac a list)
subgoal for a list
apply (case-tac a = DenyAll ,simp-all)
using nDAeqSet set-sortQ apply blast
apply (rule impI ,rule noDA1eq)
apply (subgoal-tac noDenyAll (a#list))
apply (metis append-Cons append-Nil nDAeqSet qsort .simps(2 ) set-sortQ)
by (case-tac a, simp-all)
done
lemma NetsCollectedSortQ :
distinct p =⇒noDenyAll1 p =⇒ all-in-list p l =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
NetsCollected (qsort p l)
by (metis NetsCollectedSorted SC3Q all-in-list .elims(2 ) all-in-list .simps(1 )
all-in-list .simps(2 )
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all-in-listAppend all-in-list-sublist noDAsortQ qsort .simps(1 ) qsort .simps(2 )
singleCombinatorsConc sort-is-sortedQ)
lemmas CLemmas = nMTSort nMTSortQ none-MT-rulesRS2 none-MT-rulesrd
noDAsort noDAsortQ nDASC wp1-eq wp1ID
SCp2l ANDSep wp1n-RS2
OTNSEp OTNSC noDA1sep wp1-alternativesep wellformed-eq
wellformed1-alternative-sorted
lemmas C-eqLemmas-id = CLemmas NC2Sep NetsCollectedSep
NetsCollectedSort NetsCollectedSortQ separatedNC
lemma C-eq-Until-InsertDenies:






(removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)))) =
C p
apply (subst C-eq-iD ,simp-all add : C-eqLemmas-id)
apply (rule C-eq-until-separated , simp-all)
done
lemma C-eq-Until-InsertDeniesQ :




(separate (qsort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)))) =
C p
apply (subst C-eq-iD ,simp-all add : C-eqLemmas-id)
apply (metis WP1rd set-qsort wellformed1-sortedQ wellformed-eq wp1ID
wp1-alternativesep wp1-aux1aa wp1n-RS2 wp1n-RS3 )
by (rule C-eq-until-separatedQ , simp-all)
lemma C-eq-RD-aux [rule-format ]: C (p) x = C (removeDuplicates p) x
apply (induct p,simp-all)
by (metis Cdom2 domIff nlpaux not-in-member)
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lemma C-eq-RAD-aux [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ C (list2FWpolicy p) x = C (list2FWpolicy (removeAllDuplicates p)) x
proof (induct p)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) show ?case
apply (case-tac p = [], simp-all)
apply (metis C-eq-RD-aux )
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc,simp)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (C (list2FWpolicy p)))
apply (simp add : Cdom2 Cons.hyps domIff l2p-aux rADnMT )
by (metis C-eq-RD-aux Cons.hyps domIff list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux rADnMT )
qed
lemma C-eq-RAD :
p 6= [] =⇒ C (list2FWpolicy p) = C (list2FWpolicy (removeAllDuplicates p))
by (rule ext ,erule C-eq-RAD-aux )
lemma C-eq-compile:







(removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l))))) =
C p
apply (subst C-eq-RAD [symmetric])
apply (rule idNMT ,simp add : C-eqLemmas-id)
by (rule C-eq-Until-InsertDenies, simp-all)
lemma C-eq-compileQ :






(qsort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules C
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l))))) =
C p
apply (subst C-eq-RAD [symmetric],rule idNMT )
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apply (metis WP1rd sepnMT sortnMTQ wellformed-policy1-strong .simps(1 ) wp1ID
wp1n-RS2 wp1n-RS3 )
by (rule C-eq-Until-InsertDeniesQ , simp-all)
lemma C-eq-normalize:
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
all-in-list(policy2list p)(Nets-List p) =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy (normalize p)) = C p
unfolding normalize-def
by (simp add : C-eq-compile)
lemma C-eq-normalizeQ :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
all-in-list (policy2list p) (Nets-List p) =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy (normalizeQ p)) = C p
by (simp add : normalizeQ-def C-eq-compileQ)
lemma domSubset3 : dom (C (DenyAll ⊕ x )) = dom (C (DenyAll))
by (simp add : PLemmas split-tupled-all split : option.splits)
lemma domSubset4 :
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo x y ⊕ DenyAllFromTo y x ⊕ AllowPortFromTo x y dn)) =
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo x y ⊕ DenyAllFromTo y x ))
by (auto simp: PLemmas split : option.splits decision.splits )
lemma domSubset5 :
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo x y ⊕ DenyAllFromTo y x ⊕ AllowPortFromTo y x dn)) =
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo x y ⊕ DenyAllFromTo y x ))
by (auto simp: PLemmas split : option.splits decision.splits )
lemma domSubset1 :
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo one two ⊕ DenyAllFromTo two one ⊕ AllowPortFromTo
one two dn ⊕ x )) =
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo one two ⊕ DenyAllFromTo two one ⊕ x ))
by (simp add : PLemmas split : option.splits decision.splits) (auto simp: allow-all-def
deny-all-def )
lemma domSubset2 :
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo one two ⊕ DenyAllFromTo two one ⊕ AllowPortFromTo
two one dn ⊕ x )) =
dom (C (DenyAllFromTo one two ⊕ DenyAllFromTo two one ⊕ x ))
by (simp add : PLemmas split : option.splits decision.splits) (auto simp: allow-all-def
deny-all-def )
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lemma ConcAssoc2 : C (X ⊕ Y ⊕ ((A ⊕ B) ⊕ D)) = C (X ⊕ Y ⊕ A ⊕ B ⊕ D)
by (simp add : C .simps)
lemma ConcAssoc3 : C (X ⊕ ((Y ⊕ A) ⊕ D)) = C (X ⊕ Y ⊕ A ⊕ D)
by (simp add : C .simps)
lemma RS3-NMT [rule-format ]:
DenyAll ∈ set p −→ rm-MT-rules C p 6= []
by (induct-tac p) (simp-all add : PLemmas)
lemma norm-notMT : DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ normalize p 6= []
by (simp add : DAiniD RS2-NMT RS3-NMT idNMT normalize-def rADnMT sepnMT
sortnMT )
lemma norm-notMTQ : DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ normalizeQ p 6= []
by (simp add : DAiniD RS2-NMT RS3-NMT idNMT normalizeQ-def rADnMT sep-
nMT sortnMTQ)
lemmas domDA = NormalisationIntegerPortProof .domSubset3
lemmas domain-reasoning = domDA ConcAssoc2 domSubset1 domSubset2
domSubset3 domSubset4 domSubset5 domSubsetDistr1
domSubsetDistr2 domSubsetDistrA domSubsetDistrD coerc-assoc
ConcAssoc
ConcAssoc3
The following lemmas help with the normalisation
lemma list2policyR-Start [rule-format ]: p ∈ dom (C a) −→
C (list2policyR (a # list)) p = C a p
by (induct a # list rule:list2policyR.induct) (auto simp: C .simps dom-def
map-add-def )
lemma list2policyR-End : p /∈ dom (C a) =⇒
C (list2policyR (a # list)) p = (C a
⊕
list2policy (map C list)) p
by (rule list2policyR.induct)
(simp-all add : C .simps dom-def map-add-def list2policy-def split : option.splits)
lemma l2polR-eq-el [rule-format ]:
N 6= [] −→ C (list2policyR N ) p = (list2policy (map C N )) p
proof (induct N )
case Nil show ?case by (simp-all add : list2policy-def )
next
case (Cons a N ) then show ?case
apply (case-tac p ∈ dom (C a),simp-all add : domStart list2policy-def )
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apply (rule list2policyR-Start , simp-all)
apply (rule list2policyR.induct , simp-all)
apply (simp-all add : C .simps dom-def map-add-def )




N 6= [] =⇒ C ( list2policyR N ) = (list2policy (map C N ))
by (auto simp: list2policy-def l2polR-eq-el )
lemma list2FWpolicys-eq-el [rule-format ]:
Filter 6= [] −→ C (list2policyR Filter) p = C (list2FWpolicy (rev Filter)) p
proof (induct Filter) print-cases
case Nil show ?case by (simp)
next
case (Cons a list) then show ?case
apply simp-all
apply (case-tac list = [], simp-all)
apply (case-tac p ∈ dom (C a), simp-all)
apply (rule list2policyR-Start , simp-all)
by (metis C .simps(4 ) l2polR-eq list2policyR-End nlpaux )
qed
lemma list2FWpolicys-eq :
Filter 6= [] =⇒ C (list2policyR Filter) = C (list2FWpolicy (rev Filter))
by (rule ext , erule list2FWpolicys-eq-el)
lemma list2FWpolicys-eq-sym:
Filter 6= [] =⇒C (list2policyR (rev Filter)) = C (list2FWpolicy Filter)
by (metis list2FWpolicys-eq rev-is-Nil-conv rev-rev-ident)
lemma p-eq [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ list2policy (map C (rev p)) = C (list2FWpolicy p)
by (metis l2polR-eq list2FWpolicys-eq-sym rev .simps(1 ) rev-rev-ident)
lemma p-eq2 [rule-format ]:
normalize x 6= [] −→ C (list2FWpolicy(normalize x )) = C x −→
list2policy(map C (rev(normalize x ))) = C x
by (simp add : p-eq)
lemma p-eq2Q [rule-format ]:
normalizeQ x 6= [] −→ C (list2FWpolicy (normalizeQ x )) = C x −→
list2policy (map C (rev (normalizeQ x ))) = C x
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by (simp add : p-eq)
lemma list2listNMT [rule-format ]: x 6= [] −→map sem x 6= []









by (rule ext , rule Norm-Distr-2 )
lemma NATDistr :
N 6= [] =⇒ F = C (list2policyR N ) =⇒
(λ(x , y). x ) of (NAT
⊗
2 F ◦ (λx . (x , x ))) =
list2policy ((NAT
⊗
L map C N ) op
⊗
2 (λ(x , y). x ) (λx . (x , x )))
apply (simp add : l2polR-eq)
apply (rule ext)
apply (rule Norm-Distr-2 )
done
lemma C-eq-normalize-manual :
DenyAll∈set(policy2list p) =⇒ allNetsDistinct(policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list(policy2list
p) l =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy (normalize-manual-order p l)) = C p
by (simp add : normalize-manual-order-def C-eq-compile)
lemma p-eq2-manualQ [rule-format ]:
normalize-manual-orderQ x l 6= [] −→ C (list2FWpolicy (normalize-manual-orderQ x
l)) = C x −→
list2policy (map C (rev (normalize-manual-orderQ x l))) = C x
by (simp add : p-eq)
lemma norm-notMT-manualQ : DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒
normalize-manual-orderQ p l 6= []
by (simp add : DAiniD RS2-NMT RS3-NMT idNMT normalize-manual-orderQ-def
rADnMT sepnMT sortnMTQ)
lemma C-eq-normalize-manualQ :
DenyAll∈set(policy2list p) =⇒ allNetsDistinct(policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list(policy2list
p) l =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy (normalize-manual-orderQ p l)) = C p
by (simp add : normalize-manual-orderQ-def C-eq-compileQ)
lemma p-eq2-manual [rule-format ]:
normalize-manual-order x l 6= [] −→ C (list2FWpolicy (normalize-manual-order x l))
= C x −→
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list2policy (map C (rev (normalize-manual-order x l))) = C x
by (simp add : p-eq)
lemma norm-notMT-manual : DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒
normalize-manual-order p l 6= []
by (simp add : RS2-NMT idNMT normalize-manual-order-def rADnMT sepnMT sort-
nMT wp1ID)
As an example, how this theorems can be used for a concrete normalisation instanti-
ation.
lemma normalizeNAT :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list Filter) =⇒ allNetsDistinct (policy2list Filter) =⇒
all-in-list (policy2list Filter) (Nets-List Filter) =⇒
(λ(x , y). x ) of (NAT
⊗
2 C Filter ◦ (λx . (x , x ))) =
list2policy ((NAT
⊗
L map C (rev (FWNormalisationCore.normalize Filter))) op⊗
2
(λ(x , y). x ) (λx . (x , x )))
by (simp add : C-eq-normalize NATDistr list2FWpolicys-eq-sym norm-notMT )
lemma domSimpl [simp]: dom (C (A ⊕ DenyAll)) = dom (C (DenyAll))
by (simp add : PLemmas)
The followin theorems can be applied when prepending the usual normalisation with
an additional step and using another semantical interpretation function. This is a gen-
eral recipe which can be applied whenever one nees to combine several normalisation
strategies.
lemma CRotate-eq-rotateC : CRotate p = C (rotatePolicy p)
by (induct p rule: rotatePolicy .induct) (simp-all add : C .simps map-add-def )
lemma DAinRotate:
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list (rotatePolicy p))
apply (induct p,simp-all)
subgoal for p1 p2
apply (case-tac DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p1 ),simp-all)
done
done
lemma DAUniv : dom (CRotate (P ⊕ DenyAll)) = UNIV
by (metis CRotate.simps(1 ) CRotate.simps(4 ) CRotate-eq-rotateC DAAux PLem-
mas(4 ) UNIV-eq-I domSubset3 )
lemma p-eq2R[rule-format ]:
normalize (rotatePolicy x ) 6= [] −→ C (list2FWpolicy(normalize (rotatePolicy x ))) =
CRotate x −→
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list2policy (map C (rev (normalize (rotatePolicy x )))) = CRotate x
by (simp add : p-eq)
lemma C-eq-normalizeRotate:
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ allNetsDistinct (policy2list (rotatePolicy p)) =⇒







(Nets-List (rotatePolicy p))))))) =
CRotate p
by (simp add : CRotate-eq-rotateC C-eq-compile DAinRotate)
lemma C-eq-normalizeRotate2 :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒
allNetsDistinct (policy2list (rotatePolicy p)) =⇒
all-in-list (policy2list (rotatePolicy p)) (Nets-List (rotatePolicy p)) =⇒
C (list2FWpolicy (FWNormalisationCore.normalize (rotatePolicy p))) = CRotate p
by (simp add : normalize-def , erule C-eq-normalizeRotate,simp-all)
end






Normalisation proofs which are specific to the IntegerProtocol address representation.
lemma ConcAssoc: Cp((A ⊕ B) ⊕ D) = Cp(A ⊕ (B ⊕ D))
by (simp add : Cp.simps)
lemma aux26 [simp]:
twoNetsDistinct a b c d =⇒ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) ∩ dom (Cp
(DenyAllFromTo c d)) = {}
by(auto simp:twoNetsDistinct-def netsDistinct-def PLemmas, auto)
lemma wp2-aux [rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy2Pr (xs @ [x ]) −→ wellformed-policy2Pr xs
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apply(induct xs, simp-all)




lemma Cdom2 : x ∈ dom(Cp b) =⇒ Cp (a ⊕ b) x = (Cp b) x
by (auto simp: Cp.simps)
lemma wp2Conc[rule-format ]: wellformed-policy2Pr (x#xs) =⇒ wellformed-policy2Pr
xs
by (case-tac x ,simp-all)
lemma DAimpliesMR-E [rule-format ]: DenyAll ∈ set p −→
(∃ r . applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some r)
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct , simp-all)
by (metis Cp.simps(1 ) denyAllDom)
lemma DAimplieMR[rule-format ]: DenyAll ∈ set p =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x p 6= None
by (auto intro: DAimpliesMR-E )
lemma MRList1 [rule-format ]: x ∈ dom (Cp a) =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x (b@[a]) =
Some a
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma MRList2 : x ∈ dom (Cp a) =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x (c@b@[a]) = Some a
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma MRList3 :
x /∈ dom(Cp xa) =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x (a@b#xs@[xa]) = applied-rule-rev Cp x (a
@ b # xs)
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma CConcEnd [rule-format ]:
Cp a x = Some y −→ Cp (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [a])) x = Some y (is ?P xs)
apply (rule-tac P = ?P in list2FWpolicy .induct)
by (simp-all add :Cp.simps)
lemma CConcStartaux : Cp a x = None =⇒ (Cp aa ++ Cp a) x = Cp aa x
by (simp add : PLemmas)
lemma CConcStart [rule-format ]:
xs 6= [] −→ Cp a x = None −→ Cp (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [a])) x = Cp (list2FWpolicy
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xs) x
by (rule list2FWpolicy .induct) (simp-all add : PLemmas)
lemma mrNnt [simp]: applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some a =⇒ p 6= []
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )(auto)
lemma mr-is-C [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some a −→ Cp (list2FWpolicy (p)) x = Cp a x
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule rev-induct , simp-all , safe)
apply (metis CConcEnd )
apply (metis CConcEnd)
by (metis CConcStart applied-rule-rev-def mrNnt option.exhaust)
lemma CConcStart2 :
p 6= [] =⇒ x /∈ dom (Cp a) =⇒ Cp(list2FWpolicy (p@[a])) x = Cp (list2FWpolicy
p)x
by (erule CConcStart ,simp add : PLemmas)
lemma CConcEnd1 :
q@p 6= [] =⇒ x /∈ dom (Cp a) =⇒ Cp(list2FWpolicy(q@p@[a])) x = Cp (list2FWpolicy
(q@p))x
by (subst lCdom2 ) (rule CConcStart2 , simp-all)
lemma CConcEnd2 [rule-format ]:
x ∈ dom (Cp a) −→ Cp (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [a])) x = Cp a x (is ?P xs)
by (rule-tac P = ?P in list2FWpolicy .induct) (auto simp:Cp.simps)
lemma bar3 :
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [xa]))) =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy xs)) ∨ x
∈ dom (Cp xa)
by auto (metis CConcStart eq-Nil-appendI l2p-aux2 option.simps(3 ))
lemma CeqEnd [rule-format ,simp]:
a 6= [] −→ x ∈ dom (Cp(list2FWpolicy a)) −→ Cp(list2FWpolicy(b@a)) x =
(Cp(list2FWpolicy a)) x
proof (induct rule: rev-induct)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (snoc xa xs) show ?case
apply (case-tac xs 6= [], simp-all)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp xa))
apply (metis CConcEnd2 MRList2 mr-is-C )
apply (metis snoc.hyps CConcEnd1 CConcStart2 Nil-is-append-conv bar3 )
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by (metis MRList2 eq-Nil-appendI mr-is-C )
qed
lemma CConcStartA[rule-format ,simp]:
x ∈ dom (Cp a) −→ x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (a # b))) (is ?P b)
by (rule-tac P = ?P in list2FWpolicy .induct) (simp-all add : Cp.simps)
lemma domConc:
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy b)) =⇒ b 6= [] =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (a@b)))
by (auto simp: PLemmas)
lemma CeqStart [rule-format ,simp]:
x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy a)) −→ a 6= [] −→ b 6= [] −→
Cp (list2FWpolicy (b@a)) x = (Cp (list2FWpolicy b)) x
by (rule list2FWpolicy .induct ,simp-all) (auto simp: list2FWpolicyconc PLemmas)
lemma C-eq-if-mr-eq2 :
applied-rule-rev Cp x a = Some r =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x b = Some r =⇒ a 6=[] =⇒
b 6=[] =⇒
(Cp (list2FWpolicy a)) x = (Cp (list2FWpolicy b)) x
by (metis mr-is-C )
lemma nMRtoNone[rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ applied-rule-rev Cp x p = None −→ Cp (list2FWpolicy p) x = None
proof (induct rule: rev-induct)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (snoc xa xs) show ?case
apply (case-tac xs = [], simp-all)
by (simp-all add : snoc.hyps applied-rule-rev-def dom-def )
qed
lemma C-eq-if-mr-eq :
applied-rule-rev Cp x b = applied-rule-rev Cp x a =⇒ a 6= [] =⇒ b 6= [] =⇒
(Cp (list2FWpolicy a)) x = (Cp (list2FWpolicy b)) x
apply (cases applied-rule-rev Cp x a = None, simp-all)
apply (subst nMRtoNone,simp-all)
apply (subst nMRtoNone,simp-all)
by (auto intro: C-eq-if-mr-eq2 )
lemma notmatching-notdom:
applied-rule-rev Cp x (p@[a]) 6= Some a =⇒ x /∈ dom (Cp a)
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def split : if-splits)
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lemma foo3a[rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev Cp x (a@[b]@c) = Some b −→ r ∈ set c −→ b /∈ set c −→ x /∈ dom
(Cp r)
proof (induct rule: rev-induct)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (snoc xa xs) show ?case
apply simp-all
apply (rule impI |rule conjI |simp)+
apply (rule-tac p = a @ b # xs in notmatching-notdom,simp-all)





wellformed-policy1 p =⇒ p=DenyAll#ps =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some DenyAll
=⇒ r∈set ps =⇒
x /∈ dom (Cp r)
by (rule-tac a = [] and b = DenyAll and c = ps in foo3a, simp-all)
lemma foo4 [rule-format ]:




x ∈ dom (Cp b) −→ (∀ r . r ∈ set c −→ x /∈ dom (Cp r))−→ applied-rule-rev Cp x
(b#c) = Some b
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule-tac xs = c in rev-induct , simp-all)
done
lemma mr-first :
x ∈ dom (Cp b) =⇒ (∀ r . r ∈ set c −→ x /∈ dom (Cp r)) =⇒ s = b#c =⇒
applied-rule-rev Cp x s = Some b
by (simp add : foo5b)
lemma mr-charn[rule-format ]:
a ∈ set p −→ (x ∈ dom (Cp a)) −→(∀ r . r ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (Cp r) −→ r = a)
−→
applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some a
apply(rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct)





∀ r . r ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (Cp r) −→ r = a =⇒ set p = set s =⇒
∀ r . r ∈ set s ∧ x ∈ dom (Cp r) −→ r = a
by auto
lemma mrConcEnd [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev Cp x (b # p) = Some a −→ a 6= b −→ applied-rule-rev Cp x p =
Some a
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct ,simp-all)
by auto
lemma wp3tl [rule-format ]: wellformed-policy3Pr p −→ wellformed-policy3Pr (tl p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)




lemma wp3Conc[rule-format ]: wellformed-policy3Pr (a#p) −→ wellformed-policy3Pr p
by (induct p, simp-all , case-tac a, simp-all)
lemma foo98 [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev Cp x (aa # p) = Some a −→ x ∈ dom (Cp r) −→ r ∈ set p −→ a
∈ set p
unfolding applied-rule-rev-def
proof (induct rule: rev-induct)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (snoc xa xs) then show ?case
by simp-all (case-tac r = xa, simp-all)
qed
lemma mrMTNone[simp]: applied-rule-rev Cp x [] = None
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma DAAux [simp]: x ∈ dom (Cp DenyAll)
by (simp add : dom-def PolicyCombinators.PolicyCombinators Cp.simps)
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lemma mrSet [rule-format ]: applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some r −→ r ∈ set p
unfolding applied-rule-rev-def
by (rule-tac xs=p in rev-induct) simp-all
lemma mr-not-Conc: singleCombinators p =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x p 6= Some (a⊕b)
by (auto simp: mrSet dest : mrSet elim: SCnotConc)
lemma foo25 [rule-format ]: wellformed-policy3Pr (p@[x ]) −→ wellformed-policy3Pr p
apply(induct p, simp-all)




lemma mr-in-dom[rule-format ]: applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some a −→ x ∈ dom (Cp
a)
by (rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct) (auto simp: applied-rule-rev-def )
lemma wp3EndMT [rule-format ]:
wellformed-policy3Pr (p@[xs]) −→ AllowPortFromTo a b po ∈ set p −→
dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b po)) ∩ dom (Cp xs) = {}
apply (induct p, simp-all)
by (metis NormalisationIPPProofs.wp3Conc aux0-4 inf-commute list .set-intros(1 )
wellformed-policy3Pr .simps(2 ))
lemma foo29 : dom (Cp a) 6= {} =⇒ dom (Cp a) ∩ dom (Cp b) = {} =⇒ a 6= b
by auto
lemma foo28 :
AllowPortFromTo a b po∈set p =⇒ dom(Cp(AllowPortFromTo a b po))6={} =⇒
(wellformed-policy3Pr(p@[x ])) =⇒
x 6= AllowPortFromTo a b po
by (metis foo29 Cp.simps(3 ) wp3EndMT )
lemma foo28a[rule-format ]: x ∈ dom (Cp a) =⇒ dom (Cp a) 6= {}
by auto
lemma allow-deny-dom[simp]:
dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b po)) ⊆ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b))
by (simp-all add : twoNetsDistinct-def netsDistinct-def PLemmas) auto
lemma DenyAllowDisj :
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dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) 6= {} =⇒
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b)) ∩ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) 6= {}
by (metis Int-absorb1 allow-deny-dom)
lemma foo31 :
∀ r . r ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (Cp r) −→
(r = AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r = DenyAllFromTo a b ∨ r = DenyAll) =⇒
set p = set s =⇒
(∀ r . r∈set s ∧ x∈dom(Cp r) −→ r=AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r=DenyAllFromTo
a b ∨ r = DenyAll)
by auto
lemma wp1-auxa: wellformed-policy1-strong p=⇒(∃ r . applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some
r)
apply (rule DAimpliesMR-E )
by (erule wp1-aux1aa)
lemma deny-dom[simp]:
twoNetsDistinct a b c d =⇒ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b)) ∩ dom (Cp
(DenyAllFromTo c d)) = {}
by (simp add : Cp.simps) (erule aux6 )




twoNetsDistinct a b c d =⇒ dom (Cp(AllowPortFromTo a b p)) ∩
dom(Cp(AllowPortFromTo c d po))={}
apply (case-tac p = po, simp-all)
apply (rule-tac b = Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b) in domTrans, simp-all)
apply (metis domComm aux26 tNDComm)
apply (simp add : twoNetsDistinct-def netsDistinct-def PLemmas)
by (auto simp: prod-eqI )
lemma DomInterAllowsMT-Ports:
p 6= po =⇒ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b p)) ∩ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo c d
po)) = {}
apply (simp add : twoNetsDistinct-def netsDistinct-def PLemmas)
by (auto simp: prod-eqI )
lemma wellformed-policy3-charn[rule-format ]:
singleCombinators p −→ distinct p −→ allNetsDistinct p −→
wellformed-policy1 p −→ wellformed-policy2Pr p −→ wellformed-policy3Pr p
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proof (induct p)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) then show ?case
apply (auto intro: singleCombinatorsConc ANDConc waux2 wp2Conc)
apply (case-tac a,simp-all , clarify)
subgoal for a b c d r
apply (case-tac r ,simp-all)
apply (metis Int-commute)
apply (metis DomInterAllowsMT aux7aa DomInterAllowsMT-Ports)





DenyAllFromTo b c ∈ set p =⇒ AllowPortFromTo a d po ∈ set p=⇒ allNetsDistinct
p =⇒
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo b c)) ∩ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a d po)) 6= {}=⇒
b = a ∧ c = d
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
apply (frule-tac x = b in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = d in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = a in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = c in spec)




AllowPortFromTo b c poo ∈ set p =⇒ AllowPortFromTo a d po ∈ set p =⇒
allNetsDistinct p =⇒ dom(Cp(AllowPortFromTo b c poo)) ∩
dom(Cp(AllowPortFromTo a d po)) 6= {} =⇒
b = a ∧ c = d ∧ poo = po
apply (simp add : allNetsDistinct-def )
apply (frule-tac x = b in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = d in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = a in spec)
apply (drule-tac x = c in spec)









then show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons x xs)
have wp-xs: wellformed-policy2Pr (removeShadowRules2 xs)
by (metis Cons ANDConc distinct .simps(2 ) singleCombinatorsConc)
show ?case
proof (cases x )
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using wp-xs by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b) thus ?thesis
using wp-xs Cons
by (simp,metis DenyAllFromTo aux aux7 tNDComm deny-dom)
next
case (AllowPortFromTo a b p) thus ?thesis
using wp-xs
by (simp, metis aux26 AllowPortFromTo Cons(4 ) aux aux7a tNDComm)
next
case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis




AllowPortFromTo a b po ∈ set p =⇒ DenyAllFromTo c d ∈ set p =⇒
allNetsDistinct p =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒ a 6= c ∨ b 6= d =⇒
dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b po)) ∩ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo c d)) = {}
by (rule aux26 ,rule-tac x =AllowPortFromTo a b po and y = DenyAllFromTo c d in
tND) auto
lemma sorted-WP2 [rule-format ]:




case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) thus ?case
proof (cases a)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis
using Cons by (auto intro: ANDConc singleCombinatorsConc sortedConcEnd)
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next
case (DenyAllFromTo c d) thus ?thesis
using Cons apply (simp, intro impI conjI allI impI deny-dom)
by (auto intro: aux7 tNDComm ANDConc singleCombinatorsConc sortedConcEnd)
next
case (AllowPortFromTo c d e) thus ?thesis
using Cons apply simp
apply (intro impI conjI allI , rename-tac aa b)
apply (rule aux26 )
subgoal for aa b
apply (rule-tac x = AllowPortFromTo c d e and y = DenyAllFromTo aa b in
tND ,
assumption,simp-all)
apply (subgoal-tac smaller (AllowPortFromTo c d e) (DenyAllFromTo aa b) l)
apply (simp split : if-splits)
apply metis
apply (erule sorted-is-smaller , simp-all)
apply (metis bothNet .simps(2 ) in-list .simps(2 ) in-set-in-list)
done
by (auto intro: aux7 tNDComm ANDConc singleCombinatorsConc sortedConcEnd)
next




all-in-list p l =⇒ distinct p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
wellformed-policy2Pr (sort p l)
by (metis distinct-sort set-sort sorted-WP2 SC3 aND-sort all-in-listSubset order-refl
sort-is-sorted)
lemma wellformed2-sortedQ [simp]:
all-in-list p l =⇒ distinct p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
wellformed-policy2Pr (qsort p l)
by (metis sorted-WP2 SC3Q aND-sortQ all-in-listSubset distinct-sortQ set-sortQ
sort-is-sortedQ subsetI )
lemma C-DenyAll [simp]: Cp (list2FWpolicy (xs @ [DenyAll ])) x = Some (deny ())
by (auto simp: PLemmas)
lemma C-eq-RS1n:
Cp(list2FWpolicy (removeShadowRules1-alternative p)) = Cp(list2FWpolicy p)
proof (cases p)
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case Nil then show ?thesis
by (simp, metis list2FWpolicy .simps(1 ) rSR1-eq removeShadowRules1 .simps(2 ))
next
case (Cons a list) then show ?thesis
apply (hypsubst , simp)
apply (thin-tac p = a # list)
proof (induct rule: rev-induct)
case Nil show ?case by (metis rSR1-eq removeShadowRules1 .simps(2 ))
next
case (snoc x xs) show ?case
apply (case-tac xs = [], simp-all)
apply (simp add : removeShadowRules1-alternative-def )
apply (insert snoc.hyps, case-tac x , simp-all)
apply (rule ext , rename-tac xa)
apply (case-tac x = DenyAll ,simp-all add : PLemmas)
apply (rule-tac t = removeShadowRules1-alternative (xs @ [x ]) and
s = (removeShadowRules1-alternative xs)@[x ] in subst)
apply (erule RS1n-assoc)
subgoal for a






p 6= [] =⇒ Cp(list2FWpolicy (removeShadowRules1 p)) = Cp(list2FWpolicy p)
by (metis rSR1-eq C-eq-RS1n)
lemma EX-MR-aux [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev Cp x (DenyAll # p) 6= Some DenyAll −→ (∃ y . applied-rule-rev Cp x
p = Some y)
by (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def ) (rule-tac xs = p in rev-induct , simp-all)
lemma EX-MR :
applied-rule-rev Cp x p 6= (Some DenyAll) =⇒ p = DenyAll#ps =⇒
(applied-rule-rev Cp x p = applied-rule-rev Cp x ps)
apply (auto,subgoal-tac applied-rule-rev Cp x (DenyAll#ps) 6= None, auto)
apply (metis mrConcEnd)
by (metis DAimpliesMR-E list .sel(1 ) hd-in-set list .simps(3 ) not-Some-eq)
lemma mr-not-DA:
wellformed-policy1-strong s =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some (DenyAllFromTo a
ab) =⇒
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set p = set s =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x s 6= Some DenyAll
apply (subst wp1n-tl , simp-all)
by (metis (mono-tags, lifting) Combinators.distinct(1 ) foo98
mrSet mr-in-dom WP1n-DA-notinSet set-ConsD wp1n-tl)
lemma domsMT-notND-DD :
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b)) ∩ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo c d)) 6= {} =⇒ ¬
netsDistinct a c
by (erule contrapos-nn) (simp add : Cp.simps aux6 twoNetsDistinct-def )
lemma domsMT-notND-DD2 :
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b)) ∩ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo c d)) 6= {} =⇒ ¬
netsDistinct b d
by (erule contrapos-nn) (simp add : Cp.simps aux6 twoNetsDistinct-def )
lemma domsMT-notND-DD3 :
x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b)) =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo c d)) =⇒ ¬
netsDistinct a c
by (auto intro!: domsMT-notND-DD)
lemma domsMT-notND-DD4 :
x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b)) =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo c d)) =⇒ ¬
netsDistinct b d
by (auto intro!: domsMT-notND-DD2 )
lemma NetsEq-if-sameP-DD :
allNetsDistinct p =⇒ u∈ set p =⇒ v∈ set p =⇒ u = (DenyAllFromTo a b) =⇒
v = (DenyAllFromTo c d) =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp (u)) =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp (v)) =⇒
a = c ∧ b = d
unfolding allNetsDistinct-def
by (simp)(metis allNetsDistinct-def ND0aux1 ND0aux2 domsMT-notND-DD3
domsMT-notND-DD4 )
lemma rule-charn1 :
assumes aND : allNetsDistinct p
and mr-is-allow : applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some (AllowPortFromTo a b po)
and SC : singleCombinators p
and inp : r ∈ set p
and inDom : x ∈ dom (Cp r)
shows (r = AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r = DenyAllFromTo a b ∨ r = DenyAll)
proof (cases r)
case DenyAll show ?thesis by (metis DenyAll)
next
case (DenyAllFromTo x y) show ?thesis
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by (metis DenyAllFromTo NormalisationIPPProofs.AD-aux NormalisationIPP-
Proofs.mrSet
NormalisationIPPProofs.mr-in-dom SC aND domInterMT inDom inp mr-is-allow)
next
case (AllowPortFromTo x y b) show ?thesis
by (metis (mono-tags, lifting) AllowPortFromTo NormalisationIPP-
Proofs.DistinctNetsAllowAllow




case (Conc x y) thus ?thesis using assms by (metis aux0-0 )
qed
lemma none-MT-rulessubset [rule-format ]:
none-MT-rules Cp a −→ set b ⊆ set a −→ none-MT-rules Cp b
by (induct b,simp-all) (metis notMTnMT )
lemma nMTSort : none-MT-rules Cp p =⇒ none-MT-rules Cp (sort p l)
by (metis set-sort nMTeqSet)
lemma nMTSortQ : none-MT-rules Cp p =⇒ none-MT-rules Cp (qsort p l)
by (metis set-sortQ nMTeqSet)
lemma wp3char [rule-format ]: none-MT-rules Cp xs ∧ Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b po)
= empty ∧
wellformed-policy3Pr (xs @ [DenyAllFromTo a b]) −→
AllowPortFromTo a b po /∈ set xs
by (induct xs, simp-all) (metis domNMT wp3Conc)
lemma wp3charn[rule-format ]:
assumes domAllow : dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b po)) 6= {}
and wp3 : wellformed-policy3Pr (xs @ [DenyAllFromTo a b])
shows allowNotInList : AllowPortFromTo a b po /∈ set xs
apply (insert assms)
proof (induct xs)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons x xs) show ?case using Cons
by (simp,auto intro: wp3Conc) (auto simp: DenyAllowDisj domAllow)
qed
lemma rule-charn2 :
assumes aND : allNetsDistinct p
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and wp1 : wellformed-policy1 p
and SC : singleCombinators p
and wp3 : wellformed-policy3Pr p
and allow-in-list : AllowPortFromTo c d po ∈ set p
and x-in-dom-allow : x ∈ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo c d po))
shows applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some (AllowPortFromTo c d po)
proof (insert assms, induct p rule: rev-induct)
case Nil show ?case using Nil by simp
next
case (snoc y ys) show ?case using snoc
apply simp
apply (case-tac y = (AllowPortFromTo c d po))
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply simp-all
apply (subgoal-tac ys 6= [])
apply (subgoal-tac applied-rule-rev Cp x ys = Some (AllowPortFromTo c d po))
defer 1
apply (metis ANDConcEnd SCConcEnd WP1ConcEnd foo25 )
apply (metis inSet-not-MT )
proof (cases y)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using DenyAll snoc
apply simp
by (metis DAnotTL DenyAll inSet-not-MT policy2list .simps(2 ))
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b) thus ?thesis using snoc apply simp
apply (simp-all add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule conjI )
apply (metis domInterMT wp3EndMT )
apply (rule impI )
by (metis ANDConcEnd DenyAllFromTo SCConcEnd WP1ConcEnd foo25 )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo a1 a2 b) thus ?thesis using AllowPortFromTo snoc apply
simp
apply (simp-all add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule conjI )
apply (metis domInterMT wp3EndMT )
by (metis ANDConcEnd AllowPortFromTo SCConcEnd WP1ConcEnd foo25
x-in-dom-allow)
next
case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis
using Conc snoc apply simp





wellformed-policy1 p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
wellformed-policy3Pr p =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some (DenyAllFromTo c d) =⇒
AllowPortFromTo a b po ∈ set p =⇒ x /∈ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b po))
by (clarify) (simp add : NormalisationIPPProofs.rule-charn2 domI )
lemma rule-charn4 :
assumes wp1 : wellformed-policy1 p
and aND : allNetsDistinct p
and SC : singleCombinators p
and wp3 : wellformed-policy3Pr p
and DA: DenyAll /∈ set p
and mr : applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some (DenyAllFromTo a b)
and rinp: r ∈ set p
and xindom: x ∈ dom (Cp r)
shows r = DenyAllFromTo a b
proof (cases r)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using DenyAll assms by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo c d) thus ?thesis
using assms apply simp
apply (erule-tac x = x and p = p and v = (DenyAllFromTo a b) and




case (AllowPortFromTo c d e) thus ?thesis
using assms apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac x /∈ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo c d e)), simp)
by (rule-tac p = p in rule-charn3 , auto intro: SCnotConc)
next
case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis
using assms apply simp
by (metis Conc aux0-0 )
qed
lemma foo31a:
(∀ r . r ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (Cp r) −→
(r = AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r = DenyAllFromTo a b ∨ r = DenyAll)) =⇒
set p = set s =⇒ r ∈ set s =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp r) =⇒
(r = AllowPortFromTo a b po ∨ r = DenyAllFromTo a b ∨ r = DenyAll)
by auto
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lemma aux4 [rule-format ]:
applied-rule-rev Cp x (a#p) = Some a −→ a /∈ set (p) −→ applied-rule-rev Cp x p =
None
by (rule rev-induct , simp-all) (intro impI ,simp add : applied-rule-rev-def split : if-splits)
lemma mrDA-tl :
assumes mr-DA: applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some DenyAll
and wp1n: wellformed-policy1-strong p
shows applied-rule-rev Cp x (tl p) = None
apply (rule aux4 [where a = DenyAll ])
apply (metis wp1n-tl mr-DA wp1n)
by (metis WP1n-DA-notinSet wp1n)
lemma rule-charnDAFT :
wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
wellformed-policy3Pr p =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some (DenyAllFromTo a b)
=⇒
r ∈ set (tl p) =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp r) =⇒
r = DenyAllFromTo a b
apply (subgoal-tac p = DenyAll#(tl p))





using wp1n-tl by auto
lemma mrDenyAll-is-unique:
wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some DenyAll =⇒ r ∈ set
(tl p) =⇒
x /∈ dom (Cp r)




assumes sets-eq : set p = set s
and SC : singleCombinators p
and wp1-p: wellformed-policy1-strong p
and wp1-s: wellformed-policy1-strong s
and wp3-p: wellformed-policy3Pr p
and wp3-s: wellformed-policy3Pr s
and aND : allNetsDistinct p
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shows applied-rule-rev Cp x p = applied-rule-rev Cp x s
proof (cases applied-rule-rev Cp x p)
case None
have DA: DenyAll ∈ set p using wp1-p by (auto simp: wp1-aux1aa)
have notDA: DenyAll /∈ set p using None by (auto simp: DAimplieMR)
thus ?thesis using DA by (contradiction)
next
case (Some y) thus ?thesis
proof (cases y)
have tl-p: p = DenyAll#(tl p) by (metis wp1-p wp1n-tl)
have tl-s: s = DenyAll#(tl s) by (metis wp1-s wp1n-tl)
have tl-eq : set (tl p) = set (tl s)
by (metis list .sel(3 ) WP1n-DA-notinSet sets-eq foo2
wellformed-policy1-charn wp1-aux1aa wp1-eq wp1-p wp1-s)
{
case DenyAll
have mr-p-is-DenyAll : applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some DenyAll
by (simp add : DenyAll Some)
hence x-notin-tl-p: ∀ r . r ∈ set (tl p) −→ x /∈ dom (Cp r) using wp1-p
by (auto simp: mrDenyAll-is-unique)
hence x-notin-tl-s: ∀ r . r ∈ set (tl s) −→ x /∈ dom (Cp r) using tl-eq
by auto
hence mr-s-is-DenyAll : applied-rule-rev Cp x s = Some DenyAll using tl-s
by (auto simp: mr-first)
thus ?thesis using mr-p-is-DenyAll by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b)
have mr-p-is-DAFT : applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some (DenyAllFromTo a b)
by (simp add : DenyAllFromTo Some)
have DA-notin-tl : DenyAll /∈ set (tl p)
by (metis WP1n-DA-notinSet wp1-p)
have mr-tl-p: applied-rule-rev Cp x p = applied-rule-rev Cp x (tl p)
by (metis Combinators.simps(4 ) DenyAllFromTo Some mrConcEnd tl-p)
have dom-tl-p:
∧
r . r ∈ set (tl p) ∧ x ∈ dom (Cp r) =⇒
r = (DenyAllFromTo a b)
using wp1-p aND SC wp3-p mr-p-is-DAFT
by (auto simp: rule-charnDAFT )
hence dom-tl-s:
∧
r . r ∈ set (tl s) ∧ x ∈ dom (Cp r) =⇒
r = (DenyAllFromTo a b)
using tl-eq by auto
have DAFT-in-tl-s: DenyAllFromTo a b ∈ set (tl s) using mr-tl-p
by (metis DenyAllFromTo mrSet mr-p-is-DAFT tl-eq)
have x-in-dom-DAFT : x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b))
by (metis mr-p-is-DAFT DenyAllFromTo mr-in-dom)
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hence mr-tl-s-is-DAFT : applied-rule-rev Cp x (tl s) = Some (DenyAllFromTo a
b)
using DAFT-in-tl-s dom-tl-s by (metis mr-charn)
hence mr-s-is-DAFT : applied-rule-rev Cp x s = Some (DenyAllFromTo a b)
using tl-s
by (metis DA-notin-tl DenyAllFromTo EX-MR mrDA-tl
not-Some-eq tl-eq wellformed-policy1-strong .simps(2 ))
thus ?thesis using mr-p-is-DAFT by simp
next
case (AllowPortFromTo a b c)
have wp1s: wellformed-policy1 s by (metis wp1-eq wp1-s)
have mr-p-is-A: applied-rule-rev Cp x p = Some (AllowPortFromTo a b c)
by (simp add : AllowPortFromTo Some)
hence A-in-s: AllowPortFromTo a b c ∈ set s using sets-eq
by (auto intro: mrSet)
have x-in-dom-A: x ∈ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b c))
by (metis mr-p-is-A AllowPortFromTo mr-in-dom)
have SCs: singleCombinators s using SC sets-eq
by (auto intro: SCSubset)
hence ANDs: allNetsDistinct s using aND sets-eq SC
by (auto intro: aNDSetsEq)
hence mr-s-is-A: applied-rule-rev Cp x s = Some (AllowPortFromTo a b c)
using A-in-s wp1s mr-p-is-A aND SCs wp3-s x-in-dom-A
by (simp add : rule-charn2 )
thus ?thesis using mr-p-is-A by simp
}
next




singleCombinators p =⇒ wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ wellformed-policy1-strong s
=⇒
wellformed-policy3Pr p =⇒ wellformed-policy3Pr s =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ set p =
set s =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy p) x = Cp (list2FWpolicy s) x
by (metis C-eq-Sets-mr C-eq-if-mr-eq wellformed-policy1-strong .simps(1 ))
lemma C-eq-sorted :
distinct p =⇒ all-in-list p l =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
wellformed-policy1-strong p=⇒ wellformed-policy3Pr p=⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (sort p l))= Cp (list2FWpolicy p)
by (rule ext)
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distinct p =⇒ all-in-list p l =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ wellformed-policy3Pr p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (qsort p l))= Cp (list2FWpolicy p)
by (rule ext)
(metis C-eq-Sets wellformed2-sortedQ wellformed-policy3-charn SC3Q aND-sortQ
distinct-sortQ
set-sortQ wellformed1-sorted-auxQ wellformed-eq wp1-aux1aa)
lemma C-eq-RS2-mr : applied-rule-rev Cp x (removeShadowRules2 p)= applied-rule-rev
Cp x p
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys) thus ?case
proof (cases ys = [])
case True thus ?thesis by (cases y , simp-all)
next
case False thus ?thesis
proof (cases y)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis by (simp, metis Cons DenyAll mreq-end2 )
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b) thus ?thesis by (simp, metis Cons DenyAllFromTo
mreq-end2 )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo a b p) thus ?thesis
proof (cases DenyAllFromTo a b ∈ set ys)
case True thus ?thesis using AllowPortFromTo Cons
apply (cases applied-rule-rev Cp x ys = None, simp-all)
apply (subgoal-tac x /∈ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b p)))
apply (subst mrconcNone, simp-all)
apply (simp add : applied-rule-rev-def )
apply (rule contra-subsetD [OF allow-deny-dom])
apply (erule mrNoneMT ,simp)
apply (metis AllowPortFromTo mrconc)
done
next
case False thus ?thesis using False Cons AllowPortFromTo
by (simp, metis AllowPortFromTo Cons mreq-end2 ) qed
next
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case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis





p 6= [] −→ applied-rule-rev Cp x p = None −→ Cp (list2FWpolicy p) x = None
unfolding applied-rule-rev-def
proof(induct rule: rev-induct)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (snoc xa xs) show ?case
apply (insert snoc.hyps, intro impI , simp)
apply (case-tac xs 6= [])
apply (metis CConcStart2 option.simps(3 ))
by (metis append-Nil domIff l2p-aux2 option.distinct(1 ))
qed
lemma C-eq-None2 :
a 6= [] =⇒ b 6= [] =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x a = None =⇒ applied-rule-rev Cp x b
= None =⇒
(Cp (list2FWpolicy a)) x = (Cp (list2FWpolicy b)) x
by (auto simp: C-eq-None)
lemma C-eq-RS2 :
wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (removeShadowRules2 p))= Cp (list2FWpolicy p)
apply (rule ext)
by (metis C-eq-RS2-mr C-eq-if-mr-eq RS2-NMT wp1-alternative-not-mt)
lemma none-MT-rulesRS2 : none-MT-rules Cp p =⇒ none-MT-rules Cp
(removeShadowRules2 p)
by (auto simp: RS2Set none-MT-rulessubset)
lemma CconcNone:
dom (Cp a) = {} =⇒ p 6= [] =⇒ Cp (list2FWpolicy (a # p)) x = Cp (list2FWpolicy
p) x
apply (case-tac p = [], simp-all)
apply (case-tac x∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy(p))))
apply (metis Cdom2 list2FWpolicyconc)




lemma none-MT-rulesrd [rule-format ]: none-MT-rules Cp p −→ none-MT-rules Cp
(remdups p)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma DARS3 [rule-format ]:DenyAll /∈ set p−→DenyAll /∈ set (rm-MT-rules Cp p)
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma DAnMT : dom (Cp DenyAll) 6= {}
by (simp add : dom-def Cp.simps PolicyCombinators.PolicyCombinators)
lemma DAnMT2 : Cp DenyAll 6= empty
by (metis DAAux dom-eq-empty-conv empty-iff )
lemma wp1n-RS3 [rule-format ,simp]:
wellformed-policy1-strong p −→ wellformed-policy1-strong (rm-MT-rules Cp p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)
apply (rule conjI | rule impI |simp)+
apply (metis DAnMT )
apply (metis DARS3 )
done
lemma AILRS3 [rule-format ,simp]:
all-in-list p l −→ all-in-list (rm-MT-rules Cp p) l
by (induct p, simp-all)
lemma SCRS3 [rule-format ,simp]:
singleCombinators p −→ singleCombinators(rm-MT-rules Cp p)
apply (induct p, simp-all)




lemma RS3subset : set (rm-MT-rules Cp p) ⊆ set p
by (induct p, auto)
lemma ANDRS3 [simp]:
singleCombinators p =⇒ allNetsDistinct p =⇒ allNetsDistinct (rm-MT-rules Cp p)
by (rule-tac b = p in aNDSubset , simp-all add :RS3subset)
lemma nlpaux : x /∈ dom (Cp b) =⇒ Cp (a ⊕ b) x = Cp a x
by (metis Cp.simps(4 ) map-add-dom-app-simps(3 ))
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lemma notindom[rule-format ]:
a ∈ set p −→ x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p)) −→ x /∈ dom (Cp a)
proof (induct p)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) then show ?case
apply (simp-all ,intro conjI impI )
apply (metis CConcStartA)
apply simp




lemma C-eq-rd [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] =⇒ Cp (list2FWpolicy (remdups p)) = Cp (list2FWpolicy p)
proof (rule ext , induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys) thus ?case
proof (cases ys = [])
case True thus ?thesis by simp
next
case False thus ?thesis
using Cons apply simp
apply (intro conjI impI )
apply (metis Cdom2 nlpaux notindom domIff l2p-aux )




¬ not-MT Cp p =⇒ p 6= [] =⇒ r /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p))
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons x xs) thus ?case
apply (simp split : if-splits)
apply (cases xs = [],simp-all )
by (metis CconcNone domIff )
qed
lemma C-eq-RS3-aux [rule-format ]:




case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys) thus ?case
proof (cases not-MT Cp ys)
case True thus ?thesis
using Cons apply simp
apply (intro conjI impI , simp)
apply (metis CconcNone True not-MTimpnotMT )
apply (cases x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy ys)))
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (rm-MT-rules Cp ys))))
apply (metis (mono-tags) Cons-eq-appendI NMPrm CeqEnd append-Nil
not-MTimpnotMT )
apply (simp add : domIff )
apply (subgoal-tac x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (rm-MT-rules Cp ys))))
apply (metis l2p-aux l2p-aux2 nlpaux )
by (metis domIff )
next
case False thus ?thesis
using Cons False
proof (cases ys = [])
case True thus ?thesis using Cons by (simp) (rule impI , simp)
next
case False thus ?thesis
using Cons False 〈¬ not-MT Cp ys〉 apply (simp)
apply (intro conjI impI | simp)+
apply (subgoal-tac rm-MT-rules Cp ys = [])
apply (subgoal-tac x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy ys)))
apply simp-all
apply (metis l2p-aux nlpaux )
apply (erule nMT-domMT , simp-all)





wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒ Cp(list2FWpolicy (insertDeny p)) = Cp
(list2FWpolicy p)
by (rule ext) (metis insertDeny .simps(1 ) wp1n-tl)
lemma C-eq-RS3 :
not-MT Cp p =⇒ Cp(list2FWpolicy (rm-MT-rules Cp p)) = Cp (list2FWpolicy p)
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by (rule ext) (erule C-eq-RS3-aux [symmetric])
lemma NMPrd [rule-format ]: not-MT Cp p −→ not-MT Cp (remdups p)
by (induct p, simp-all) (auto simp: NMPcharn)
lemma NMPDA[rule-format ]: DenyAll ∈ set p −→ not-MT Cp p
by (induct p, simp-all add : DAnMT )
lemma NMPiD [rule-format ]: not-MT Cp (insertDeny p)
by (insert DAiniD [of p]) (erule NMPDA)
lemma list2FWpolicy2list [rule-format ]:
Cp (list2FWpolicy(policy2list p)) = (Cp p)
apply (rule ext)
apply (induct-tac p, simp-all)
subgoal for x x1 x2
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (x2 )))
apply (metis Cdom2 CeqEnd domIff p2lNmt)
apply (metis CeqStart domIff p2lNmt nlpaux )
done
done
lemmas C-eq-Lemmas = none-MT-rulesRS2 none-MT-rulesrd SCp2l wp1n-RS2
wp1ID NMPiD waux2
wp1alternative-RS1 p2lNmt list2FWpolicy2list wellformed-policy3-charn
wp1-eq
lemmas C-eq-subst-Lemmas = C-eq-sorted C-eq-sortedQ C-eq-RS2 C-eq-rd C-eq-RS3
C-eq-id
lemma C-eq-All-untilSorted :
DenyAll∈set(policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list(policy2list p) l =⇒ allNetsDistinct(policy2list
p) =⇒
Cp(list2FWpolicy (sort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules Cp
(insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)) =
Cp p
apply (subst C-eq-sorted ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-RS2 ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-rd ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-RS3 ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)




DenyAll∈ set(policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list(policy2list p) l =⇒ allNetsDis-
tinct(policy2list p) =⇒
Cp(list2FWpolicy (qsort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules Cp
(insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)) =
Cp p
apply (subst C-eq-sortedQ ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-RS2 ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-rd ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-RS3 ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
apply (subst C-eq-id ,simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas)
done
lemma C-eq-All-untilSorted-withSimps:
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list (policy2list p) l =⇒
allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
Cp(list2FWpolicy(sort(removeShadowRules2 (remdups(rm-MT-rules Cp (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)) =
Cp p
by (simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas C-eq-subst-Lemmas)
lemma C-eq-All-untilSorted-withSimpsQ :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list (policy2list p) l =⇒
allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
Cp(list2FWpolicy(qsort(removeShadowRules2 (remdups(rm-MT-rules Cp (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l)) =
Cp p
by (simp-all add : C-eq-Lemmas C-eq-subst-Lemmas)
lemma InDomConc[rule-format ]: p 6= [] −→ x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (p))) −→
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (a#p)))
apply (induct p, simp-all)
subgoal for a p
apply(case-tac p = [],simp-all add : dom-def Cp.simps)
done
done
lemma not-in-member [rule-format ]: member a b −→ x /∈ dom (Cp b) −→ x /∈ dom
(Cp a)
by (induct b)(simp-all add : dom-def Cp.simps)
lemma src-in-sdnets[rule-format ]:
¬ member DenyAll x −→ p ∈ dom (Cp x ) −→ subnetsOfAdr (src p) ∩ (fst-set (sdnets
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x )) 6= {}
apply (induct rule: Combinators.induct)
apply (simp-all add : fst-set-def subnetsOfAdr-def PLemmas, rename-tac x1 x2 )
apply (intro impI )
apply (simp add : fst-set-def )
subgoal for x1 x2
apply (case-tac p ∈ dom (Cp x2 ))
apply (rule subnetAux )




¬ member DenyAll x −→ p ∈ dom (Cp x ) −→ subnetsOfAdr (dest p) ∩ (snd-set
(sdnets x )) 6= {}
apply (induct rule: Combinators.induct)
apply (simp-all add : snd-set-def subnetsOfAdr-def PLemmas, rename-tac x1 x2 )
apply (intro impI ,simp add : snd-set-def )
subgoal for x1 x2
apply (case-tac p ∈ dom (Cp x2 ))
apply (rule subnetAux )




p∈ dom (Cp x ) −→ ¬ member DenyAll x −→
(∃ (a,b)∈sdnets x . a ∈ subnetsOfAdr (src p) ∧ b ∈ subnetsOfAdr (dest p))
apply (rule Combinators.induct)
apply (simp-all add : PLemmas subnetsOfAdr-def )
apply (intro impI , simp)
subgoal for x1 x2
apply (case-tac p ∈ dom (Cp (x2 )))




[[disjSD-2 x y ; ¬ member DenyAll x ; ¬ member DenyAll y ;
p ∈ dom (Cp x ); p ∈ dom (Cp y)]] =⇒ False
apply (rule-tac A = sdnets x and B = sdnets y and D = src p and F = dest p in
tndFalse)
by (auto simp: dest-in-sdnets src-in-sdnets sdnets-in-subnets disjSD-2-def )
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lemma list2FWpolicy-eq :
zs 6= [] =⇒ Cp (list2FWpolicy (x ⊕ y # z )) p = Cp (x ⊕ list2FWpolicy (y # z )) p
by (metis ConcAssoc l2p-aux list2FWpolicy .simps(2 ))
lemma dom-sep[rule-format ]:
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p)) −→ x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy(separate p)))
proof (induct p rule: separate.induct ,simp-all , goal-cases)
case (1 v va y z ) then show ?case
apply (intro conjI impI )
apply (simp,drule mp)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo v va)))
apply (metis CConcStartA domIff l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc not-Cons-self )
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (y #z ))))
apply (metis CConcStartA Cdom2 domIff l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy ((DenyAllFromTo v va)#y#z ))))
apply (simp add : dom-def Cp.simps,simp-all)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo v va)), simp-all)
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (y #z ))))
apply (metis InDomConc sepnMT list .simps(2 ))
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy ((DenyAllFromTo v va)#y#z ))))
by (simp-all add : dom-def Cp.simps)
next
case (2 v va vb y z ) then show ?case
apply (intro impI conjI ,simp)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo v va vb)))
apply (metis CConcStartA domIff l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc not-Cons-self )
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (y #z ))))
apply (metis CConcStartA Cdom2 InDomConc domIff l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc
nlpaux )
apply (simp add : dom-def Cp.simps, simp-all)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo v va vb)), simp-all)
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (y #z ))),simp)
apply (metis Conc-not-MT InDomConc sepnMT )
apply (metis domIff nlpaux )
done
next
case (3 v va y z ) then show ?case
apply (intro conjI impI ,simp)
apply (drule mp)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp ((v ⊕ va))))





apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp ((v ⊕ va))),simp-all)
apply (drule mp)
apply (simp add : Cp.simps dom-def )
apply (metis InDomConc list .simps(2 )sepnMT )
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (y#z ))))
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp y),simp-all)
apply (metis CConcStartA Cdom2 ConcAssoc domIff )
apply (metis InDomConc domIff l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp y),simp-all)
by (metis domIff nlpaux )
qed
lemma domdConcStart [rule-format ]:
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (a#b))) −→ x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy b)) −→ x ∈
dom (Cp (a))
by (induct b, simp-all) (auto simp: PLemmas)
lemma sep-dom2-aux :
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (a ⊕ y # z ))) =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp (a ⊕ list2FWpolicy (y
# z )))
by auto (metis list2FWpolicy-eq p2lNmt)
lemma sep-dom2-aux2 :
(x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (separate (y # z )))) −→ x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy
(y # z )))) =⇒
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (a # separate (y # z )))) =⇒
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (a ⊕ y # z )))
by (metis CConcStartA InDomConc domdConcStart list .simps(2 )
list2FWpolicy .simps(2 ) list2FWpolicyconc)
lemma sep-dom2 [rule-format ]:
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (separate p))) −→ x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy( p)))
by (rule separate.induct) (simp-all add : sep-dom2-aux sep-dom2-aux2 )
lemma sepDom: dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p)) = dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (separate p)))
by (rule equalityI ) (rule subsetI , (erule dom-sep|erule sep-dom2 ))+
lemma C-eq-s-ext [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ Cp (list2FWpolicy (separate p)) a = Cp (list2FWpolicy p) a
proof (induct rule: separate.induct , goal-cases)
case (1 x ) thus ?case
apply (cases x = [],simp-all)
apply (cases a ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy x )))
apply (subgoal-tac a ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (separate x ))))
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apply (metis Cdom2 list2FWpolicyconc sepDom sepnMT )
apply (metis sepDom)
by (metis nlpaux sepDom list2FWpolicyconc sepnMT )
next
case (2 v va y z ) thus ?case
apply (cases z = [],simp-all)
apply (intro conjI impI |simp)+
apply (simp add : PLemmas(8 ) UPFDefs(8 ) list2FWpolicyconc sepnMT )
by (metis (mono-tags, lifting) Conc-not-MT Cdom2 list2FWpolicy-eq nlpaux sepDom
l2p-aux sepnMT )
next
case (3 v va vb y z ) thus ?case
apply (cases z = [], simp-all)
apply (simp add : PLemmas(8 ) UPFDefs(8 ) list2FWpolicyconc sepnMT )
by (metis (no-types, hide-lams) Conc-not-MT Cdom2 nlpaux domIff l2p-aux sep-
nMT )
next
case (4 v va y z ) thus ?case
apply (cases z = [], simp-all)
apply (simp add : PLemmas(8 ) UPFDefs(8 ) l2p-aux sepnMT )
by (metis (no-types, lifting) ConcAssoc PLemmas(8 ) UPFDefs(8 ) list .distinct(1 )
list2FWpolicyconc sepnMT )
next
case 5 thus ?case by simp
next
case 6 thus ?case by simp
next
case 7 thus ?case by simp
next
case 8 thus ?case by simp
qed
lemma C-eq-s: p 6= [] =⇒ Cp (list2FWpolicy (separate p)) = Cp (list2FWpolicy p)
by (rule ext) (simp add : C-eq-s-ext)
lemmas sortnMTQ = NormalisationIntegerPortProof .C-eq-Lemmas-sep(14 )
lemmas C-eq-Lemmas-sep = C-eq-Lemmas sortnMT sortnMTQ RS2-NMT NMPrd
not-MTimpnotMT
lemma C-eq-until-separated :
DenyAll∈set(policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list(policy2list p) l =⇒ allNetsDistinct(policy2list
p) =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (separate (sort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules Cp
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l))) =
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Cp p
by (simp add : C-eq-All-untilSorted-withSimps C-eq-s wellformed1-alternative-sorted
wp1ID wp1n-RS2 )
lemma C-eq-until-separatedQ :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list (policy2list p) l =⇒
allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
Cp(list2FWpolicy(separate(qsort(
removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules Cp
(insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l))) =
Cp p
by (simp add : C-eq-All-untilSorted-withSimpsQ C-eq-s setnMT wp1ID wp1n-RS2 )
lemma domID [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] ∧ x ∈ dom(Cp(list2FWpolicy p)) −→ x ∈ dom (Cp(list2FWpolicy(insertDenies
p)))
proof(induct p)
case Nil then show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) then show ?case
proof(cases p=[], goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
apply(simp) apply(rule impI )
apply (cases a, simp-all)
apply (simp-all add : Cp.simps dom-def )+
by auto
next
case 2 then show ?case
proof(cases x ∈ dom(Cp(list2FWpolicy p)), goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
apply simp apply (rule impI )
apply (cases a, simp-all)
apply (metis InDomConc idNMT )
apply (rule InDomConc, simp-all add : idNMT )+
done
next
case 2 then show ?case
apply simp apply (rule impI )
proof(cases x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p))), goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
proof(induct a)
case DenyAll then show ?case by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo src dest) then show ?case
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by simp (rule InDomConc, simp add : idNMT )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo src dest port) then show ?case
by simp (rule InDomConc, simp add : idNMT )
next
case (Conc - -) then show ?case
by simp(rule InDomConc, simp add : idNMT )
qed
next
case 2 then show ?case
proof (induct a)
case DenyAll then show ?case by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo src dest) then show ?case
by(simp,metis domIff CConcStartA list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux Cdom2 )
next
case (AllowPortFromTo src dest port) then show ?case
by(simp,metis domIff CConcStartA list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux Cdom2 )
next
case (Conc - -) then show ?case








x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕ DenyAllFromTo a b))
=⇒
Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b⊕DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕ DenyAllFromTo a b) x = Some (deny
())
by (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b))) (simp-all add : PLemmas split :
if-splits)
lemma iDdomAux [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p)) −→
x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p))) −→
Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)) x = Some (deny ())
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys) thus ?case
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proof (cases y)
case DenyAll then show ?thesis by simp
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b) then show ?thesis
using DenyAllFromTo Cons apply simp
apply (rule impI )+
proof (cases ys = [], goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case by (simp add : DA-is-deny)
next
case 2 then show ?case
apply simp
apply (drule mp)
apply (metis DenyAllFromTo InDomConc )
apply (cases x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))),simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 DenyAllFromTo idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (subgoal-tac Cp (list2FWpolicy (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕
DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕ DenyAllFromTo a b#insertDenies
ys)) x =
Cp ((DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕
DenyAllFromTo a b)) x )
apply (metis DA-is-deny DenyAllFromTo domdConcStart)




case (AllowPortFromTo a b c) then show ?thesis using Cons AllowPortFromTo
proof (cases ys = [], goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
apply (simp,intro impI )
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b a)))
apply (auto simp: PLemmas split : if-splits)
done
next
case 2 then show ?case
apply (simp, intro impI )
apply (drule mp)
apply (metis AllowPortFromTo InDomConc)
apply (cases x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))),simp-all)
apply (metis AllowPortFromTo Cdom2 idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (subgoal-tac Cp (list2FWpolicy (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕
DenyAllFromTo b a ⊕
AllowPortFromTo a b c#insertDenies ys)) x =
Cp ((DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b a)) x )
apply (auto simp: PLemmas split : if-splits)[1 ]
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case (Conc a b) then show ?thesis
proof (cases ys = [], goal-cases)
case 1 then show ?case
apply(simp,intro impI )
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet
a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a))))
by (auto simp: PLemmas split : if-splits)
next
case 2 then show ?case
apply(simp,intro impI )
apply(cases x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))))
apply (metis Cdom2 Conc Cons InDomConc idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (subgoal-tac Cp (list2FWpolicy(DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet
a)(first-destNet a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet
a)⊕
a ⊕ b#insertDenies ys)) x =
Cp ((DenyAllFromTo(first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a) ⊕




apply (metis Conc l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
apply (subgoal-tac Cp((DenyAllFromTo(first-srcNet a)(first-destNet a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a)(first-srcNet a)⊕ a ⊕ b))
x =
Cp((DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a)(first-destNet a)⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a))) x )
apply simp
defer 1
apply (metis CConcStartA Conc ConcAssoc nlpaux )




lemma iD-isD [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p)) −→
Cp (DenyAll ⊕ list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)) x = Cp DenyAll x
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apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p))))




x /∈dom (Cp a) =⇒ x /∈dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p)) =⇒ x /∈ dom (Cp
(list2FWpolicy(a#p)))
by (metis domdConcStart)
lemma domsdisj [rule-format ]:
p 6= [] −→ (∀ x s. s ∈ set p ∧ x ∈ dom (Cp A) −→ x /∈ dom (Cp s)) −→ y ∈ dom
(Cp A) −→
y /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p))
proof (induct p)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) show ?case
apply (case-tac p = [], simp)
apply (rule-tac x = y in spec)
apply (simp add : split-tupled-all)
by (metis Cons.hyps inDomConc list .set-intros(1 ) list .set-intros(2 ))
qed
lemma isSepaux :
p 6= [] =⇒ noDenyAll (a#p) =⇒ separated (a # p) =⇒
x ∈ dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a) ⊕ a)) =⇒
x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p))
apply (rule-tac A = (DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a) ⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a) ⊕ a) in domsdisj ,
simp-all)
apply (rule notI )
subgoal for xa s
apply (rule-tac p = xa and x =(DenyAllFromTo (first-srcNet a) (first-destNet a)
⊕
DenyAllFromTo (first-destNet a) (first-srcNet a) ⊕ a)
and y = s in disjSD-no-p-in-both, simp-all)




lemma none-MT-rulessep[rule-format ]: none-MT-rules Cp p −→ none-MT-rules Cp
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(separate p)
by (induct p rule: separate.induct) (simp-all add : Cp.simps map-add-le-mapE
map-le-antisym)
lemma dom-id :
noDenyAll (a#p) =⇒ separated (a#p) =⇒ p 6= [] =⇒
x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p)) =⇒ x ∈ dom (Cp (a)) =⇒
x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)))
apply (rule-tac a = a in isSepaux , simp-all)
using idNMT apply blast
using noDAID apply blast
using id-aux4 noDA1eq sepNetsID apply blast
by (simp add : NormalisationIPPProofs.Cdom2 domIff )
lemma C-eq-iD-aux2 [rule-format ]:
noDenyAll1 p −→ separated p−→ p 6= []−→ x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p))−→
Cp(list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)) x = Cp(list2FWpolicy p) x
proof (induct p)
case Nil thus ?case by simp
next
case (Cons y ys) thus ?case
using Cons proof (cases y)
case DenyAll thus ?thesis using Cons DenyAll apply simp
apply (case-tac ys = [], simp-all)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy ys)),simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 domID idNMT list2FWpolicyconc noDA1eq)
apply (metis DenyAll iD-isD idNMT list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
done
next
case (DenyAllFromTo a b) thus ?thesis
using Cons apply simp
apply (rule impI |rule allI |rule conjI |simp)+
apply (case-tac ys = [], simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 ConcAssoc DenyAllFromTo)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy ys)), simp-all)
apply (drule mp)
apply (metis noDA1eq)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))))
apply (metis Cdom2 DenyAllFromTo idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis domID)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))))
apply (subgoal-tac Cp (list2FWpolicy (DenyAllFromTo a b ⊕ DenyAllFromTo b
a ⊕
DenyAllFromTo a b # insertDenies ys)) x = Some (deny ()))
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apply simp-all
apply (subgoal-tac Cp (list2FWpolicy (DenyAllFromTo a b # ys)) x =
Cp ((DenyAllFromTo a b)) x )
apply (simp add : PLemmas, simp split : if-splits)
apply (metis list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
apply (metis Cdom2 DenyAllFromTo iD-isD iDdomAux idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis Cdom2 DenyAllFromTo domIff idNMT list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
done
next
case (AllowPortFromTo a b c) thus ?thesis
using AllowPortFromTo Cons apply simp
apply (rule impI |rule allI |rule conjI |simp)+
apply (case-tac ys = [], simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 ConcAssoc AllowPortFromTo)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy ys)),simp-all)
apply (drule mp)
apply (metis noDA1eq)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))))
apply (metis Cdom2 AllowPortFromTo idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis domID)
apply (subgoal-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (AllowPortFromTo a b c)))
apply (case-tac x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))), simp-all)
apply (metis AllowPortFromTo Cdom2 ConcAssoc l2p-aux2 list2FWpolicyconc
nlpaux )
apply (meson Combinators.distinct(3 ) FWNormalisationCore.member .simps(4 )
NormalisationIPPProofs.dom-id noDenyAll .simps(1 ) separated .simps(1 ))
apply (metis AllowPortFromTo domdConcStart)
done
next
case (Conc a b) thus ?thesis
using Cons Conc apply simp
apply (intro impI allI conjI |simp)+
apply (case-tac ys = [],simp-all)
apply (metis Cdom2 ConcAssoc Conc)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy ys)),simp-all)
apply (drule mp)
apply (metis noDA1eq)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (a ⊕ b)))
apply (case-tac x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))), simp-all)
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (rule idNMT , simp)
apply (metis domID)
apply (metis Cdom2 Conc idNMT list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (metis Cdom2 Conc domIff idNMT list2FWpolicyconc )
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apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (a ⊕ b)))
apply (case-tac x /∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy (insertDenies ys))), simp-all)
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (rule idNMT , simp)
apply (metis Cdom2 Conc ConcAssoc list2FWpolicyconc nlpaux )
apply (metis (lifting , no-types) FWNormalisationCore.member .simps(1 ) Normal-
isationIPPProofs.dom-id noDenyAll .simps(1 ) separated .simps(1 ))





separated p =⇒ noDenyAll1 p =⇒ wellformed-policy1-strong p =⇒
Cp(list2FWpolicy (insertDenies p)) = Cp (list2FWpolicy p)
by (rule ext) (metis CConcStartA C-eq-iD-aux2 DAAux wp1-alternative-not-mt
wp1n-tl)
lemma noDAsortQ [rule-format ]: noDenyAll1 p −→ noDenyAll1 (qsort p l)
proof (cases p)
case Nil then show ?thesis by simp
next
case (Cons a list) show ?thesis
apply (insert 〈p = a # list 〉, simp-all)
proof (cases a = DenyAll)
case True
assume ∗ : a = DenyAll
show noDenyAll1 (a # list) −→
noDenyAll1 (qsort [y←list . ¬ smaller a y l ] l @ a # qsort [y←list . smaller
a y l ] l)
using noDAsortQ by fastforce
next
case False
assume ∗ : a 6= DenyAll
have ∗∗ : noDenyAll1 (a # list) =⇒ noDenyAll (a # list) by(case-tac a,simp-all
add :∗)
show noDenyAll1 (a # list) −→
noDenyAll1 (qsort [y←list . ¬ smaller a y l ] l @ a # qsort [y←list . smaller
a y l ] l)
apply (insert ∗,rule impI )
apply (rule noDA1eq , frule ∗∗)





distinct p =⇒noDenyAll1 p =⇒ all-in-list p l =⇒ singleCombinators p =⇒
NetsCollected (qsort p l)
by(metis C-eqLemmas-id(22 ))
lemmas CLemmas = nMTSort nMTSortQ none-MT-rulesRS2 none-MT-rulesrd
noDAsort noDAsortQ nDASC wp1-eq wp1ID SCp2l ANDSep wp1n-RS2
OTNSEp OTNSC noDA1sep wp1-alternativesep wellformed-eq
wellformed1-alternative-sorted
lemmas C-eqLemmas-id = CLemmas NC2Sep NetsCollectedSep
NetsCollectedSort NetsCollectedSortQ separatedNC
lemma C-eq-Until-InsertDenies:
DenyAll∈set(policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list(policy2list p) l =⇒ allNetsDistinct
(policy2list p)=⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy((insertDenies(separate(sort(removeShadowRules2
(remdups(rm-MT-rules Cp (insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list
p)))))) l))))) =
Cp p
by (subst C-eq-iD ,simp-all add : C-eqLemmas-id) (rule C-eq-until-separated , simp-all)
lemma C-eq-Until-InsertDeniesQ :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list (policy2list p) l =⇒
allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy ((insertDenies (separate (qsort (removeShadowRules2
(remdups (rm-MT-rules Cp (insertDeny (removeShadowRules1 (policy2list
p)))))) l))))) =
Cp p
apply (subst C-eq-iD , simp-all add : C-eqLemmas-id)
apply (metis WP1rd set-qsort wellformed1-sortedQ wellformed-eq wp1ID
wp1-alternativesep
wp1-aux1aa wp1n-RS2 wp1n-RS3 )
apply (rule C-eq-until-separatedQ)
by simp-all
lemma C-eq-RD-aux [rule-format ]: Cp (p) x = Cp (removeDuplicates p) x
apply (induct p, simp-all)
apply (intro conjI impI )
by (metis Cdom2 domIff nlpaux not-in-member) (metis Cp.simps(4 ) CConcStartaux
Cdom2 domIff )
lemma C-eq-RAD-aux [rule-format ]:
181
p 6= [] −→ Cp (list2FWpolicy p) x = Cp (list2FWpolicy (removeAllDuplicates p)) x
proof (induct p)
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) then show ?case
apply simp-all
apply (case-tac p = [], simp-all)
apply (metis C-eq-RD-aux )
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc, simp)
apply (case-tac x ∈ dom (Cp (list2FWpolicy p)))
apply (subst list2FWpolicyconc)
apply (rule rADnMT , simp)
apply (subst Cdom2 ,simp)
apply (simp add : NormalisationIPPProofs.Cdom2 domIff )
by (metis C-eq-RD-aux nlpaux domIff list2FWpolicyconc rADnMT )
qed
lemma C-eq-RAD :
p 6= [] =⇒ Cp (list2FWpolicy p) = Cp (list2FWpolicy (removeAllDuplicates p))
by (rule ext) (erule C-eq-RAD-aux )
lemma C-eq-compile:
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list (policy2list p) l =⇒
allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate
(sort (removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules Cp (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l))))) = Cp p
by (metis C-eq-RAD C-eq-Until-InsertDenies removeAllDuplicates.simps(2 ))
lemma C-eq-compileQ :
DenyAll∈set(policy2list p) =⇒ all-in-list(policy2list p) l =⇒ allNetsDis-
tinct(policy2list p) =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (removeAllDuplicates (insertDenies (separate (qsort
(removeShadowRules2 (remdups (rm-MT-rules Cp (insertDeny
(removeShadowRules1 (policy2list p)))))) l))))) = Cp p
apply (subst C-eq-RAD [symmetric])
apply (rule idNMT )
apply (metis WP1rd sepnMT sortnMTQ wellformed-policy1-strong .simps(1 ) wp1ID
wp1n-RS2 wp1n-RS3 )
apply (rule C-eq-Until-InsertDeniesQ , simp-all)
done
lemma C-eq-normalizePr :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
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all-in-list (policy2list p) (Nets-List p) =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (normalizePr p)) = Cp p
unfolding normalizePrQ-def
by (simp add : C-eq-compile normalizePr-def )
lemma C-eq-normalizePrQ :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
all-in-list (policy2list p) (Nets-List p) =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (normalizePrQ p)) = Cp p
unfolding normalizePrQ-def
using C-eq-compileQ by auto
lemma domSubset3 : dom (Cp (DenyAll ⊕ x )) = dom (Cp (DenyAll))
by (simp add : PLemmas split-tupled-all split : option.splits)
lemma domSubset4 :
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo x y ⊕ DenyAllFromTo y x ⊕ AllowPortFromTo x y dn))
=
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo x y ⊕ DenyAllFromTo y x ))
by (simp add : PLemmas split : option.splits decision.splits) auto
lemma domSubset5 :
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo x y ⊕ DenyAllFromTo y x ⊕ AllowPortFromTo y x dn))
=
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo x y ⊕ DenyAllFromTo y x ))
by (simp add : PLemmas split : option.splits decision.splits) auto
lemma domSubset1 :
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo one two ⊕ DenyAllFromTo two one ⊕ AllowPortFromTo
one two dn ⊕ x )) =
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo one two ⊕ DenyAllFromTo two one ⊕ x ))
by (simp add : PLemmas allow-all-def deny-all-def split : option.splits decision.splits)
auto
lemma domSubset2 :
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo one two ⊕ DenyAllFromTo two one ⊕ AllowPortFromTo
two one dn ⊕ x )) =
dom (Cp (DenyAllFromTo one two ⊕ DenyAllFromTo two one ⊕ x ))
by (simp add : PLemmas allow-all-def deny-all-def split : option.splits decision.splits)
auto
lemma ConcAssoc2 : Cp (X ⊕ Y ⊕ ((A ⊕ B) ⊕ D)) = Cp (X ⊕ Y ⊕ A ⊕ B ⊕ D)
by (simp add : Cp.simps)
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lemma ConcAssoc3 : Cp (X ⊕ ((Y ⊕ A) ⊕ D)) = Cp (X ⊕ Y ⊕ A ⊕ D)
by (simp add : Cp.simps)
lemma RS3-NMT [rule-format ]: DenyAll ∈ set p −→
rm-MT-rules Cp p 6= []
by (induct-tac p) (simp-all add : PLemmas)
lemma norm-notMT : DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ normalizePr p 6= []
unfolding normalizePrQ-def
by (simp add : DAiniD RS3-NMT RS2-NMT idNMT normalizePr-def rADnMT sep-
nMT sortnMT )
lemma norm-notMTQ : DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ normalizePrQ p 6= []
unfolding normalizePrQ-def
by (simp add : DAiniD RS3-NMT sortnMTQ RS2-NMT idNMT rADnMT sepnMT )
lemma domDA: dom (Cp (DenyAll ⊕ A)) = dom (Cp (DenyAll))
by (rule domSubset3 )
lemmas domain-reasoningPr = domDA ConcAssoc2 domSubset1 domSubset2
domSubset3 domSubset4 domSubset5 domSubsetDistr1
domSubsetDistr2 domSubsetDistrA domSubsetDistrD coerc-assoc ConcAssoc
ConcAssoc3
The following lemmas help with the normalisation
lemma list2policyR-Start [rule-format ]: p ∈ dom (Cp a) −→
Cp (list2policyR (a # list)) p = Cp a p
by (induct a # list rule:list2policyR.induct)
(auto simp: Cp.simps dom-def map-add-def )
lemma list2policyR-End : p /∈ dom (Cp a) =⇒
Cp (list2policyR (a # list)) p = (Cp a
⊕
list2policy (map Cp list)) p
by (rule list2policyR.induct)
(simp-all add : Cp.simps dom-def map-add-def list2policy-def split : option.splits)
lemma l2polR-eq-el [rule-format ]: N 6= [] −→
Cp( list2policyR N ) p = (list2policy (map Cp N )) p
proof (induct N )
case Nil show ?case by simp
next
case (Cons a p) show ?case
apply (insert Cons.hyps, simp-all add : list2policy-def )




N 6= [] =⇒ Cp( list2policyR N ) = (list2policy (map Cp N ))
by (auto simp: list2policy-def l2polR-eq-el )
lemma list2FWpolicys-eq-el [rule-format ]:
Filter 6= [] −→ Cp (list2policyR Filter) p = Cp (list2FWpolicy (rev Filter)) p
apply (induct-tac Filter)
apply simp-all
subgoal for a list
apply (case-tac list = [])
apply simp-all




apply (subgoal-tac Cp (list2policyR (a # list)) p = Cp (list2policyR list) p)
apply (subgoal-tac Cp (list2FWpolicy (rev list @ [a])) p = Cp (list2FWpolicy (rev
list)) p)
apply simp
apply (rule CConcStart2 )
apply simp
apply simp
apply (case-tac list ,simp-all)




Filter 6= [] =⇒
Cp (list2policyR Filter) = Cp (list2FWpolicy (rev Filter))
by (rule ext , erule list2FWpolicys-eq-el)
lemma list2FWpolicys-eq-sym:
Filter 6= [] =⇒
Cp (list2policyR (rev Filter)) = Cp (list2FWpolicy Filter)
by (metis list2FWpolicys-eq rev-is-Nil-conv rev-rev-ident)
lemma p-eq [rule-format ]: p 6= [] −→
list2policy (map Cp (rev p)) = Cp (list2FWpolicy p)
by (metis l2polR-eq list2FWpolicys-eq-sym rev .simps(1 ) rev-rev-ident)
lemma p-eq2 [rule-format ]: normalizePr x 6= [] −→
Cp (list2FWpolicy (normalizePr x )) = Cp x −→
185
list2policy (map Cp (rev (normalizePr x ))) = Cp x
by (simp add : p-eq)
lemma p-eq2Q [rule-format ]: normalizePrQ x 6= [] −→
Cp (list2FWpolicy (normalizePrQ x )) = Cp x −→
list2policy (map Cp (rev (normalizePrQ x ))) = Cp x
by (simp add : p-eq)
lemma list2listNMT [rule-format ]: x 6= [] −→map sem x 6= []










by (rule ext , rule Norm-Distr-2 )
lemma NATDistr :
N 6= [] =⇒ F = Cp (list2policyR N ) =⇒
((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f ((NAT
⊗
2 F ) o (λ x . (x ,x ))) =
(list2policy ( ((NAT
⊗
L (map Cp N )) (op
⊗
2)
(λ (x ,y). x ) (λ x . (x ,x ))))))
by (simp add : l2polR-eq) (rule ext ,rule Norm-Distr-2 )
lemma C-eq-normalize-manual :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒ allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
all-in-list (policy2list p) l =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (normalize-manual-orderPr p l)) = Cp p
unfolding normalize-manual-orderPr-def
by(simp-all add :C-eq-compile)
lemma p-eq2-manualQ [rule-format ]:
normalize-manual-orderPrQ x l 6= [] −→
Cp (list2FWpolicy (normalize-manual-orderPrQ x l)) = Cp x −→
list2policy (map Cp (rev (normalize-manual-orderPrQ x l))) = Cp x
by (simp add : p-eq)
lemma norm-notMT-manualQ : DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒
normalize-manual-orderPrQ p l 6= []
by (simp add : DAiniD RS3-NMT sortnMTQ RS2-NMT idNMT
normalize-manual-orderPrQ-def rADnMT sepnMT )
lemma C-eq-normalizePr-manualQ :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒
allNetsDistinct (policy2list p) =⇒
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all-in-list (policy2list p) l =⇒
Cp (list2FWpolicy (normalize-manual-orderPrQ p l)) = Cp p
by (simp add : normalize-manual-orderPrQ-def C-eq-compileQ)
lemma p-eq2-manual [rule-format ]: normalize-manual-orderPr x l 6= [] −→
Cp (list2FWpolicy (normalize-manual-orderPr x l)) = Cp x −→
list2policy (map Cp (rev (normalize-manual-orderPr x l))) = Cp x
by (simp add : p-eq)
lemma norm-notMT-manual : DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list p) =⇒
normalize-manual-orderPr p l 6= []
unfolding normalize-manual-orderPr-def
by (simp add : idNMT rADnMT wellformed1-alternative-sorted wp1ID
wp1-alternativesep wp1n-RS2 )
As an example, how this theorems can be used for a concrete normalisation instanti-
ation.
lemma normalizePrNAT :
DenyAll ∈ set (policy2list Filter) =⇒
allNetsDistinct (policy2list Filter) =⇒
all-in-list (policy2list Filter) (Nets-List Filter) =⇒
((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f (((NAT
⊗
2 Cp Filter) o (λx . (x ,x ))))) =
list2policy ((NAT
⊗
L (map Cp (rev (normalizePr Filter)))) (op
⊗
2) (λ (x ,y). x )
(λ x . (x ,x )))
by (simp add : C-eq-normalizePr NATDistr list2FWpolicys-eq-sym norm-notMT )
lemma domSimpl [simp]: dom (Cp (A ⊕ DenyAll)) = dom (Cp (DenyAll))
by (simp add : PLemmas)
end















The simple system of a stateless packet filter is not enough to model all common
real-world scenarios. Some protocols need further actions in order to be secured. A
prominent example is the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), which is a popular means to
move files across the Internet. It behaves quite differently from most other application
layer protocols as it uses a two-way connection establishment which opens a dynamic
port. A stateless packet filter would only have the possibility to either always open all
the possible dynamic ports or not to allow that protocol at all. Neither of these options
is satisfactory. In the first case, all ports above 1024 would have to be opened which
introduces a big security hole in the system, in the second case users wouldn’t be very
happy. A firewall which tracks the state of the TCP connections on a system does not
help here either, as the opening and closing of the ports takes place on the application
layer. Therefore, a firewall needs to have some knowledge of the application protocols
being run and track the states of these protocols. We next model this behaviour.
The key point of our model is the idea that a policy remains the same as before: a
mapping from packet to packet out. We still specify for every packet, based on its source
and destination address, the expected action. The only thing that changes now is that
this mapping is allowed to change over time. This indicates that our test data will not
consist of single packets but rather of sequences thereof.
At first we hence need a state. It is a tuple from some memory to be refined later and
the current policy.
type-synonym ( ′α, ′β, ′γ) FWState = ′α × (( ′β, ′γ) packet 7→ unit)
Having a state, we need of course some state transitions. Such a transition can hap-
pen every time a new packet arrives. State transitions can be modelled using a state-
exception monad.
type-synonym ( ′α, ′β, ′γ) FWStateTransitionP =
( ′β, ′γ) packet ⇒ ((( ′β, ′γ) packet 7→ unit) decision, ( ′α, ′β, ′γ) FWState)
MON SE
type-synonym ( ′α, ′β, ′γ) FWStateTransition =
(( ′β, ′γ) packet × ( ′α, ′β, ′γ) FWState) ⇀ ( ′α, ′β, ′γ) FWState
The memory could be modelled as a list of accepted packets.
type-synonym ( ′β, ′γ) history = ( ′β, ′γ) packet list
fun packet-with-id where
packet-with-id [] i = []




ids1 i (x#xs) = (id x = i ∧ ids1 i xs)
|ids1 i [] = True
fun ids where
ids a (x#xs) = (NetworkCore.id x ∈ a ∧ ids a xs)
|ids a [] = True
definition applyPolicy :: ( ′i × ( ′i 7→ ′o)) 7→ ′o
where applyPolicy = (λ (x ,z ). z x )
end







The File Transfer Protocol FTP is a well known example of a protocol which uses
dynamic ports and is therefore a natural choice to use as an example for our model.
We model only a simplified version of the FTP protocol over IntegerPort addresses,
still containing all messages that matter for our purposes. It consists of the following
four messages:
1. init : The client contacts the server indicating his wish to get some data.
2. ftp-port-request p: The client, usually after having received an acknowledgement of
the server, indicates a port number on which he wants to receive the data.
3. ftp-ftp-data: The server sends the requested data over the new channel. There
might be an arbitrary number of such messages, including zero.
4. ftp-close: The client closes the connection. The dynamic port gets closed again.
The content field of a packet therefore now consists of either one of those four messages
or a default one.
datatype msg = ftp-init | ftp-port-request port | ftp-data | ftp-close | ftp-other
We now also make use of the ID field of a packet. It is used as session ID and we make
the assumption that they are all unique among different protocol runs.
189
At first, we need some predicates which check if a packet is a specific FTP message
and has the correct session ID.
definition
is-init :: id ⇒ (adr ip, msg)packet ⇒ bool where
is-init = (λ i p. (id p = i ∧ content p = ftp-init))
definition
is-ftp-port-request :: id ⇒ port ⇒(adr ip, msg) packet ⇒ bool where
is-ftp-port-request = (λ i port p. (id p = i ∧ content p = ftp-port-request port))
definition
is-ftp-data :: id ⇒ (adr ip, msg) packet ⇒ bool where
is-ftp-data = (λ i p. (id p = i ∧ content p = ftp-data))
definition
is-ftp-close :: id ⇒ (adr ip, msg) packet ⇒ bool where
is-ftp-close = (λ i p. (id p = i ∧ content p = ftp-close))
definition
port-open :: (adr ip, msg) history ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒ bool where
port-open = (λ L a p. (not-before (is-ftp-close a) (is-ftp-port-request a p) L))
definition
is-ftp-other :: id ⇒ (adr ip, msg ) packet ⇒ bool where
is-ftp-other = (λ i p. (id p = i ∧ content p = ftp-other))
fun are-ftp-other where
are-ftp-other i (x#xs) = (is-ftp-other i x ∧ are-ftp-other i xs)
|are-ftp-other i [] = True
The protocol policy specification
We now have to model the respective state transitions. It is important to note that
state transitions themselves allow all packets which are allowed by the policy, not only
those which are allowed by the protocol. Their only task is to change the policy. As an
alternative, we could have decided that they only allow packets which follow the protocol
(e.g. come on the correct ports), but this should in our view rather be reflected in the
policy itself.
Of course, not every message changes the policy. In such cases, we do not have to
model different cases, one is enough. In our example, only messages 2 and 4 need special
transitions. The default says that if the policy accepts the packet, it is added to the
history, otherwise it is simply dropped. The policy remains the same in both cases.
fun last-opened-port where
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last-opened-port i ((j ,s,d ,ftp-port-request p)#xs) = (if i=j then p else last-opened-port
i xs)
| last-opened-port i (x#xs) = last-opened-port i xs
| last-opened-port x [] = undefined
fun FTP-STA :: ((adr ip,msg) history , adr ip, msg) FWStateTransition
where
FTP-STA ((i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr), (log , pol)) =
(if before(Not o is-ftp-close i)(is-init i) log ∧
dest-port (i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr) = (21 ::port)
then Some (((i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr)#log ,
(allow-from-to-port pr (subnet-of d) (subnet-of s))
⊕
pol))
else Some (((i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr)#log ,pol)))
|FTP-STA ((i ,s,d ,ftp-close), (log ,pol)) =
(if (∃ p. port-open log i p) ∧ dest-port (i ,s,d ,ftp-close) = (21 ::port)
then Some ((i ,s,d ,ftp-close)#log ,
deny-from-to-port (last-opened-port i log) (subnet-of d)(subnet-of s)
⊕
pol)
else Some (((i ,s,d ,ftp-close)#log , pol)))
|FTP-STA (p, s) = Some (p#(fst s),snd s)
fun FTP-STD :: ((adr ip,msg) history , adr ip, msg) FWStateTransition
where FTP-STD (p,s) = Some s
definition TRPolicy :: (adr ip,msg)packet × (adr ip,msg)history × ((adr ip,msg)packet
7→ unit)
7→ (unit × (adr ip,msg)history × ((adr ip,msg)packet 7→
unit))
where TRPolicy = ((FTP-STA,FTP-STD)
⊗
∇ applyPolicy) o
(λ(x ,(y ,z )).((x ,z ),(x ,(y ,z ))))
definition TRPolicyMon
where TRPolicyMon = policy2MON (TRPolicy)




′ = policy2MON (((λ(x ,y ,z ). (z ,(y ,z ))) o-f TRPolicy ))
Now we specify our test scenario in more detail. We could test:
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• one correct FTP-Protocol run,
• several runs after another,
• several runs interleaved,
• an illegal protocol run, or
• several illegal protocol runs.
We only do the the simplest case here: one correct protocol run.
There are four different states which are modelled as a datatype.
datatype ftp-states = S0 | S1 | S2 | S3
The following constant is True for all sets which are correct FTP runs for a given
source and destination address, ID, and data-port number.
fun
is-ftp :: ftp-states ⇒ adr ip ⇒ adr ip ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒
(adr ip,msg) history ⇒ bool
where
is-ftp H c s i p [] = (H =S3 )
|is-ftp H c s i p (x#InL) = (snd s = 21 ∧((λ (id ,sr ,de,co). (((id = i ∧ (
(H =ftp-states.S2 ∧ sr = c ∧ de = s ∧ co = ftp-init ∧ is-ftp S3 c s i p InL) ∨
(H =ftp-states.S1 ∧ sr = c ∧ de = s ∧ co = ftp-port-request p ∧ is-ftp S2 c s i p
InL) ∨
(H =ftp-states.S1 ∧ sr = s ∧ de = (fst c,p) ∧ co= ftp-data ∧ is-ftp S1 c s i p InL)
∨
(H =ftp-states.S0 ∧ sr = c ∧ de = s ∧ co = ftp-close ∧ is-ftp S1 c s i p InL) )))))
x ))
definition is-single-ftp-run :: adr ip src ⇒ adr ip dest ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒ (adr ip,msg)
history set
where is-single-ftp-run s d i p = {x . (is-ftp S0 s d i p x )}
The following constant then returns a set of all the historys which denote such a
normal behaviour FTP run, again for a given source and destination address, ID, and
data-port.
The following definition returns the set of all possible interleaving of two correct FTP
protocol runs.
definition
ftp-2-interleaved :: adr ip src ⇒ adr ip dest ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒
adr ip src ⇒ adr ip dest ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒
(adr ip,msg) history set where
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ftp-2-interleaved s1 d1 i1 p1 s2 d2 i2 p2 =
{x . (is-ftp S0 s1 d1 i1 p1 (packet-with-id x i1 )) ∧
(is-ftp S0 s2 d2 i2 p2 (packet-with-id x i2 ))}
lemma subnetOf-lemma: (a::int) 6= (c::int) =⇒ ∀ x∈subnet-of (a, b::port). (c, d) /∈ x
by (rule ballI , simp add : subnet-of-int-def )
lemma subnetOf-lemma2 : ∀ x∈subnet-of (a::int , b::port). (a, b) ∈ x
by (rule ballI , simp add : subnet-of-int-def )
lemma subnetOf-lemma3 : (∃ x . x ∈ subnet-of (a::int , b::port))
by (rule exI , simp add : subnet-of-int-def )
lemma subnetOf-lemma4 : ∃ x∈subnet-of (a::int , b::port). (a, c::port) ∈ x
by (rule bexI , simp-all add : subnet-of-int-def )
lemma port-open-lemma: ¬ (Ex (port-open [] (x ::port)))
by (simp add : port-open-def )
lemmas FTPLemmas = TRPolicy-def applyPolicy-def policy2MON-def
Let-def in-subnet-def src-def
dest-def subnet-of-int-def
is-init-def p-accept-def port-open-def is-ftp-data-def is-ftp-close-def
is-ftp-port-request-def content-def PortCombinators
exI subnetOf-lemma subnetOf-lemma2 subnetOf-lemma3 subnetOf-lemma4
NetworkCore.id-def adr ipLemmas port-open-lemma
bind-SE-def unit-SE-def valid-SE-def
end






FTP where the policy is part of the output.
definition POL :: ′a ⇒ ′a where POL x = x
Variant 2 takes the policy into the output
fun FTP-STP ::
((id ⇀ port), adr ip, msg) FWStateTransitionP
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where
FTP-STP (i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr) (ports, policy) =
(if p-accept (i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr) policy then
Some (allow (POL ((allow-from-to-port pr (subnet-of d) (subnet-of s))
⊕
policy)),
( (ports(i 7→pr)),(allow-from-to-port pr (subnet-of d) (subnet-of s))⊕
policy))
else (Some (deny (POL policy),(ports,policy))))
|FTP-STP (i ,s,d ,ftp-close) (ports,policy) =
(if (p-accept (i ,s,d ,ftp-close) policy) then
case ports i of
Some pr ⇒




deny-from-to-port pr (subnet-of d) (subnet-of s)
⊕
policy)
|None ⇒Some(allow (POL policy), ports, policy)
else Some (deny (POL policy), ports, policy))
|FTP-STP p x = (if p-accept p (snd x )
then Some (allow (POL (snd x )),((fst x ),snd x ))
else Some (deny (POL (snd x )),(fst x ,snd x )))
end






In this theory we generate the test data for correct runs of the FTP protocol. As
usual, we start with definining the networks and the policy. We use a rather simple
policy which allows only FTP connections starting from the Intranet and going to the
Internet, and deny everything else.
definition
intranet :: adr ip net where
intranet = {{(a,e) . a = 3}}
definition
internet :: adr ip net where
internet = {{(a,c). a > 4}}
194
definition
gatekeeper :: adr ip net where
gatekeeper = {{(a,c). a =4}}
definition
voip-policy :: (adr ip,address voip-msg) FWPolicy where
voip-policy = AU
The next two constants check if an address is in the Intranet or in the Internet re-
spectively.
definition
is-in-intranet :: address ⇒ bool where
is-in-intranet a = (a = 3 )
definition
is-gatekeeper :: address ⇒ bool where
is-gatekeeper a = (a = 4 )
definition
is-in-internet :: address ⇒ bool where
is-in-internet a = (a > 4 )
The next definition is our starting state: an empty trace and the just defined policy.
definition
σ-0-voip :: (adr ip, address voip-msg) history ×
(adr ip, address voip-msg) FWPolicy
where
σ-0-voip = ([],voip-policy)
Next we state the conditions we have on our trace: a normal behaviour FTP run from
the intranet to some server in the internet on port 21.
definition accept-voip :: (adr ip, address voip-msg) history ⇒ bool where




packet-with-id [] i = []
|packet-with-id (x#xs) i =
(if id x = i then (x#(packet-with-id xs i)) else (packet-with-id xs i))
The depth of the test case generation corresponds to the maximal length of generated
traces, 4 is the minimum to get a full FTP protocol run.
fun ids1 where
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ids1 i (x#xs) = (id x = i ∧ ids1 i xs)
|ids1 i [] = True
lemmas ST-simps = Let-def valid-SE-def unit-SE-def bind-SE-def
subnet-of-int-def p-accept-def content-def
is-in-intranet-def is-in-internet-def intranet-def internet-def exI
subnetOf-lemma subnetOf-lemma2 subnetOf-lemma3 subnetOf-lemma4 voip-policy-def
NetworkCore.id-def is-arq-def is-fin-def
is-connect-def is-setup-def ports-open-def subnet-of-adr-def
VOIP .NB-voip-def σ-0-voip-def PLemmas VOIP-TRPolicy-def
policy2MON-def applyPolicy-def
end


















We now also make use of the ID field of a packet. It is used as session ID and we make
the assumption that they are all unique among different protocol runs.
At first, we need some predicates which check if a packet is a specific FTP message
and has the correct session ID.
definition
FTPVOIP-is-init :: id ⇒ (adr ip, ftpvoip ) packet ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-is-init = (λ i p. (id p = i ∧ content p = ftp-init))
definition
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FTPVOIP-is-port-request :: id ⇒ port ⇒(adr ip, ftpvoip) packet ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-is-port-request = (λ i port p. (id p = i ∧ content p = ftp-port-request port))
definition
FTPVOIP-is-data :: id ⇒ (adr ip, ftpvoip) packet ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-is-data = (λ i p. (id p = i ∧ content p = ftp-data))
definition
FTPVOIP-is-close :: id ⇒ (adr ip, ftpvoip) packet ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-is-close = (λ i p. (id p = i ∧ content p = ftp-close))
definition
FTPVOIP-port-open :: (adr ip, ftpvoip) history ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-port-open = (λ L a p. (not-before (FTPVOIP-is-close a)
(FTPVOIP-is-port-request a p) L))
definition
FTPVOIP-is-other :: id ⇒ (adr ip, ftpvoip ) packet ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-is-other = (λ i p. (id p = i ∧ content p = other))
fun FTPVOIP-are-other where
FTPVOIP-are-other i (x#xs) = (FTPVOIP-is-other i x ∧ FTPVOIP-are-other i xs)
|FTPVOIP-are-other i [] = True
fun last-opened-port where
last-opened-port i ((j ,s,d ,ftp-port-request p)#xs) = (if i=j then p else last-opened-port
i xs)
| last-opened-port i (x#xs) = last-opened-port i xs
| last-opened-port x [] = undefined
fun FTPVOIP-FTP-STA ::
((adr ip, ftpvoip) history , adr ip, ftpvoip) FWStateTransition
where
FTPVOIP-FTP-STA ((i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr), (InL, policy)) =
(if not-before (FTPVOIP-is-close i) (FTPVOIP-is-init i) InL ∧
dest-port (i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr) = (21 ::port) then
Some (((i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr)#InL, policy ++
(allow-from-to-port pr (subnet-of d) (subnet-of s))))
else Some (((i ,s,d ,ftp-port-request pr)#InL,policy)))
|FTPVOIP-FTP-STA ((i ,s,d ,ftp-close), (InL,policy)) =
(if (∃ p. FTPVOIP-port-open InL i p) ∧ dest-port (i ,s,d ,ftp-close) = (21 ::port)
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then Some ((i ,s,d ,ftp-close)#InL, policy ++
deny-from-to-port (last-opened-port i InL) (subnet-of d) (subnet-of s))
else Some (((i ,s,d ,ftp-close)#InL, policy)))
|FTPVOIP-FTP-STA (p, s) = Some (p#(fst s),snd s)
fun FTPVOIP-FTP-STD :: ((adr ip, ftpvoip) history , adr ip, ftpvoip)
FWStateTransition
whereFTPVOIP-FTP-STD (p,s) = Some s
definition
FTPVOIP-is-arq :: NetworkCore.id ⇒ ( ′a::adr , ftpvoip) packet ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-is-arq i p = (NetworkCore.id p = i ∧ content p = ARQ)
definition
FTPVOIP-is-fin :: id ⇒ ( ′a::adr , ftpvoip) packet ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-is-fin i p = (id p = i ∧ content p = Fin)
definition
FTPVOIP-is-connect :: id ⇒ port ⇒ ( ′a::adr , ftpvoip) packet ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-is-connect i port p = (id p = i ∧ content p = Connect port)
definition
FTPVOIP-is-setup :: id ⇒ port ⇒ ( ′a::adr , ftpvoip) packet ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-is-setup i port p = (id p = i ∧ content p = Setup port)
We need also an operator ports-open to get access to the two dynamic ports.
definition
FTPVOIP-ports-open :: id ⇒ port × port ⇒ (adr ip, ftpvoip) history ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-ports-open i p L = ((not-before (FTPVOIP-is-fin i) (FTPVOIP-is-setup i
(fst p)) L) ∧
not-before (FTPVOIP-is-fin i) (FTPVOIP-is-connect i (snd p))
L)
As we do not know which entity closes the connection, we define an operator which
checks if the closer is the caller.
fun
FTPVOIP-src-is-initiator :: id ⇒ adr ip ⇒ (adr ip,ftpvoip) history ⇒ bool where
FTPVOIP-src-is-initiator i a [] = False
|FTPVOIP-src-is-initiator i a (p#S ) = (((id p = i) ∧
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(∃ port . content p = Setup port) ∧
((fst (src p) = fst a))) ∨
(FTPVOIP-src-is-initiator i a S ))
definition FTPVOIP-subnet-of-adr :: int ⇒ adr ip net where
FTPVOIP-subnet-of-adr x = {{(a,b). a = x}}
fun FTPVOIP-VOIP-STA ::
((adr ip, ftpvoip) history , adr ip, ftpvoip) FWStateTransition
where
FTPVOIP-VOIP-STA ((a,c,d ,ARQ), (InL, policy)) =
Some (((a,c,d , ARQ)#InL,
(allow-from-to-port (1719 ::port)(subnet-of d) (subnet-of c))
⊕
policy))
|FTPVOIP-VOIP-STA ((a,c,d ,ARJ ), (InL, policy)) =
(if (not-before (FTPVOIP-is-fin a) (FTPVOIP-is-arq a) InL)
then Some (((a,c,d ,ARJ )#InL,
deny-from-to-port (14 ::port) (subnet-of c) (subnet-of d)
⊕
policy))
else Some (((a,c,d ,ARJ )#InL,policy)))
|FTPVOIP-VOIP-STA ((a,c,d ,ACF callee), (InL, policy)) =
Some (((a,c,d ,ACF callee)#InL,
allow-from-to-port (1720 ::port) (subnet-of-adr callee) (subnet-of d)
⊕
allow-from-to-port (1720 ::port) (subnet-of d) (subnet-of-adr callee)
⊕
deny-from-to-port (1719 ::port) (subnet-of d) (subnet-of c)
⊕
policy))
|FTPVOIP-VOIP-STA ((a,c,d , Setup port), (InL, policy)) =
Some (((a,c,d ,Setup port)#InL,
allow-from-to-port port (subnet-of d) (subnet-of c)
⊕
policy))
|FTPVOIP-VOIP-STA ((a,c,d , ftpvoip.Connect port), (InL, policy)) =
Some (((a,c,d ,ftpvoip.Connect port)#InL,
allow-from-to-port port (subnet-of d) (subnet-of c)
⊕
policy))
|FTPVOIP-VOIP-STA ((a,c,d ,Fin), (InL,policy)) =
(if ∃ p1 p2 . FTPVOIP-ports-open a (p1 ,p2 ) InL then (
(if FTPVOIP-src-is-initiator a c InL
then (Some (((a,c,d ,Fin)#InL,
(deny-from-to-port (1720 ::int) (subnet-of c) (subnet-of d) )
⊕
(deny-from-to-port (snd (SOME p. FTPVOIP-ports-open a p InL))
(subnet-of c) (subnet-of d))
⊕
(deny-from-to-port (fst (SOME p. FTPVOIP-ports-open a p InL))




else (Some (((a,c,d ,Fin)#InL,
(deny-from-to-port (1720 ::int) (subnet-of c) (subnet-of d) )
⊕
(deny-from-to-port (fst (SOME p. FTPVOIP-ports-open a p InL))
(subnet-of c) (subnet-of d))
⊕
(deny-from-to-port (snd (SOME p. FTPVOIP-ports-open a p InL))





| FTPVOIP-VOIP-STA (p, (InL, policy)) =
Some ((p#InL,policy))
fun FTPVOIP-VOIP-STD ::
((adr ip, ftpvoip) history , adr ip, ftpvoip) FWStateTransition
where
FTPVOIP-VOIP-STD (p,s) = Some s
definition FTP-VOIP-STA :: ((adr ip, ftpvoip) history , adr ip, ftpvoip)
FWStateTransition
where
FTP-VOIP-STA = ((λ(x ,x ). Some x ) ◦m ((FTPVOIP-FTP-STA
⊗
S
FTPVOIP-VOIP-STA o (λ (p,x ). (p,x ,x )))))
definition FTP-VOIP-STD :: ((adr ip, ftpvoip) history , adr ip, ftpvoip)
FWStateTransition
where
FTP-VOIP-STD = (λ(x ,x ). Some x ) ◦m ((FTPVOIP-FTP-STD
⊗
S
FTPVOIP-VOIP-STD o (λ (p,x ). (p,x ,x ))))
definition FTPVOIP-TRPolicy where
FTPVOIP-TRPolicy = policy2MON (
(((FTP-VOIP-STA,FTP-VOIP-STD)
⊗
∇ applyPolicy) o (λ (x ,(y ,z )).
((x ,z ),(x ,(y ,z ))))))
lemmas FTPVOIP-ST-simps = Let-def in-subnet-def src-def dest-def
subnet-of-int-def id-def FTPVOIP-port-open-def
FTPVOIP-is-init-def FTPVOIP-is-data-def FTPVOIP-is-port-request-def
FTPVOIP-is-close-def p-accept-def content-def PortCombinators exI
NetworkCore.id-def adr ipLemmas
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datatype ftp-states2 = FS0 | FS1 | FS2 | FS3
datatype voip-states2 = V0 | V1 | V2 | V3 | V4 | V5
The constant is-voip checks if a trace corresponds to a legal VoIP protocol, given the
IP-addresses of the three entities, the ID, and the two dynamic ports.
fun FTPVOIP-is-voip :: voip-states2 ⇒ address ⇒ address ⇒ address ⇒ id ⇒ port
⇒
port ⇒ (adr ip, ftpvoip) history ⇒ bool
where
FTPVOIP-is-voip H s d g i p1 p2 [] = (H = V5 )
|FTPVOIP-is-voip H s d g i p1 p2 (x#InL) =
(((λ (id ,sr ,de,co).
(((id = i ∧
(H = V4 ∧ ((sr = (s,1719 ) ∧ de = (g ,1719 ) ∧ co = ARQ ∧
FTPVOIP-is-voip V5 s d g i p1 p2 InL))) ∨
(H = V0 ∧ sr = (g ,1719 ) ∧ de = (s,1719 ) ∧ co = ARJ ∧
FTPVOIP-is-voip V4 s d g i p1 p2 InL) ∨
(H = V3 ∧ sr = (g ,1719 ) ∧ de = (s,1719 ) ∧ co = ACF d ∧
FTPVOIP-is-voip V4 s d g i p1 p2 InL) ∨
(H = V2 ∧ sr = (s,1720 ) ∧ de = (d ,1720 ) ∧ co = Setup p1 ∧
FTPVOIP-is-voip V3 s d g i p1 p2 InL) ∨
(H = V1 ∧ sr = (d ,1720 ) ∧ de = (s,1720 ) ∧ co = Connect p2 ∧
FTPVOIP-is-voip V2 s d g i p1 p2 InL) ∨
(H = V1 ∧ sr = (s,p1 ) ∧ de = (d ,p2 ) ∧ co = Stream ∧
FTPVOIP-is-voip V1 s d g i p1 p2 InL) ∨
(H = V1 ∧ sr = (d ,p2 ) ∧ de = (s,p1 ) ∧ co = Stream ∧
FTPVOIP-is-voip V1 s d g i p1 p2 InL) ∨
(H = V0 ∧ sr = (d ,1720 ) ∧ de = (s,1720 ) ∧ co = Fin ∧
FTPVOIP-is-voip V1 s d g i p1 p2 InL) ∨
(H = V0 ∧ sr = (s,1720 ) ∧ de = (d ,1720 ) ∧ co = Fin ∧
FTPVOIP-is-voip V1 s d g i p1 p2 InL)))))) x )
Finally, NB-voip returns the set of protocol traces which correspond to a correct
protocol run given the three addresses, the ID, and the two dynamic ports.
definition
FTPVOIP-NB-voip :: address ⇒ address ⇒ address ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒ port ⇒
(adr ip, ftpvoip) history set where
FTPVOIP-NB-voip s d g i p1 p2 = {x . (FTPVOIP-is-voip V0 s d g i p1 p2 x )}
fun
FTPVOIP-is-ftp :: ftp-states2 ⇒ adr ip ⇒ adr ip ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒
(adr ip, ftpvoip) history ⇒ bool
where
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FTPVOIP-is-ftp H c s i p [] = (H =FS3 )
|FTPVOIP-is-ftp H c s i p (x#InL) = (snd s = 21 ∧((λ (id ,sr ,de,co). (((id = i ∧ (
(H =FS2 ∧ sr = c ∧ de = s ∧ co = ftp-init ∧ FTPVOIP-is-ftp FS3 c s i p InL) ∨
(H =FS1 ∧ sr = c ∧ de = s ∧ co = ftp-port-request p ∧ FTPVOIP-is-ftp FS2 c s i
p InL) ∨
(H =FS1 ∧ sr = s ∧ de = (fst c,p) ∧ co= ftp-data ∧ FTPVOIP-is-ftp FS1 c s i p
InL) ∨
(H =FS0 ∧ sr = c ∧ de = s ∧ co = ftp-close ∧ FTPVOIP-is-ftp FS1 c s i p InL)
))))) x ))
definition
FTPVOIP-NB-ftp :: adr ip src ⇒ adr ip dest ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒ (adr ip, ftpvoip) history
set where
FTPVOIP-NB-ftp s d i p = {x . (FTPVOIP-is-ftp FS0 s d i p x )}
definition
ftp-voip-interleaved :: adr ip src ⇒ adr ip dest ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒
address ⇒ address ⇒ address ⇒ id ⇒ port ⇒ port ⇒
(adr ip, ftpvoip) history set
where
ftp-voip-interleaved s1 d1 i1 p1 vs vd vg vi vp1 vp2 =
{x . (FTPVOIP-is-ftp FS0 s1 d1 i1 p1 (packet-with-id x i1 )) ∧




























This is the fourth scenario, slightly more complicated than the previous one, as we now
also model specific servers within one network. Therefore, we could not use anymore the
modelling using datatype synonym, but only use the one where an address is modelled
as an integer (with ports).
Just for comparison, this theory is the same scenario with datatype synonym anyway,
but with four distinct networks instead of one contained in another. As there is no
corresponding network model included, we need to define a custom one.
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datatype Adr = Intranet | Internet | Mail | Web | DMZ
instance Adr ::adr ..
type-synonym port = int
type-synonym Networks = Adr × port
definition
intranet ::Networks net where
intranet = {{(a,b). a= Intranet}}
definition
dmz :: Networks net where
dmz = {{(a,b). a= DMZ}}
definition
mail :: Networks net where
mail = {{(a,b). a=Mail}}
definition
web :: Networks net where
web = {{(a,b). a=Web}}
definition
internet :: Networks net where
internet = {{(a,b). a= Internet}}
definition
Intranet-mail-port :: (Networks ,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
Intranet-mail-port = (allow-from-ports-to {21 ::port ,14} intranet mail)
definition
Intranet-Internet-port :: (Networks,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
Intranet-Internet-port = allow-from-ports-to {80 ::port ,90} intranet internet
definition
Internet-web-port :: (Networks,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
Internet-web-port = (allow-from-ports-to {80 ::port ,90} internet web)
definition
Internet-mail-port :: (Networks,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
Internet-mail-port = (allow-all-from-port-to internet (21 ::port) dmz )
definition
policyPort :: (Networks, DummyContent) FWPolicy where






We only want to create test cases which are sent between the three main networks:
e.g. not between the mailserver and the dmz. Therefore, the constraint looks as follows.
%
definition
not-in-same-net :: (Networks,DummyContent) packet ⇒ bool where
not-in-same-net x = ((src x @ internet −→ ¬ dest x @ internet) ∧
(src x @ intranet −→ ¬ dest x @ intranet) ∧
(src x @ dmz −→ ¬ dest x @ dmz ))
lemmas PolicyLemmas = dmz-def internet-def intranet-def mail-def web-def
Internet-web-port-def Internet-mail-port-def
Intranet-Internet-port-def Intranet-mail-port-def








This scenario is slightly more complicated than the SimpleDMZ one, as we now also
model specific servers within one network. Therefore, we cannot use anymore the mod-
elling using datatype synonym, but only use the one where an address is modelled as an
integer (with ports).
The scenario is the following:
Networks: • Intranet (Company intern network)
• DMZ (demilitarised zone, servers, etc), containing at least two distinct
servers “mail” and “web”
• Internet (“all others”)
Policy: • allow http(s) from Intranet to Internet
• deny all trafic from Internet to Intranet
• allo imaps and smtp from intranet to mailserver
• allow smtp from Internet to mailserver
• allow http(s) from Internet to webserver
• deny everything else
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definition
intranet ::adr ip net where
intranet = {{(a,b) . (a > 1 ∧ a < 4 ) }}
definition
dmz :: adr ip net where
dmz = {{(a,b). (a > 6 ) ∧ (a < 11 )}}
definition
mail :: adr ip net where
mail = {{(a,b). a = 7}}
definition
web :: adr ip net where
web = {{(a,b). a = 8 }}
definition
internet :: adr ip net where
internet = {{(a,b). ¬ ( (a > 1 ∧ a < 4 ) ∨ (a > 6 ) ∧ (a < 11 )) }}
definition
Intranet-mail-port :: (adr ip,
′b) FWPolicy where
Intranet-mail-port = (allow-from-to-ports {21 ::port ,14} intranet mail)
definition
Intranet-Internet-port :: (adr ip,
′b) FWPolicy where
Intranet-Internet-port = allow-from-to-ports {80 ::port ,90} intranet internet
definition
Internet-web-port :: (adr ip,
′b) FWPolicy where
Internet-web-port = (allow-from-to-ports {80 ::port ,90} internet web)
definition
Internet-mail-port :: (adr ip,
′b) FWPolicy where
Internet-mail-port = (allow-all-from-port-to internet (21 ::port) dmz )
definition
policyPort :: (adr ip, DummyContent) FWPolicy where





We only want to create test cases which are sent between the three main networks:
e.g. not between the mailserver and the dmz. Therefore, the constraint looks as follows.
definition
not-in-same-net :: (adr ip,DummyContent) packet ⇒ bool where
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not-in-same-net x = ((src x @ internet −→ ¬ dest x @ internet) ∧
(src x @ intranet −→ ¬ dest x @ intranet) ∧
(src x @ dmz −→ ¬ dest x @ dmz ))
lemmas PolicyLemmas = policyPort-def dmz-def internet-def intranet-def mail-def
web-def
Intranet-Internet-port-def Intranet-mail-port-def Internet-web-port-def


















The most basic firewall scenario; there is a personal PC on one side and the Internet
on the other. There are two policies: the first one allows all traffic from the PC to the
Internet and denies all coming into the PC. The second policy only allows specific ports
from the PC. This scenario comes in three variants: the first one specifies the allowed
protocols directly, the second together with their respective port numbers, the third one
only with the port numbers.
Definitions of the subnets
definition
PC :: (adr ip net) where
PC = {{(a,b). a = 3}}
definition
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Internet :: adr ip net where
Internet = {{(a,b). ¬ (a = 3 )}}
definition
not-in-same-net :: (adr ip,DummyContent) packet ⇒ bool where
not-in-same-net x = ((src x @ PC −→ dest x @ Internet) ∧ (src x @ Internet −→
dest x @ PC ))
Definitions of the policies
definition
strictPolicy :: (adr ip,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
strictPolicy = deny-all ++ allow-all-from-to PC Internet
definition
PortPolicy :: (adr ip,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
PortPolicy = deny-all ++ allow-from-ports-to {http,smtp,ftp} PC Internet
definition
PortPolicyBig :: (adr ip,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
PortPolicyBig = deny-all ++
allow-from-port-to http PC Internet ++
allow-from-port-to smtp PC Internet ++
allow-from-port-to ftp PC Internet
lemmas policyLemmas = strictPolicy-def PortPolicy-def PC-def
Internet-def PortPolicyBig-def src-def dest-def
adr ipLemmas content-def
PortCombinators in-subnet-def PortPolicyBig-def id-def
declare Ports [simp add ]
definition wellformed-packet ::(adr ip,DummyContent) packet ⇒ bool where
wellformed-packet p = (content p = data)
end






The most basic firewall scenario; there is a personal PC on one side and the Internet
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on the other. There are two policies: the first one allows all traffic from the PC to the
Internet and denies all coming into the PC. The second policy only allows specific ports
from the PC. This scenario comes in three variants: the first one specifies the allowed
protocols directly, the second together with their respective port numbers, the third one
only with the port numbers.
Definitions of the subnets
definition
PC :: (ipv4 net) where
PC = {{((a,b,c,d),e). a = 1 ∧ b = 3 ∧ c = 5 ∧ d = 2}}
definition
Internet :: ipv4 net where
Internet = {{((a,b,c,d),e). ¬ (a = 1 ∧ b = 3 ∧ c = 5 ∧ d = 2 )}}
definition
not-in-same-net :: (ipv4 ,DummyContent) packet ⇒ bool where
not-in-same-net x = ((src x @ PC −→ dest x @ Internet) ∧ (src x @ Internet −→
dest x @ PC ))
Definitions of the policies
definition
strictPolicy :: (ipv4 ,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
strictPolicy = deny-all ++ allow-all-from-to PC Internet
definition
PortPolicy :: (ipv4 ,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
PortPolicy = deny-all ++ allow-from-ports-to {80 ::port ,24 ,21} PC Internet
definition
PortPolicyBig :: (ipv4 ,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
PortPolicyBig = deny-all ++ allow-from-port-to (80 ::port) PC Internet++
allow-from-port-to (24 ::port) PC Internet++ allow-from-port-to (21 ::port) PC Internet
lemmas policyLemmas = strictPolicy-def PortPolicy-def PC-def












The most basic firewall scenario; there is a personal PC on one side and the Internet
on the other. There are two policies: the first one allows all traffic from the PC to the
Internet and denies all coming into the PC. The second policy only allows specific ports
from the PC. This scenario comes in three variants: the first one specifies the allowed
protocols directly, the second together with their respective port numbers, the third one
only with the port numbers.
datatype Adr = pc | internet
type-synonym DatatypeTwoNets = Adr × int
instance Adr ::adr ..
definition
PC :: DatatypeTwoNets net where
PC = {{(a,b). a = pc}}
definition
Internet :: DatatypeTwoNets net where
Internet = {{(a,b). a = internet}}
definition
not-in-same-net :: (DatatypeTwoNets,DummyContent) packet ⇒ bool where
not-in-same-net x = ((src x @ PC −→ dest x @ Internet) ∧ (src x @ Internet −→
dest x @ PC ))
Definitions of the policies
In fact, the short definitions wouldn’t have to be written down - they are the auto-
matically simplified versions of their big counterparts.
definition
strictPolicy :: (DatatypeTwoNets,DummyContent) FWPolicy where
strictPolicy = deny-all ++ allow-all-from-to PC Internet
definition
PortPolicy :: (DatatypeTwoNets, ′b) FWPolicy where
PortPolicy = deny-all ++ allow-from-ports-to {80 ::port ,24 ,21} PC Internet
definition
PortPolicyBig :: (DatatypeTwoNets, ′b) FWPolicy where
PortPolicyBig =
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allow-from-port-to (80 ::port) PC Internet
⊕
allow-from-port-to (24 ::port) PC Internet
⊕
allow-from-port-to (21 ::port) PC Internet
⊕
deny-all



















FWLink :: adr ip net where
FWLink = {{(a,b). a = 1}}
definition
any :: adr ip net where
any = {{(a,b). a > 5}}
definition
i4 :: adr ip net where
i4 = {{(a,b). a = 2 }}
definition
i27 :: adr ip net where
i27 = {{(a,b). a = 3 }}
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definition
eth-intern:: adr ip net where
eth-intern = {{(a,b). a = 4 }}
definition
eth-private:: adr ip net where
eth-private = {{(a,b). a = 5 }}
definition
MG2 :: (adr ip net ,port) Combinators where
MG2 = AllowPortFromTo i27 any 1 ⊕
AllowPortFromTo i27 any 2 ⊕
AllowPortFromTo i27 any 3
definition
MG3 :: (adr ip net ,port) Combinators where
MG3 = AllowPortFromTo any FWLink 1
definition
MG4 :: (adr ip net ,port) Combinators where
MG4 = AllowPortFromTo FWLink FWLink 4
definition
MG7 :: (adr ip net ,port) Combinators where
MG7 = AllowPortFromTo FWLink i4 6 ⊕
AllowPortFromTo FWLink i4 7
definition
MG8 :: (adr ip net ,port) Combinators where
MG8 = AllowPortFromTo FWLink i4 6 ⊕
AllowPortFromTo FWLink i4 7
definition
DG3 :: (adr ip net ,port) Combinators where
DG3 = AllowPortFromTo any any 7
definition
Policy = DenyAll ⊕ MG8 ⊕ MG7 ⊕ MG4 ⊕ MG3 ⊕ MG2 ⊕ DG3








MG2-def MG3-def MG4-def MG7-def MG8-def
DG3-def
lemmas PolicyL = MG2-def MG3-def MG4-def MG7-def MG8-def DG3-def Policy-def
definition
not-in-same-net :: (adr ip,DummyContent) packet ⇒ bool where
not-in-same-net x = (((src x @ i27 ) −→ ( ¬ (dest x @ i27 ))) ∧
((src x @ i4 ) −→ ( ¬ (dest x @ i4 ))) ∧
((src x @ eth-intern) −→ ( ¬ (dest x @ eth-intern))) ∧
((src x @ eth-private) −→ ( ¬ (dest x @ eth-private))))
consts fixID :: id
consts fixContent :: DummyContent
definition fixElements p = (id p = fixID ∧ content p = fixContent)
lemmas fixDefs = fixElements-def NetworkCore.id-def NetworkCore.content-def
lemma sets-distinct1 : (n::int) 6= m =⇒ {(a,b). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a = m}
by auto
lemma sets-distinct2 : (m::int) 6= n =⇒ {(a,b). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a = m}
by auto
lemma sets-distinct3 : {((a::int),(b::int)). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a > n}
by auto
lemma sets-distinct4 : {((a::int),(b::int)). a > n} 6= {(a,b). a = n}
by auto
lemma aux : [[a ∈ c; a /∈ d ; c = d ]] =⇒ False
by auto
lemma sets-distinct5 : (s::int) < g =⇒ {(a::int , b::int). a = s} 6= {(a::int , b::int). g
< a}
apply (auto simp: sets-distinct3 )[1 ]
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apply (subgoal-tac (s,4 ) ∈ {(a::int ,b::int). a = (s)})
apply (subgoal-tac (s,4 ) /∈ {(a::int ,b::int). g < a})




lemma sets-distinct6 : (s::int) < g =⇒ {(a::int , b::int). g < a} 6= {(a::int , b::int). a
= s}
apply (rule not-sym)
apply (rule sets-distinct5 )
by simp
lemma distinctNets: FWLink 6= any ∧ FWLink 6= i4 ∧ FWLink 6= i27 ∧ FWLink
6= eth-intern ∧ FWLink 6= eth-private ∧
any 6= FWLink ∧ any 6= i4 ∧ any 6= i27 ∧ any 6= eth-intern ∧ any 6= eth-private
∧ i4 6= FWLink ∧
i4 6= any ∧ i4 6= i27 ∧ i4 6= eth-intern ∧ i4 6= eth-private ∧ i27 6= FWLink ∧ i27
6= any ∧
i27 6= i4 ∧ i27 6= eth-intern ∧ i27 6= eth-private ∧ eth-intern 6= FWLink ∧ eth-intern
6= any ∧
eth-intern 6= i4 ∧ eth-intern 6= i27 ∧ eth-intern 6= eth-private ∧ eth-private 6=
FWLink ∧
eth-private 6= any ∧ eth-private 6= i4 ∧ eth-private 6= i27 ∧ eth-private 6= eth-intern
by (simp add : PolicyLemmas sets-distinct1 sets-distinct2 sets-distinct3 sets-distinct4
sets-distinct5 sets-distinct6 )
lemma aux5 : [[x 6= a; y 6=b; (x 6= y ∧ x 6= b) ∨ (a 6= b ∧ a 6= y)]] =⇒ {x ,a} 6= {y ,b}
by auto
lemma aux2 : {a,b} = {b,a}
by auto
lemma ANDex : allNetsDistinct (policy2list Policy)
apply (simp add : PolicyL allNetsDistinct-def distinctNets)
by (auto simp: PLemmas PolicyLemmas netsDistinct-def sets-distinct5 sets-distinct6 )
fun (sequential) numberOfRules where
numberOfRules (a⊕b) = numberOfRules a + numberOfRules b
|numberOfRules a = (1 ::int)
fun numberOfRulesList where
numberOfRulesList (x#xs) = ((numberOfRules x )#(numberOfRulesList xs))
|numberOfRulesList [] = []
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lemma all-in-list : all-in-list (policy2list Policy) (Nets-List Policy)
apply (simp add : PolicyL)
apply (unfold Nets-List-def )
apply (unfold bothNets-def )
apply (insert distinctNets)
by simp
lemmas normalizeUnfold = normalize-def Policy-def Nets-List-def bothNets-def aux
aux2 bothNets-def
end







FWLink :: adr ip net where
FWLink = {{(a,b). a = 1}}
definition
any :: adr ip net where
any = {{(a,b). a > 5}}
definition
i4-32 :: adr ip net where
i4-32 = {{(a,b). a = 2 }}
definition
i10-32 :: adr ip net where
i10-32 = {{(a,b). a = 3 }}
definition
eth-intern:: adr ip net where
eth-intern = {{(a,b). a = 4 }}
definition
eth-private:: adr ip net where
eth-private = {{(a,b). a = 5 }}
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definition
D1a :: (adr ip net , port) Combinators where
D1a = AllowPortFromTo eth-intern any 1 ⊕
AllowPortFromTo eth-intern any 2
definition
D1b :: (adr ip net , port) Combinators where
D1b = AllowPortFromTo eth-private any 1 ⊕
AllowPortFromTo eth-private any 2
definition
D2a :: (adr ip net , port) Combinators where
D2a = AllowPortFromTo any i4-32 21
definition
D2b :: (adr ip net , port) Combinators where
D2b = AllowPortFromTo any i10-32 21 ⊕
AllowPortFromTo any i10-32 43
definition
Policy :: (adr ip net , port) Combinators where
Policy = DenyAll ⊕ D2b ⊕ D2a ⊕ D1b ⊕ D1a
lemmas PolicyLemmas = Policy-def D1a-def D1b-def D2a-def D2b-def







D1a-def D1b-def D2a-def D2b-def
consts fixID :: id
consts fixContent :: DummyContent
definition fixElements p = (id p = fixID ∧ content p = fixContent)
lemmas fixDefs = fixElements-def NetworkCore.id-def NetworkCore.content-def
lemma sets-distinct1 : (n::int) 6= m =⇒ {(a,b). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a = m}
by auto
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lemma sets-distinct2 : (m::int) 6= n =⇒ {(a,b). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a = m}
by auto
lemma sets-distinct3 : {((a::int),(b::int)). a = n} 6= {(a,b). a > n}
by auto
lemma sets-distinct4 : {((a::int),(b::int)). a > n} 6= {(a,b). a = n}
by auto
lemma aux : [[a ∈ c; a /∈ d ; c = d ]] =⇒ False
by auto
lemma sets-distinct5 : (s::int) < g =⇒ {(a::int , b::int). a = s} 6= {(a::int , b::int). g
< a}
apply (auto simp: sets-distinct3 )
apply (subgoal-tac (s,4 ) ∈ {(a::int ,b::int). a = (s)})
apply (subgoal-tac (s,4 ) /∈ {(a::int ,b::int). g < a})




lemma sets-distinct6 : (s::int) < g =⇒ {(a::int , b::int). g < a} 6= {(a::int , b::int). a
= s}
apply (rule not-sym)
apply (rule sets-distinct5 )
by simp
lemma distinctNets: FWLink 6= any ∧ FWLink 6= i4-32 ∧ FWLink 6= i10-32 ∧
FWLink 6= eth-intern ∧ FWLink 6= eth-private ∧ any 6= FWLink ∧ any 6=
i4-32 ∧ any 6= i10-32 ∧ any 6= eth-intern ∧ any 6= eth-private ∧ i4-32 6=
FWLink ∧ i4-32 6= any ∧ i4-32 6= i10-32 ∧ i4-32 6= eth-intern ∧ i4-32 6=
eth-private ∧ i10-32 6= FWLink ∧ i10-32 6= any ∧ i10-32 6= i4-32 ∧ i10-32
6= eth-intern ∧ i10-32 6= eth-private ∧ eth-intern 6= FWLink ∧ eth-intern
6= any ∧ eth-intern 6= i4-32 ∧ eth-intern 6= i10-32 ∧ eth-intern 6=
eth-private ∧ eth-private 6= FWLink ∧ eth-private 6= any ∧ eth-private 6=
i4-32 ∧ eth-private 6= i10-32 ∧ eth-private 6= eth-intern
by (simp add : PolicyL sets-distinct1 sets-distinct2 sets-distinct3
sets-distinct4 sets-distinct5 sets-distinct6 )
lemma aux5 : [[x 6= a; y 6=b; (x 6= y ∧ x 6= b) ∨ (a 6= b ∧ a 6= y)]] =⇒ {x ,a} 6= {y ,b}
by auto
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lemma aux2 : {a,b} = {b,a}
by auto
lemma ANDex : allNetsDistinct (policy2list Policy)
apply (simp add : PolicyLemmas allNetsDistinct-def distinctNets)
apply (simp add : PolicyL)
by (auto simp: PLemmas PolicyL netsDistinct-def sets-distinct5 sets-distinct6
sets-distinct1
sets-distinct2 )
fun (sequential) numberOfRules where
numberOfRules (a⊕b) = numberOfRules a + numberOfRules b
|numberOfRules a = (1 ::int)
fun numberOfRulesList where
numberOfRulesList (x#xs) = ((numberOfRules x )#(numberOfRulesList xs))
|numberOfRulesList [] = []
lemma all-in-list : all-in-list (policy2list Policy) (Nets-List Policy)
apply (simp add : PolicyLemmas)
apply (unfold Nets-List-def )
apply (unfold bothNets-def )
apply (insert distinctNets)
by simp
lemmas normalizeUnfold = normalize-def PolicyL Nets-List-def bothNets-def aux









definition subnet1 :: adr ip net where
subnet1 = {{(d ,e). d > 1 ∧ d < 256}}
definition subnet2 :: adr ip net where
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subnet2 = {{(d ,e). d > 500 ∧ d < 1256}}
definition
accross-subnets x ≡
((src x @ subnet1 ∧ (dest x @ subnet2 )) ∨
(src x @ subnet2 ∧ (dest x @ subnet1 )))
definition
filter :: (adr ip, DummyContent) FWPolicy where
filter = allow-from-port-to (1 ::port) subnet1 subnet2 ++
allow-from-port-to (2 ::port) subnet1 subnet2 ++
allow-from-port-to (3 ::port) subnet1 subnet2 ++ deny-all
definition
nat-0 where
nat-0 = (Af (λx . {x}))






lemmas subnets = subnet1-def subnet2-def
definition Adr11 :: int set
where Adr11 = {d . d > 2 ∧ d < 3}
definition Adr21 :: int set where
Adr21 = {d . d > 502 ∧ d < 503}
definition nat-1 where
nat-1 = nat-0 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr11 Adr21 )
definition policy-1 where
policy-1 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-1
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))
lemmas UnfoldPolicy1 = UnfoldPolicy0 nat-1-def Adr11-def Adr21-def policy-1-def
definition Adr12 :: int set
where Adr12 = {d . d > 4 ∧ d < 6}
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definition Adr22 :: int set where
Adr22 = {d . d > 504 ∧ d < 506}
definition nat-2 where
nat-2 = nat-1 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr12 Adr22 )
definition policy-2 where
policy-2 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-2
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))
lemmas UnfoldPolicy2 = UnfoldPolicy1 nat-2-def Adr12-def Adr22-def policy-2-def
definition Adr13 :: int set
where Adr13 = {d . d > 6 ∧ d < 9}
definition Adr23 :: int set where
Adr23 = {d . d > 506 ∧ d < 509}
definition nat-3 where
nat-3 = nat-2 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr13 Adr23 )
definition policy-3 where
policy-3 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-3
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))
lemmas UnfoldPolicy3 = UnfoldPolicy2 nat-3-def Adr13-def Adr23-def policy-3-def
definition Adr14 :: int set
where Adr14 = {d . d > 8 ∧ d < 12}
definition Adr24 :: int set where
Adr24 = {d . d > 508 ∧ d < 512}
definition nat-4 where
nat-4 = nat-3 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr14 Adr24 )
definition policy-4 where
policy-4 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-4
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))
lemmas UnfoldPolicy4 = UnfoldPolicy3 nat-4-def Adr14-def Adr24-def policy-4-def
definition Adr15 :: int set
where Adr15 = {d . d > 10 ∧ d < 15}
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definition Adr25 :: int set where
Adr25 = {d . d > 510 ∧ d < 515}
definition nat-5 where
nat-5 = nat-4 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr15 Adr25 )
definition policy-5 where
policy-5 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-5
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))
lemmas UnfoldPolicy5 = UnfoldPolicy4 nat-5-def Adr15-def Adr25-def policy-5-def
definition Adr16 :: int set
where Adr16 = {d . d > 12 ∧ d < 18}
definition Adr26 :: int set where
Adr26 = {d . d > 512 ∧ d < 518}
definition nat-6 where
nat-6 = nat-5 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr16 Adr26 )
definition policy-6 where
policy-6 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-6
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))
lemmas UnfoldPolicy6 = UnfoldPolicy5 nat-6-def Adr16-def Adr26-def policy-6-def
definition Adr17 :: int set
where Adr17 = {d . d > 14 ∧ d < 21}
definition Adr27 :: int set where
Adr27 = {d . d > 514 ∧ d < 521}
definition nat-7 where
nat-7 = nat-6 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr17 Adr27 )
definition policy-7 where
policy-7 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-7
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))
lemmas UnfoldPolicy7 = UnfoldPolicy6 nat-7-def Adr17-def Adr27-def policy-7-def
definition Adr18 :: int set
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where Adr18 = {d . d > 16 ∧ d < 24}
definition Adr28 :: int set where
Adr28 = {d . d > 516 ∧ d < 524}
definition nat-8 where
nat-8 = nat-7 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr18 Adr28 )
definition policy-8 where
policy-8 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-8
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))
lemmas UnfoldPolicy8 = UnfoldPolicy7 nat-8-def Adr18-def Adr28-def policy-8-def
definition Adr19 :: int set
where Adr19 = {d . d > 18 ∧ d < 27}
definition Adr29 :: int set where
Adr29 = {d . d > 518 ∧ d < 527}
definition nat-9 where
nat-9 = nat-8 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr19 Adr29 )
definition policy-9 where
policy-9 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-9
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))
lemmas UnfoldPolicy9 = UnfoldPolicy8 nat-9-def Adr19-def Adr29-def policy-9-def
definition Adr110 :: int set
where Adr110 = {d . d > 20 ∧ d < 30}
definition Adr210 :: int set where
Adr210 = {d . d > 520 ∧ d < 530}
definition nat-10 where
nat-10 = nat-9 ++ (srcPat2pool-IntPort Adr110 Adr210 )
definition policy-10 where
policy-10 = ((λ (x ,y). x ) o-f
((nat-10
⊗
2 filter) o (λ x . (x ,x ))))










In this theory we generate the test data for correct runs of the FTP protocol. As
usual, we start with definining the networks and the policy. We use a rather simple
policy which allows only FTP connections starting from the Intranet and going to the
Internet, and deny everything else.
definition
intranet :: adr ip net where
intranet = {{(a,e) . a = 3}}
definition
internet :: adr ip net where
internet = {{(a,c). a > 4}}
definition
gatekeeper :: adr ip net where
gatekeeper = {{(a,c). a =4}}
definition
voip-policy :: (adr ip,address voip-msg) FWPolicy where
voip-policy = AU
The next two constants check if an address is in the Intranet or in the Internet re-
spectively.
definition
is-in-intranet :: address ⇒ bool where
is-in-intranet a = (a = 3 )
definition
is-gatekeeper :: address ⇒ bool where
is-gatekeeper a = (a = 4 )
definition
is-in-internet :: address ⇒ bool where
is-in-internet a = (a > 4 )
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The next definition is our starting state: an empty trace and the just defined policy.
definition
σ-0-voip :: (adr ip, address voip-msg) history ×
(adr ip, address voip-msg) FWPolicy
where
σ-0-voip = ([],voip-policy)
Next we state the conditions we have on our trace: a normal behaviour FTP run from
the intranet to some server in the internet on port 21.
definition accept-voip :: (adr ip, address voip-msg) history ⇒ bool where




packet-with-id [] i = []
|packet-with-id (x#xs) i =
(if id x = i then (x#(packet-with-id xs i)) else (packet-with-id xs i))
The depth of the test case generation corresponds to the maximal length of generated
traces, 4 is the minimum to get a full FTP protocol run.
fun ids1 where
ids1 i (x#xs) = (id x = i ∧ ids1 i xs)
|ids1 i [] = True
lemmas ST-simps = Let-def valid-SE-def unit-SE-def bind-SE-def
subnet-of-int-def p-accept-def content-def
is-in-intranet-def is-in-internet-def intranet-def internet-def exI
subnetOf-lemma subnetOf-lemma2 subnetOf-lemma3 subnetOf-lemma4 voip-policy-def
NetworkCore.id-def is-arq-def is-fin-def
is-connect-def is-setup-def ports-open-def subnet-of-adr-def
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